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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) can provide information-theoretically secure communications and is
a strong candidate for the next generation of cryptography. However, in practice, the performance of
QKD is limited by “practical imperfections” in realistic sources, channels, and detectors (such as multi-
photon components or imperfect encoding from the sources, losses and misalignment in the channels,
or dark counts in detectors). Addressing such practical imperfections is a crucial part of implementing
QKD protocols with good performance in reality. There are two highly important future directions for
QKD: (1) QKD over free space, which can allow secure communications between mobile platforms such
as handheld systems, drones, planes, and even satellites, and (2) fibre-based QKD networks, which can
simultaneously provide QKD service to numerous users at arbitrary locations. These directions are both
highly promising, but so far they are limited by practical imperfections in the channels and devices,
which pose huge challenges and limit their performance. In this thesis, we develop adaptive techniques
with innovative protocol and algorithm design, as well as novel techniques such as machine learning,
to address some of these key challenges, including (a) atmospheric turbulence in channels for free-space
QKD, (b) asymmetric losses in channels for QKD network, and (c) efficient parameter optimization in
real time, which is important for both free-space QKD and QKD networks. We believe that this work
will pave the way to important implementations of free-space QKD and fibre-based QKD networks in
the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Information privacy is a crucial part of our daily lives. From financial transactions, personal identi-
fication, to banking and even national defense, cryptography is an indispensable part of our modern
society. Quantum computing threatens the security of conventional public-key cryptography, which is
widely used for key agreement and digital signature, and plays a key role in internet security. Many
public-key cryptographic algorithms, such as the popular RSA, depend on an assumed intractability of
difficult mathematics problems, such as large number factorization. However, an algorithm proposed for
a universal quantum computer, the Shor’s algorithm [1], can efficiently solve the large number factoriza-
tion problem, thus breaking down the security of RSA, which would bring huge risks to modern security
applications in fields such as finance and national defense.
Quantum computer uses quantum bits (“qubits”), which are two-level systems possessing quantum
mechanical properties (such as superposition and entanglement), to encode and process information.
With the inherent parallelism from the superposed quantum states of qubits, it is believed that quantum
computers can provide computing power that exponentially exceeds that of the classical computers we
use today. Many applications have been proposed (and being developed) for quantum computers, such
as acceleration of optimization and searching problems, as well as simulation of quantum systems, but
perhaps the most influential application of quantum computers so far is their aforementioned ability to
break cryptographic systems.
The trouble is - this seemingly impending doom of cryptography brought by quantum computers
might not be that far away. Though a scalable, universal quantum computer has yet to be built (and
there have been only rudimentary demonstrations of Shor’s algorithm), many companies such as Google,
IBM, Intel have already started building quantum computers based on superconducting qubits, and
there are also implementations or proposals with linear optics, ion traps, or nuclear magnetic resonance.
Importantly, though we are still rather far from a large-scale error-corrected universal quantum computer,
there have already been demonstrations where the current-technology quantum computers solve problems
that are intractable on classical computers (an advantage commonly called “quantum supremacy”), such
as in Ref. [2] for quantum circuits and Ref. [3] for boson sampling.
Moreover, even if it might be years before a universal quantum computer capable of running Shor’s
algorithm at a practical scale is built, we also need to consider a retroactive threat to security. That is,
1
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an eavesdropper Eve can simply intercept and save for decades the transcript of any classical communi-
cation whose secure keys are generated from e.g. RSA, and wait for the invention of new algorithms or
construction of new computers such as quantum computers to crack the key. This means that impor-
tant information from the present day might be leaked in the future once quantum computers become
practical. This further calls for a cryptographic scheme that can resist attacks from quantum computers
as soon as possible.
To address such an increasing threat from quantum computing, one strong candidate for the next
generation of cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD uses qubits encoded in photons
to transfer information, and allows two parties (traditionally called Alice and Bob) to share a pair of
random bit strings (called “key”) with information-theoretic, i.e. provable, security. QKD can protect
users from the attacks of even quantum computers. Because of this, QKD is considered as one of the
strong candidates for the next-generation technology for secure communications. 1
The security of QKD fundamentally comes from the “no-cloning theorem” [6], that is, a qubit cannot
be perfectly duplicated with perfect fidelity. In other words, information that is encoded in qubits
and sent through a public quantum channel cannot be retrieved by an eavesdropper without inevitably
disturbing the quantum state. Once a qubit is measured, the measurement will disturb the state. Such
disturbance can subsequently be detected by Alice and Bob, quantifiable by a “quantum-bit-error-rate”
(QBER). If Alice and Bob detect such error, they will either reduce their key length and thus remove
information leaked to an eavesdropper, or abort the communication if too much disturbance is present.
This ensures an information-theoretically quantifiable level of security, independent of Eve’s computing
capabilities (even in the scenario that she possesses a quantum computer).
Once a pair of secure keys are distributed between Alice and Bob via QKD, Alice can use the “One-
Time-Pad” protocol (which encrypts a message by performing an XOR operation between the secure
random key and the actual message she wants to send) to send the encrypted message to Bob, who then
decrypts the message by performing XOR again using his secure key. The One-Time-Pad [7] protocol is
proven to be secure as long as the keys are secure and not reused. Therefore, QKD can enable secure
communications between Alice and Bob, protected from even the attacks a quantum computer.
The problem is, while QKD is theoretically secure, side channels still exist in a system built with
practical components, such as in sources and detectors. There have been multiple quantum hacking
attacks, e.g. Refs. [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] that target the practical weaknesses in QKD systems. Therefore,
an important question in quantum cryptography is to determine how secure a system really is in practice.
Ideally, QKD requires single-photon sources, which are difficult to implement in reality. To be able
to use “imperfect” realistic photon sources (which contain both single photons and multi-photon con-
tributions), the decoy-state method [14, 15, 16] is proposed, which uses multiple intensities to estimate
the single-photon contributions, and allows the secure use of the relatively easily attainable weak coher-
ent pulse (WCP) sources in QKD systems, drastically improving the practical usefulness of QKD and
increasing its key rate.
Aside from multi-photon contributions from WCP sources, sources might also have other imper-
1There are also other candidates such as “post-quantum cryptography”, for instance lattice-based cryptography (such
as “learning with error” [4] and “ring learning with error” [5]), which can resist the Shor’s algorithm. The advantage of
such schemes is that they are software-based and can be implemented on classical computers. However, in a way they are
only temporary solutions since they only resist the attacks from known quantum algorithms, and their security might be
compromised if new quantum algorithms targeting specific post-quantum cryptographic schemes arise in the future. On
the other hand, the security of QKD is independent of whichever types of equipment or algorithms the eavesdropper might
have. In this thesis, we will focus our discussion on QKD only.
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fections such as fluctuating intensities, which requires characterization of the intensity fluctuation and
corresponding reduction to the secure key rate. Also, sources might have imperfect encoding, which is
addressed by loss-tolerant QKD protocols.
Among the components of a QKD system, detectors are especially susceptible to attacks (and a
majority of hacking attempts target the detectors), making them the Achilles’ Heel of QKD systems.
The measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [17] protocol allows an untrusted third-party to make
measurements, thus avoiding all security breaches from detector side channels. Since its proposal, MDI-
QKD has attracted worldwide interest, and there have been hundreds of follow-up theory and experi-
mental papers. For example, some notable experimental implementations have been reported in Refs.
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
A recently proposed protocol, Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol [25], maintains a similar measurement-
device-independence as MDI-QKD, but can significantly extend the maximum distance and overcome
the maximum key rate versus distance trade-off for repeaterless QKD (such as the TGW and PLOB
bounds [26, 27], which state that the maximum key rate of QKD scales linearly with the transmittance
of the channel, without the help quantum repeater). This groundbreaking advantage of TF-QKD has
generated much interest in the community, both theoretically [28, 29, 30, 31, 32] and experimentally
[33, 34, 35, 36].
More details on QKD protocols and common techniques to address practical imperfections in QKD
systems are included in Chapter 2.
Two promising future directions of QKD are to implement it over free-space, and implement it as a
multi-user fibre-based quantum network. However, though highly attractive if successfully implemented,
there are several key challenges involved in free-space QKD and fibre-based quantum networks.
This thesis aims at addressing some of these practical challenges, and paving the way for more robust
implementations of free-space QKD and QKD fibre networks.
1.2 Motivation
The introductions to the motivations of each project here are based on the background sections of our
papers Refs. [63, 65, 67].
1.2.1 Free-Space QKD
There has been increasing interest in implementing QKD through free-space channels. A major attraction
for free-space QKD is that, when performed efficiently, it could potentially be applied to airborne or
maritime quantum communications where participating parties are on mobile platforms. Furthermore,
it could even enable applications for ground to satellite quantum communications, and eventually, a
global quantum communication network.
Free-space quantum communication has seen great advances over the past 25 years. The first demon-
stration of free-space QKD was published by Bennett et al. from IBM research in 1992 [37] over 32cm
of free-space channel, which was also the first successful demonstration of experimental QKD. Over the
next two decades, numerous demonstrations for free-space QKD have been made. In 1998, Buttler and
Hughes et al. [38] performed QKD over 1km of free-space channel outdoors at night-time. In 2005,
Peng et al. [39] performed distribution of entangled photons over 13km. In 2007, two successful ex-
perimental ground-to-ground free-space QKD experiments based on BB84 and E91 protocol [40, 41]
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were implemented over a 144km link between the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife. Ling et al.
[42] performed another entanglement-based QKD Experiment with modified E91 protocol over 1.4km
in urban area in 2008. In 2012, Yin et al. and Ma et al. [43, 44] respectively performed quantum
teleportation over 100km and 143 km.
In recent years, free-space QKD has also seen much development over rapidly moving platforms,
with an air-to-ground experiment in 2013 by Nauerth et al. [45] over a plane 20km from ground, a
demonstration of QKD with devices on moving turntable and floating hot balloon over 20km and 40km
by J-Y Wang et al. [46] in 2013, a very recent report on drone-to-drone QKD experiment in 2017 by D.
Hill et al. [47], and notably, satellite-based quantum communication experiments in 2017 [48, 49, 50],
including a QKD experiment from a quantum satellite to the ground over a 1200km channel. Meanwhile,
there is a lot of interest in doing QKD in a maritime environment either over sea water[51] or through
seawater [52]. A study on quantum communication performance over a turbulent free-space maritime
channel using real atmospheric data can be found in Ref.[51].
A major characteristic of a free-space channel is its time-dependent transmittance. This is due
to the temporal fluctuations of the local refractive index in the free-space channel, i.e. atmospheric
turbulence, which causes scintillation and beam wandering [53], and results in fluctuations in the channel
transmittance, which in turn affect QKD performance.
Therefore, addressing turbulence is a major challenge for QKD over free-space. In Chapters 3 and
4, we will discuss a real-time selection technique, that can drastically improve the maximum tolerated
transmission distance (channel loss), and greatly improve the performance of free-space QKD when
turbulence is present in the channels.
1.2.2 Fibre-based Quantum Network
As we now live in an era of the Internet of Things (IoT) that interconnects many users and devices,
for QKD to be widely deployed in the future, an important step is to study it in a network setting, i.e.
designing quantum networks that can connect and provide service to numerous users, who may freely
join or leave a network.
Up till now, multiple field implementations of point-to-point QKD networks have been reported in
e.g., Refs.[54, 55, 56]. However, they all relied on trusted relays (where the information stops being
quantum at the relays), which are undesirable for security. MDI-QKD protocol (which will be explained
in more detail in chapter 2) solves this problem by allowing untrusted relays in a quantum network,
which is a huge advantage over previous point-to-point QKD networks, making MDI-QKD a powerful
candidate for future quantum networks. For instance, a first three-user star-shaped MDI-QKD network
experiment in a metropolitan setting has been reported in Ref. [57].
However, a major limitation of MDI-QKD is that it requires all users to have near-identical (i.e.
symmetric) channel losses to the untrusted relay for the protocol to work well [58, 59], and the key rate
will degrade very quickly with an increased level of asymmetry between channel losses. As standard
fibre has a constant loss per distance of 0.2dB/km, the above limitation means that the users Alice and
Bob are limited to similar fibre lengths, or geographical distances between their sites and the relay in a
realistic fibre-based network. Because of this limitation, previous experiments of MDI-QKD either were
performed in the laboratory over symmetric fibre spools [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], or had to deliberately
add a tailored length of fibre to the shorter channel (to introduce additional loss) in exchange for better
symmetry [24]. Adding additional fibres not only is cumbersome as it requires halting the system (and
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
not practical when there are many pairs of connections in a quantum network, or when channel loss is
changing) but also results in suboptimal key rate when channels are asymmetric.
In a realistic setup, a quantum network will very likely have asymmetric channels due to different
geographical locations of sites (or, if one intends to implement MDI-QKD over free-space, due to moving
platforms and changing channels). The requirement on symmetric channels significantly limits the
key rate of previous MDI-QKD protocols in a general quantum network, thus seriously hindering the
widespread deployment of MDI-QKD.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrated a technique of compensating for channel loss with different laser in-
tensities from users. We show that we can lift this limitation on channel symmetry, and allow completely
arbitrary levels of asymmetry between any two channels. This makes it possible to enable a scalable
high-rate MDI-QKD network.
Furthermore, as TF-QKD allows a similar measurement-device-independence and can be a candidate
for a quantum network with untrusted relays too, in Chapter 6 we extend our results and show that it
works well for TF-QKD with asymmetric channels in quantum networks too.
1.2.3 Machine Learning in QKD
Machine learning is a type of algorithm that extracts the implicit relationships between input and output
data, and use this learnt mapping to analyze new data. Machine learning techniques, especially neural
networks, have been widely used in computer vision, language recognition, and automated control. There
is increasing interest in the field in applying machine learning to improve the performance of quantum
communication. For instance, there is recent literature that applies machine learning to continuous-
variable (CV) QKD to improve the noise-filtering [60] and the prediction/compensation of intensity
evolution of light over time [61], respectively.
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, we will discuss the application of machine learning to a specific problem:
parameter optimization for QKD.
In reality, a QKD experiment always has a limited transmission time. Therefore, the total number
of signals is finite. This means that, when estimating the single-photon contributions with decoy-
state analysis, one would need to take into consideration the statistical fluctuations of the observables:
the Gain and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). This is called the finite-key analysis of QKD. When
considering finite-size effects, the choice of intensities and probabilities of sending these intensities is
crucial to getting the optimal rate. Therefore, we would need to perform optimizations for the search of
parameters.
Traditionally, the optimization of parameters is implemented as either a brute-force global search
for smaller numbers of parameters, or local search algorithms for larger numbers of parameters. For
instance, in several papers studying MDI-QKD protocols in symmetric [62] and asymmetric channels
[65], a local search method called coordinate descent algorithm is used to find the optimal set of intensity
and probabilities.
However, optimization of parameters often requires significant computational power. This means that
a QKD system has to either wait for an optimization off-line (and suffer from delay) or use sub-optimal
or even unoptimized parameters in real time. Moreover, due to the amount of computing resources
required, parameter optimization is usually limited to relatively powerful devices such as a desktop PC.
There is increasing interest in implementing QKD in free-space on mobile platforms, such as drones,
handheld systems, and even satellites. Such devices (e.g. single-board computers and mobile System-
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Table 1.1: An outline of how the chapters 3-7 (corresponding to results from 5 of our papers) are
organized in this thesis, including the protocols (BB84, MDI-QKD, TF-QKD), the topics (turbulence,
channel asymmetry, machine learning) and the applications (free-space QKD, and fibre-based QKD
network). Due to limited spacing, we have used abbreviations for some terms. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss
turbulence in free-space QKD for BB84 and MDI-QKD. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss channel asymmetry for
MDI-QKD and TF-QKD in a network setting. Chapter 7 discusses using machine learning (in parameter
optimization) for all three protocols, which can be useful for both free-space QKD and fibre-based QKD
networks.
Protocol Turbulence Asymmetry Machine Learning
BB84 Chapter 3 [63] - Chapter 7 [67]
MDI-QKD Chapter 4 [64] Chapter 5 [65] Chapter 7 [67]
TF-QKD - Chapter 6 [66] Chapter 7 [67]
on-Chips) are usually limited in computational power. As low-latency is important in such free-space
applications, fast and accurate parameter optimization based on a changing environment in real time is
a difficult task on such low-power platforms.
Moreover, with the advent of the internet of things (IoT), a highly attractive future direction of QKD
is a quantum network that connects multiple devices, each of which could be portable and mobile, and
numerous connections are present at the same time. This will present a great computational challenge
for the controller of a quantum network with many pairs of users (where real-time optimization might
simply be infeasible for even a moderate number of connections).
With the development of machine learning technologies based on neural networks in recent years, and
with more and more low-power devices implementing on-board acceleration chips for neural networks,
we present a new method of using neural networks to help predict optimal parameters efficiently on
low-power devices. Such a method makes it possible to support real-time parameter optimization for
free-space QKD systems, or large-scale QKD networks with thousands of connections.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
• In Chapter 2, we review the QKD protocols including BB84, MDI-QKD and TF-QKD, and common
techniques such as decoy-state method, finite-size analysis, and parameter optimization to address
practical imperfections.
Our new results are included in Chapters 3-7.
Chapters 3 and 4 correspond to our results for free-space QKD.
• In Chapter 3, we discuss a real-time selection technique that greatly improves the performance
of free-space BB84 when turbulence is present in the channels. This chapter corresponds to our
paper Ref. [63]
• In Chapter 4, we extend the real-time selection technique to MDI-QKD and show similar effective-
ness when turbulence is present. This chapter corresponds to our paper Ref. [64]
Chapters 5 and 6 correspond to our results mainly for fibre-based QKD networks.
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• In Chapter 5, we demonstrated a technique of compensating for asymmetric channel loss with
different laser intensities from users, allowing MDI-QKD to be performed over asymmetric channels,
and therefore enabling a scalable MDI-QKD network. This chapter corresponds to our paper Ref.
[65]
• In Chapter 6, we extend the asymmetric-intensity method to TF-QKD, and demonstrate that
TF-QKD can be performed efficiently over asymmetric channels too. This chapter corresponds to
our paper Ref. [66]
Chapter 7 corresponds to our results for machine learning in QKD.
• In Chapter 7, we apply machine learning to a specific problem: parameter optimization for QKD,
and show that it can greatly improve the efficiency of parameter optimization and allow it to be
performed in real-time on low power devices, making it a highly useful tool for both free-space
QKD and QKD networks. This chapter corresponds to our paper Ref. [67].
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 8.
• In Chapter 8, we conclude the thesis, and also discuss some unsolved problems and future research
directions, in terms of short-term projects and long-term goals.
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Quantum Key Distribution.” Physical Review A 100, 062334 (2019). [67]
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Chapter 2
Background on QKD Protocols
In this chapter, we will review some of the key concepts in QKD protocols and practical techniques
in previous literature, which lay the foundations of the new proposals in this thesis. The content of
this chapter is a recapitulation of several previous important papers on the subject, especially Refs.
[69, 70, 71, 14, 72, 17, 58, 62]. We also refer to Ref. [73, 74, 75, 76, 77] for an overview of topics such as
QKD, hacking attacks, and MDI-QKD. One can refer to Ref. [73] for a comprehensive review of QKD
with realistic devices.
2.1 List of Abbreviations
In this section, we list some of the frequently used abbreviations in this thesis:
Theoretical concepts and protocols:
• QKD: Quantum Key Distribution
• RSA: RivestShamirAdleman (cryptosystem)
• BB84: Bennett-Brassard-84 (protocol)
• MDI-QKD: Measurement-Device-Independent QKD
• TF-QKD: Twin-Field QKD
• CV-QKD: Continuous-Variable QKD
• GLLP: Gottesman-Lo-Lutkenhaus-Preskill (proof)
• PLOB: Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (bound)
• HOM: Hong-Ou-Mandel (interference)
• QBER: Quantum Bit Error Rate
• XOR: Exclusive-OR (gate)
• ECC: Error Correction Code
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• BSM: Bell State Measurement
• PDTC: Probability Distribution of Transmission Coefficient
• ARTS: Adaptive Real Time Selection
• P-RTS: Prefixed-threshold Real Time Selection
• LS: Local Search
• CD: Coordinate Descent
• NN: Neural Network
• ReLU: Rectified Linear Unit
• IoT: Internet of Things
Experimental devices and hardware components:
• WCP: Weak Coherent Pulse (source)
• SPDC: Spontaneous Parametric Down-Conversion (source)
• SPAD: Single-Photon Avalanche Detector
• SNSPD: Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detector
• BS: Beam Splitter
• PM: Phase Modulator
• Pol-M: Polarization Modulator
• IM: Intensity Modulator
• CPU: Central Processing Unit
• GPU: Graphical Processing Unit
2.2 BB84
The contents of this section are based on Refs. [69, 70].
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard published the paper “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution
and coin tossing” [69], which later became known as the BB84 protocol, and marked the first QKD
protocol proposed.
The key steps of BB84 are:
• Each of Alice and Bob, the two users who would like to share a secret key, respectively prepares and
measures in two non-orthogonal bases, which we can denote as the diagonal (X) and rectilinear (Z)
bases. In the Z (rectilinear) basis, Alice (Bob) prepares (measures) states in |H〉 , |V 〉 corresponding
to 0 and 1 bit, while in the X (diagonal) basis, Alice (Bob) prepares (measures) states in |+〉 =
1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉), also corresponding to 0 and 1 bit. An illustration of this can
be found in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of the states sent in the BB84 protocol. Alice sends states |H〉 , |V 〉 in Z basis,
and |+〉 , |−〉 in X basis. The states correspond to bit values 0 or 1 in each basis. Bob measures the bits
randomly in X or Z basis, and later announce the basis choice where he and Alice chose the same basis
(sifting). They then randomly choose and publicly announce a portion of the data to sample error rate,
which they subsequently use to reduce the key length in order to reduce an eavesdropper’s information
to near zero (privacy amplification). Figure reproduced with modifications based on Table 1 from Ref.
[69].
• After the transmission of signals is complete, Alice and Bob then announce the bases they chose,
and keep only events where they chose the same basis (which is a process called sifting). After the
sifting, Alice and Bob acquire a pair of raw keys (random bits).
• Alice and Bob perform random sampling on part of the data, and test the quantum-bit-error-rate
(QBER). Alice and Bob abort if the QBER exceeds a certain threshold.
• They then perform error correction on the data (raw key) to ensure that they have the same
random string with a high probability. In this process, some additional information is leaked to
an eavesdropper.
• Lastly, they perform privacy amplification on the error-corrected keys (which usually takes the
form of a universal hashing function), that discards part of the keys, to reduce the information an
eavesdropper can hold to close to zero. The amount of information an eavesdropper has (and sub-
sequently the amount of hashing necessary) is estimated by the aforementioned random sampling
of part of the data and the estimated quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER) among the data.
After the above process, Alice and Bob acquire a pair of random bits (keys) that contains no infor-
mation that can possibly be obtained by an eavesdropper (i.e. information-theoretically secure). They
can then use this pair of random key for e.g. a one-time-pad [7], where the sender uses the key to
perform a logical XOR operation on any message to encode it, and the receiver uses the same key to
perform another XOR operation, decoding the original message. This process is proven to be secure if
the random key itself is secure.
There have been subsequent security proofs that rigorously showed the unconditional security of the
BB84 protocol against eavesdropping, importantly Refs. [78, 70]. The key idea of these proofs is to link a
prepare-and-measure scheme (as described above) with an entanglement distribution scheme. Instead of
sending out the four states |H〉 , |V 〉 , |+〉 , |−〉, let us imagine that Alice possesses an entanglement source
that generates entangled EPR pairs [79] of qubits. One of the qubits is kept locally (say, with quantum
memory) at Alice’s lab, and another qubit is sent to Bob. After Bob receives the other half of the
EPR pair, Alice and Bob then “distill” pure entanglement pairs by performing quantum error correction
by measuring the “bit error rate” (X basis QBER) and the “phase error rate” (Z basis QBER) and
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Figure 2.2: An illustration of the idea behind the security proof of BB84. (a) Alice has an entanglement
source that distributes entanglement pairs between Alice and Bob. The pairs are then measured in Z
axis or X axis (the latter not shown in the figure). A random sample from each basis can help them
quantify the bit error and the phase error rate used for error-correction and privacy amplification. (b)
Alice first measures in Z basis (or X basis - not shown in the figure), and then send the qubit - now
deterministically in Z basis after the measurement - to Bob who measures it in Z (X) basis. The two
cases are in fact equivalent because the measurements are commutable with Eve’s potential disturbance
of the entanglement pairs as well as Alice and Bob’s error correction. Therefore, with a prepare-and-
measure scheme like BB84 combined with classical error-correction and hashing, we can achieve the
same security as the corresponding entanglement distillation protocol with quantum error correction
and privacy amplification. Figure reproduced with modifications based on Fig .1 from Ref. [71].
performing correction operations. Once pure entanglement pairs are obtained, they can then measure
either both in X basis or Z basis (or in different bases, in which case the event is discarded during
sifting) to obtain the key. Since pure entanglement pairs do not carry basis nor bit information before
measurement, such a scheme gives them unconditionally secure key pairs.
The Lo-Chau proof [78], which is built on [80], proposed the above idea of entanglement distillation,
and showed the unconditional security of QKD when Alice and Bob possess quantum computers and are
able to perform quantum error correction. Furthermore, the Shor-Preskill proof relaxed the requirement
by allowing Alice and Bob to perform classical error-correction and hashing (privacy amplification), to
gain the same unconditional security. A key observation is that the above entanglement distribution
scheme is equivalent to the case where Alice first measures in either Z or X basis, and sends the (now no
longer in entanglement) qubit to Bob, who does another measurement on the qubit in the same basis, i.e.
the entanglement distribution scheme is equivalent to the prepare-and-measure scheme. This is because
the local measurement at Alice is commutable with the error corrections or Eve’s potential perturbations
on the qubit sent to Bob. The quantum error correction is replaced with classical error correction and
privacy amplification, based on the Z basis and X basis QBER, which are still respectively called the bit
error rate and the phase error rate (because they correspond to the quantum error correction operations,
in the imaginary entanglement distribution scenario).
In the Shor-Preskill Proof [70], it is shown that the secure key rate can be bounded by:
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R = 1− h2(eX)− h2(eZ) (2.1)
where h2(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary entropy function, and eX , eZ are respectively
the bit error rate and the phase error rate.
An illustration of the above security proof is shown in Fig. 2.2.
2.3 Decoy-State Method
The contents of this section are based on Refs. [71, 14, 72].
The Shor-Preskill rate proves unconditional security for BB84 and proposes a lower bound for secret
key rate. However, the protocol assumes a perfect single-photon source. In practice, there are two
types of commonly used sources for QKD: (1) entanglement source based on spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) (which can either be used for entanglement-based QKD protocols such as
Ekert 91 [81], or for BB84 and its variants by allowing the sender to measure one of the two entangled
photons generated, creating a heralded single photon source). However, entanglement sources have a low
generation rate of single photons, and another type of source (2) weak coherent pulse (WCP) source is
commonly used due to its ease of implementation and high repetition rate. A WCP source is simply a
heavily attenuated laser, which outputs a coherent state
|α〉 =
∑
n
e−|α|
2/2 α
n
√
n!
|n〉 (2.2)
which is a superposition of photon number states (Fock states) |n〉. To use a WCP source, Alice
needs to make the coherent state phase randomized, in order to minimize the phase correlation between
adjacent pulses [72]. In some cases, Alice actively randomizes the phase of her signals (e.g. with a
phase modulator) [82]. In some other experiments, phase randomization is achieved by switching a laser
above and below its lasing threshold (i.e. gain-switched laser) during each signal generation, such as
demonstrated in [83]. When we perform a phase randomization on the state |α〉 (i.e. integrate over θ in
|αe−iθ〉) we can obtain
|α〉 〈α| =
∑
n
e−|α|
2 |α|2n
n!
|n〉 〈n| =
∑
n
e−µ
µn
n!
|n〉 〈n| (2.3)
where the intensity µ = |α|2. This means that a phase-randomized WCP source can be viewed of as a
classical mixture of pulses containing n photons, with a classical Poissonian probabilistic distribution
described by µ and n. The security of discrete phase randomization (where the phase randomly takes
several discrete values instead of sampling continuously between [0, 2pi)) for WCP sources has also been
proven [84].
While a WCP source with a reasonably low intensity µ has a fair amount of probability to send
single photons, it also has some probabilities of sending a vacuum state or multiple photons, the latter
of which would pose a security risk to QKD, due to an eavesdropper being able to perform a photon-
number splitting attack [85]. In such an attack, since all photons in a multi-photon pulse undergo the
same e.g. polarization or phase modulation processes, the eavesdropper can simply split of one of these
multiphotons, and send the remaining photon (or photons) to Bob. In this way, Eve has a perfect copy
of the signal sent to Bob, resulting in a security breach. Note that this doesn’t violate the no-cloning
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theorem, as multiple copies of the same information are prepared in the first place, while the theorem
only states that unknown quantum information on a single qubit (i.e. single-photon) cannot be perfectly
cloned. Therefore, we can see that the multiphoton proportion in a WCP source poses a security risk.
The paper by Gottesman-Lo-Lutkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [71] proves that, even for imperfect sources
with multiphoton components, it is possible to modify the upper bound for secure key rate by considering
only the single photon components, in the form of (from Eq. (50) in [71]):
R = max
{
(1−∆)
[
1− h2
(
δ
1−∆
)]
− h2(δ), 0
}
(2.4)
where ∆ = pMpD is the proportion of multiphoton contribution among detected photons, and δ is the
observed bit error rate.
To accurately estimate the proportion of single photons and the phase-error rate among single pho-
tons, in Refs. [15, 14, 16], a “decoy-state” method is proposed. The key idea is that, instead of constantly
using one intensity µ for the WCP source, Alice can randomly switch between multiple intensity settings
{µ, ν, ω, . . . }. The different intensities allow different Poissonian photon number distributions. Combin-
ing the data from multiple intensity settings (decoy states), we can obtain linear constraints from the
observables, gain Q and error-gain QE (the probability of getting a count or an error, respectively, for
each signal sent), for each intensity setting. From the gains we can obtain:
Qµ =
∑
n
e−µ
µn
n!
Yn =
∑
n
Pµn Yn
Qν =
∑
n
e−ν
νn
n!
Yn =
∑
n
P νnYn
Qω =
∑
n
e−ω
ω2
n!
Yn =
∑
n
Pωn Yn
. . .
(2.5)
and from the error-gains:
QµEµ =
∑
n
e−µ
µn
n!
enYn =
∑
n
Pµn enYn
QνEν =
∑
n
e−ν
νn
n!
enYn =
∑
n
P νn enYn
QωEω =
∑
n
e−ω
ω2
n!
enYn =
∑
n
Pωn enYn
. . .
(2.6)
Note that, importantly, a key assumption is made here, that
Yn(µ) = Yn(ν) = Yn(ω) = ...
en(µ) = en(ν) = en(ω) = ...
(2.7)
which physically means that the eavesdropper does not know which intensity setting a given pulse comes
from (as she only has the information of the photon number n in the pulse, not the intensity {µ, ν, ω, . . . }).
1This is because the process of generating a pulse with photon number n from a probability distribution
1Note that, by “intensity”, we actually mean the intensity setting of a laser source - which determines the probability
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P (n) is a Markov process, which means that the process is memoryless, and the pulse itself with n
photons has no information of the probability distribution P (n) that generated it. This is the keystone
to the security of decoy-state method.
The above equations constitute two sets of linear programs, with Yn and enYn as variables. If Alice
is allowed to use an infinite amount of intensity settings (commonly denoted as the “asymptotic” case),
she will be able to perfectly estimate all Yn and enYn. Using the GLLP key rate formula along with
Y1, e1 estimated from the linear program, we can obtain the key rate for decoy-state BB84 with WCP
source, as in Ref. [72] Eq. 42:
R = q(Pµ1 Y1(1− h2(e1))− feQµh2(Eµ)) (2.8)
where we assume that µ is the signal state, Pµ1 = µe
−µ, q is the basis probability (1/2 for standard BB84
and ≈ 1 for efficient BB84), h2 is the binary entropy function, Y1, e1 are the single-photon contributions
estimated from the linear program, and fe is the error-correction efficiency (a constant larger than 1,
the smaller the better), which depends on the error-correction code used.
In reality, Alice can only use a finite number of decoy states. In such a case, the bounds obtained from
the linear programs will not be perfect, and Alice and Bob would only obtain lower and upper bounds
on the variables Yn and enYn. The single-photon contributions Y1 and e1 in the key rate expression need
to be replaced by Y L1 and e
U
1 .
In practice, a 3-decoy protocol with {µ, ν, ω, . . . } settings is commonly used - and in fact it is shown
in [72] that using these three decoy states already generate a key rate very close to the infinite-decoy
asymptotic key rate, and using more decoys will bring little further benefit. For a 3-decoy protocol, in
Ref. [72] Eqs. 34, 37, analytical forms for Y L1 and e
U
1 have been obtained:
Y L1 =
µ
µν − ν2 (Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0)
eU1 =
QνEνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L1 ν
(2.9)
where Y0 equals the dark count rate from detectors, and e0 =
1
2 is the error for vacuum state.
2.4 Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI) QKD
This section is based on Refs. [17, 58, 86].
2.4.1 Protocol
As described in Chapter 1, while QKD is theoretically proven to be secure, practical components in
QKD systems allow for the existence of side channels, and there have been many hacking attempts
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] that attack practical QKD systems.
distribution of the photon numbers in a pulse being sent. Of course, a phase-randomized WCP source sends a classical
mixture of photon number states, and we assume that Eve can make e.g. a quantum nondemolition measurement on the
photon number of a pulse, and obtain the EM field intensity of the pulse. However, she cannot obtain information on the
Poissonian probability distribution of photon numbers in e.g. Alice’s laser source to obtain values of {µ, ν, ω, . . . }, which
is the cornerstone for the security of decoy-state analysis. By convention, throughout the rest of the text, in the context
of WCP sources we will use the phrases “intensity setting” and “intensity” interchangeably.
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Figure 2.3: An illustration of the setup of MDI-QKD and how its security is proven. The protocol is
equivalent to an entanglement distribution protocol (in 1a-1c) where Alice and Bob each keep half an
entangled pair locally and send the other half to Charles, who performs a Bell State Measurement. By
entanglement swapping, Alice’s and Bob’s local qubits are now entangled, and they can measure locally
in X or Z basis (here in the illustration it’s the Z basis) to obtain bit (Z) and phase (X) error rate.
However, in practice, the Bell State Measurement and Alice and Bob’s local measurements can be time-
reversed, making the protocol a prepare-and-measure setup (2a-2b) where Alice and Bob can simply
send signals encoded in corresponding |H〉 , |V 〉 and |+〉 , |−〉 states instead of part of an entangled pair,
but the security of the protocol is unchanged. Figure reproduced with modifications based on Fig. 3.1
from Ref. [90], while the original setup is based on Fig .1 from Ref. [91].
An ultimate solution to this is to perform Device-Independent (DI) QKD [87], which is based on the
testing of Bell’s inequality and does not make any assumptions on the devices. However, a Bell test is
difficult to implement in reality. Hence, up so far DI-QKD remains mostly of theoretical interest only.
Also, DI-QKD is vulnerable to memory attacks [88] and covert channels [89].
On the other hand, a practical solution that is feasible with off-the-shelf components and high
repetition-rate sources is Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI) QKD [17]. The motivation of MDI-
QKD is that, among the many types of hacking attempts, a large number of attacks target the side
channels in detectors, which become the Achilles’ Heel of practical QKD systems. MDI-QKD is a
scheme that eliminates all detector side channels (a review on hacking attacks, particularly ones target-
ing detectors, e.g. time-shift attack, can be found in e.g. Refs. [77, 73]), hence protecting a QKD system
against a majority of the types of attacks, while still maintaining a satisfactory level of key rate and
requiring only practical off-the-shelf components. This makes MDI-QKD a good balance point between
the security in practice and ease of implementation.
The key idea of MDI-QKD is that, instead of Alice sending signals to Bob, they can both send signals
to a third party, Charles, who performs a Bell measurement that tests the parity (and not the bits) of
the incoming signals. More specifically, the procedures of the protocol can be described as follows:
• Alice and Bob each randomly switches between two bases X and Z to send signals (following Ref.
[17], let us suppose Alice and Bob encodes bits in polarization), sending |H〉 , |V 〉 in the Z basis
and |+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) in the X basis.
• Charles sets up a beam-splitter (BS), and two pairs of detectors cH , cV , dH , dV , each pair behind
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Table 2.1: Key generation for MDI-QKD. This is an expanded version based on Table I in Ref. [17].
According to the protocol, Alice and Bob need to flip one of their bits before generating the raw key,
unless they sent in X basis and |ψ+〉 is detected. This table describes whether Alice and Bob can generate
the correct key based on their sent signals and Charles’ announced event |ψ−〉 and |ψ+〉 (other detector
events are discarded). The “-” signs are impossible combinations for sent signals versus detector events
in the ideal case (although if there is misalignment in the system, or if dark count rate is non-negligible,
events might be detected in these cases, which would contribute to the QBER).
Basis Alice & Bob |ψ−〉 |ψ+〉
Z HV or VH key (flip) key (flip)
Z HH or VV - -
X +- or -+ key (flip) -
X ++ or – - key (no flip)
a polarizing beam-splitter (PBS) along the Z basis H,V , and measures the incoming signals from
Alice and Bob.
• Charles announces the Bell test results publicly. Only events where exactly one H and one V
detector clicks simultaneously (behind the same PBS or each from one PBS) are announced as
a successful event. The cases cHdV and cV dH correspond to the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1√2 (|HV 〉 −
|V H〉) = 1√
2
(|−+〉 − |+−〉), while the cases cHcV and dHdV correspond to the Bell state |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|HV 〉 + |V H〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉 − |−−〉). Data whose patterns of clicked detectors are not among
the above four cases, and data where fewer (or more) than two detectors click are discarded. Note
that, in the MDI-QKD scheme, only two states |ψ+〉 , |ψ−〉 out of the four Bell states can be
distinguished.
• Alice and Bob announce their bases choices and sift the results. Based on Charles’s announced
results, they can determine the parity of their bits and generate key. The details of how detection
results generate key can be seen in Table 2.1.
• As in BB84, they can then perform error-correction, and sample part of the results for the gain
and QBER data and perform privacy amplification to get the final key.
A more detailed illustration of the MDI-QKD experimental setup is shown in Chapter 5, Fig. 5.1.
Security-wise, MDI-QKD is equivalent to an entanglement-distribution scenario (illustrated in Fig.
2.3): Assume that Alice and Bob each possess an entanglement pair. They can each send half of their
entanglement pair to Charles, who performs a Bell measurement on the two incoming qubits. This
constitutes an entanglement swapping operation, where the two qubits sent to Charles are mapped onto
a Bell state, and the two remaining qubits held by Alice and Bob are now entangled. Since Alice and
Bob now share an entanglement pair, they can measure the pair in X or Z basis to obtain a pair of bits
with perfect security.
A key point used in Ref. [17] is that, since Charles measurement (on the qubits sent to Charles) and
Alice and Bob’s measurements (on the local qubits remaining in their labs) commute, the above scenario
is equivalent to the case where Alice and Bob first measure their local qubits in X or Z basis, and send
the other (now no longer in entanglement) qubit to Charles, i.e. a time-reversed scheme.
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Moreover, Alice and Bob do not even need to possess entanglement pairs to begin with. They can
simply prepare random qubits in X or Z basis (among the four states |H〉 , |V 〉 , |+〉 , |−〉) and send them
to Charles for a Bell state measurement. The qubits that are sent out are in the same states as the
scenario above (where they start out with entanglement pairs but measure their local qubits before
sending). This means that, MDI-QKD can be reduced to a prepare-and-measure scheme, which is much
easier to implement.
The idea of a time-reversed EPR scheme was first proposed in Ref. [91], and Ref. [92] provided
a security proof. However, such a scheme was not practical when first proposed, and had rather low
key rate; thus, it received little attention in the community. It was not until over a decade later
when Ref. [17] added the ingredient of decoy-state technique (which will be discussed in the next
subsection), and made use of the important known fact that a Bell-state measurement (BSM) can be
easier performed by standard linear optics components (such as beam-splitters and polarizing beam-
splitters) and threshold single-photon detectors, that the scheme was made highly practical. Ref. [17]
performed explicit calculation and showed that MDI-QKD can have very high key rate, and the MDI-
QKD protocol subsequently gained widespread attention in the QKD community.
2.4.2 Decoy-State MDI-QKD
Practically, similar to decoy-state BB84, MDI-QKD is also compatible with decoy-state analysis, which
enables the use of WCP sources instead of single photon sources. The difference here is that, since both
Alice and Bob send signals now, each of them needs to choose between different levels of intensities µi, µj ,
and the linear equations contain variables of Ymn, Ymnemn (instead of Yn, Ynen), because one needs to
consider the cases where m,n photons are respectively sent from Alice and Bob to Charles through the
two channels.
Qµiµj =
∑
m,n
(e−µi
µi
m
m!
)(e−µj
µj
m
n!
)Ymn =
∑
m,n
Pµim P
µj
n Ymn
. . .
(2.10)
and from the error-gains:
QµiµjEµiµj =
∑
m,n
(e−µi
µi
m
m!
)(e−µj
µj
m
n!
)emnYmn =
∑
m,n
Pµim P
µj
n emnYmn
. . .
(2.11)
Again, a key assumption is made here, that all Ym,n(µi, µj) (and all em,n(µi, µj)) are values inde-
pendent of the choice of µi, µj
Similar to BB84, one can apply again the GLLP key rate formula and incorporate the single-photon
contributions,
R = P 2Z((P
µ
1 )
2Y Z11(1− h2(eX11))− feQZµµh2(EZµµ)) (2.12)
where we assume Alice and Bob both use intensity µ as the signal state and Z as the encoding basis.
Pµ1 = µe
−µ is the probability of sending single photons, Y Z11, e
X
11 are the single-photon (both Alice and
Bob sent single-photon) yield and QBER, fe is again the error-correction probability, and PZ is the basis
choice probability (1/2 for equal probability of choosing X,Z bases, and ≈ 1 for “efficient” case where
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Z basis is chosen with close to 1 probability).
Again, in practice, Alice and Bob can only choose a finite number of decoy states. This results in
an imperfect (but close to asymptotic) bound on the single-photon contributions, Y Z,L11 , e
X,U
11 . A good
choice is again where Alice and Bob each choose 3-decoys, {µ, ν, ω}. The analytical forms for Y Z,L11 , eX,U11
have been obtained in Refs. [58, 86]:
Y Z,L11 =
1
µ− ν (
µ
ν2
QZ,M1νν −
ν
µ2
QZ,M2νν )
Y X,L11 =
1
µ− ν (
µ
ν2
QX,M1νν −
ν
µ2
QX,M2νν )
eX,U11 =
1
ν2Y X,L11
(e2νQXννE
X
νν − eνQXνωEXνω − eνQXωνEXων +QXωωEXωω)
(2.13)
where
QZ,M1νν = e
2νQZνν − eνQZνω − eνQZων +QZωω
QZ,M2µµ = e
2µQZµµ − eµQZµω − eµQZωµ +QZωω
QX,M1νν = e
2νQXνν − eνQXνω − eνQXων +QXωω
QX,M2µµ = e
2µQXµµ − eµQXµω − eµQXωµ +QXωω
(2.14)
A later proposal in Ref. [86] made the observation that in fact Y Z,L11 = Y
X,L
11 (since the pair of single
photons are in Bell states and basis-independent). This means that Alice and Bob in fact only need to
perform decoy-state analysis in one basis (X basis) to obtain Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 , and the entire Z basis can be
used for key generation, and only one signal intensity s is required. Furthermore, this signal intensity
s can be different from µ as Z basis is decoupled from the X basis. This constitutes a “four-intensity”
MDI-QKD protocol, which (as we will describe in Section 2.5) not only improves finite-size analysis, but
also is a useful construction for scenarios where channels are asymmetric. We will further analyze this
point and discuss our findings in Chapter 5.
2.5 Twin-Field (TF) QKD
This section is based on Refs. [25, 32]. Parts of the overview of different proposals of TF-QKD is also
based on the review paper Ref. [74].
2.5.1 Motivation
One main challenge of QKD is the maximum distance over which the quantum signals can be sent in order
to establish secure communications. Because fundamentally, QKD relies on the sending and receiving of
single-photons (and that it cannot be cloned), its secure key rate is limited by the transmittance of the
quantum channel (i.e. the probability of the photon being able to pass through the channel and reach
a receiver). There are papers that study the fundamental upper bound of the distance versus key rate
trade-offs for QKD, such as the TGW [26] bound and PLOB [27] bound (also called “linear bounds”),
which state that the maximum QKD key rate scales linearly with transmittance in the channel (here we
show the PLOB [27] bound):
R ≤ −log2(1− ηAB) = O(ηAB) (2.15)
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Figure 2.4: A comparison of the PLOB bound and the key rates of TFQKD. Here we use the simple TF-
QKD protocol [32], and simulate the key rate for an ideal case and a case with practical parameters. For
the ideal case, we assume no dark count or misalignment error, and the only error comes from imperfect
estimation of phase error rate due to multiphoton contributions in WCP sources (we also assume an
infinite number of decoy states and infinite data). For the practical case, we set a misalignment of 0.09
rad, and a dark count rate of 7× 10−7. In both cases, we fix the signal intensity as µ = 0.05. As can be
seen, TF-QKD is able to beat the PLOB bound in both ideal and practical scenarios.
where ηAB is the transmittance between Alice and Bob. To put things into perspective, each 50km of
standard fibre (10dB loss in transmittance) will cause the key rate to drop by one order-of-magnitude.
One solution to this problem is to use classical, trusted relays. That is, Alice performs QKD and
generates keys between Alice-Relay, and Bob performs QKD and generates keys between Relay-Bob.
The relay can then perform an XOR on the keys and announce the combined keys, which can allow
Alice and Bob to recover a mutual key. (Effectively, this can be viewed as the relay creating a secure
channel between itself and Bob with One-Time-Pad using the Bob-Relay key from QKD, and securely
sending Alice’s key to Bob over this secure channel.) This operation can be repeated over many relays,
indefinitely extending the distance of secure communications. There have been several demonstrations of
quantum networks using trusted relays, some even over thousands of kilometres [56]. However, a major
problem of such an approach is that the signals stop being quantum at the relays, therefore requiring the
crucial assumption that all relays must be trusted, where one compromised link could lead to a breach
of security.
An alternative is to use quantum repeaters, which are able to generate and store entanglement pairs.
Alice and Bob can use entanglement pairs to perform teleportation of signals (which doesn’t require the
quantum signals to physically pass through the channel, given previously stored entanglement pairs).
Multiple relays can use entanglement swapping to extend the range of entanglement pairs, which extends
the maximum distance over which Alice and Bob can securely establish communication. However,
quantum repeaters require quantum memories, which are still at a stage of infancy and are not practical
with current technology. There are also proposals that aim at avoiding the use of quantum memory,
such as “all-photonic quantum repeater” [93], which uses a pre-generated highly entangled photon state
(called a cluster state), Bell measurements and post-selection to establish connections between itself and
Alice and Bob. However, cluster states are experimentally difficult to implement too, and an all-photon
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quantum repeater has yet to be experimentally demonstrated.
MDI-QKD allows untrusted relays. Here Alice and Bob both act as senders and a relay is set up
in the middle. This eliminates detector side channels and provides better practical security for QKD.
However, MDI-QKD does not improve the fundamental rate-distance scaling properties of QKD, as
the key rate of MDI-QKD still scales with the total transmittance between Alice and Bob (i.e. the
transmittances in the channels Alice-Charles and Charles-Bob are multiplied in the scaling of key rate),
because MDI-QKD generates keys from coincidences, where both signals in the two channels have to
pass through the channel successfully. Note that, however, in principle MDI-QKD can provide longer
maximum distance than say BB84, because it uses coincidences between detectors to generate key, and
the dark count rate of the detectors (which ultimately determines the maximum cutoff distance of QKD
- keys cannot be generated at the point where the level of signal is so weak as to be comparable to the
level of noise from dark counts) has less of an effect on the signal-to-noise ratio, since only coincidences
of dark counts contribute to QBER for MDI-QKD. Nonetheless, at such maximum distances the key
rate will be extremely low.
2.5.2 Proposal of TF-QKD
Figure 2.5: An illustration of the setup of TF-QKD. As can be seen, intuitively, TF-QKD can be thought
of as a modified phase-encoding QKD as in (a), but instead of splitting Alice’s pulse into signal and
reference pulses, here in TF-QKD as in (b), Alice and Bob independently send coherent pulses (based
on a shared phase reference), and a third party Charles performs a swap test, which tests the difference
between the phases in Alice’s and Bob’s signals (i.e. just like MDI-QKD, only the parity between Alice’s
and Bob’s bits are announced, but not the values itself, giving TF-QKD a similar kind of measurement-
device-independence). Figure reproduced with modifications based on Fig. 2 from Ref. [25].
Recently, there is a new protocol proposed by Lucamarini et al., called “Twin-Field” (TF) QKD [25],
that can surpass the fundamental distance-key rate trade-off described by the linear bound. Furthermore,
TF-QKD also retains the measurement-device-independence properties similar to that of MDI-QKD.
Because of these striking properties, TF-QKD has gained worldwide attention in the QKD community
since its proposal.
Before we describe the TF-QKD protocol, let us consider first a phase-encoding QKD scheme between
Alice and Bob. Alice’s signal (suppose its a WCP source) is first split into two pulses on different paths
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by a beam-splitter (usually called a “signal” pulse and a “reference” pulse). Alice encodes her bit string
by applying phase modulation on the signal pulse (with a phase shift of 0, pi for X basis and 12pi,
3
2pi for
Z basis). After the two pulses reach the receiver Bob2, he can again apply a phase modulation to the
incoming signal pulse, and combine the pulses with a beam-splitter connected to two detectors. The
idea is, if Alice and Bob choose the same basis, depending on whether their phase modulations differ or
coincide, the two pulses will have a 0 or pi phase difference, and exit the beam splitter at different ports,
triggering a different detector. Physically, Alice and Bob together form a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
for the incoming signal.
The simple but important observation in TF-QKD is that, instead of splitting off an incoming signal
at Alice’s beam-splitter, it’s possible for two independent sources to send signals with matching or un-
matching phases 0, pi or 12pi,
3
2pi (provided that they have a common global phase reference), and the
two signals will interfere at the receiver, reaching one of the two detectors depending on whether their
phases are the same or opposite. In this way, physically the setup is still similar to the above phase-
encoding QKD scheme, but the two sources could be two different users, Alice and Bob, sending to a
receiver Charles. Since the two sources Alice and Bob don’t need to be located together geographically,
this protocol effectively doubles the distance between Alice and Bob, with the same key rate scaling
as if Alice performs a phase-encoding QKD with the receiver Charles in the middle (over only half the
distance between Alice and Bob). That is, the key rate of TF-QKD
RTF−QKD = O(
√
ηAB) (2.16)
Fundamentally, TF-QKD exhibits this advantageous scaling, because it relies on single-photon inter-
ference (rather than two-photon Hong-Ou-Mandel interference as in MDI-QKD) to generate the key. For
each key bit generated, on average only one signal has passed through either Alice’s channel or Bob’s
channel (and the relay Charles cannot tell which one it came from), but not through both channels.
Therefore, only the loss in one of the channels is considered at any time.
One important note is that, in order to establish a global phase reference, in practice TF-QKD
requires phase stability between the two quantum signals, one from each of Alice and Bob. This can be
experimentally challenging. In contrast, MDI-QKD does not require such phase stability.
2.5.3 Variants of TF-QKD and Security Proofs
However, though promising, there are still some important caveats to such a proposal. The original
proposal of TF-QKD [25] has not provided a rigorous security proof. The main problem is that decoy-
state analysis (which is necessary in order to enable the use of practical WCP sources) requires global
phase randomization. This is not a problem for phase-encoding QKD, as the signal and reference
pulses share the same global random phase. However, for TF-QKD, Alice and Bob are at two separate
locations. This means that they need to independently perform phase randomization, and later announce
the global phase to perform post-selection on cases where they share a close enough global phase.
However, the phase and the photon number in a pulse are incompatible observables, which cannot be
simultaneously measured with certainty. This means that, decoy-state analysis is not compatible with
the public announcement of global phase.
2By applying a delay to one of the pulses, the two pulses can be recombined by another beam-splitter to travel in
the same fibre channel, but this is equivalent to a time-multiplexing process, and logically the pulses are still in different
channels.
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Since the original proposal of TF-QKD, there have been several papers that aim at designing a
modified TF-QKD protocol for which a complete security proof can be given. One underlying idea for
several of these proofs is to divide the signals into two parts - an “encoding” part that publicly announces
the global phase and generates the key (and samples the bit error rate), and another “testing” part that
randomizes the phase, and tries to obtain data that can upper-bound the phase error rate for the
encoding part. It is assumed that an eavesdropper cannot tell the encoding part from the testing part,
which means that data in the testing part can be used to estimate some invariant quantity, that can be
used to bound the phase error rate for encoding part. Once the phase error is bounded, combining it
with the gain and error of the encoding part, the key rate still takes the form of Shor-Preskill key rate:
R = 1− h2(ebit)− h2(ephase) (2.17)
where ebit, ephase are the bit error and phase error, and the key rate in practice will be multiplied by the
gain in the signal state.
There are numerous variants for the TF-QKD protocol, that differ in their choices of “encoding” and
“testing” phases, as well as the respective usage/absence of phase randomization in the two bases. We
give a brief introduction to some representative TF-QKD type protocols in Appendix A.1.
In this thesis, we will focus on the “simple TF-QKD protocol” [32]. In Chapter 6 of this thesis, we
discuss the security and performance of the simple TF-QKD protocol when channels have asymmetric
levels of loss. By making TF-QKD resistant to asymmetric channels, we enable applications of TF-QKD
in a fibre network setting, just like for asymmetric MDI-QKD in Chapter 5.
2.6 Finite-Size Analysis
In the above discussions on security proof and decoy-state analysis, we have assumed that the observables
(gain, QBER) Alice and Bob obtain in the experiment are always the same as their expected values.
However, this is only true when there is an infinite number of signals being sent (the “asymptotic
scenario”). In practice, as the sending of each signal can be considered as a random event (whether the
signal reaches the receiver, whether the signal reaches the wrong detector, etc.), statistical fluctuation
might cause the overall sum of the random events (i.e. the total counted number of detected signals,
and the total error counts) to deviate from the expected value. This might cause an overestimation of
the key rate if we directly assume that the expected values such as gain and QBER are equal to these
observed values, which will result in a security breach.
A simple model is using a “standard error analysis” (e.g. in Ref. [72, 94, 62, 86]): We assume that the
random events of each signal being detected (counting towards the gain) and being incorrectly detected
(counting towards the QBER) are independently and identically distributed (i.e. “i.i.d.”). From the
central limit theorem, the sum of these events (the total counts and error counts) will follow a normal
distribution.
If a random variable n follows a normal distribution and has an expected value 〈n〉, we can bound the
probability that the variable n takes a value within a confidence interval within γ numbers of standard
deviation from the expected value:
P (n < 〈n〉 − γ〈n〉) = P (n > 〈n〉+ γ〈n〉) = 1
2
[1− erf(γ/
√
2)] (2.18)
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where we have used the cumulative probability distribution of a normal distribution, and erf is the error-
function. Inversely, if we know the observed value n, we have the same probability of  = erf(γ/
√
2)
that the expected value 〈n〉 will fall within the confidence interval of γ standard deviations near the
observable n:
n = n− γ√n ≤ 〈n〉 ≤ n+ γ√n = n (2.19)
here we take an estimated value of
√
n for the standard deviation of variable n.
With the above method of bounding the expected value from observed value, we can apply this to
our decoy-state analysis (which calculates the key rate from the expected values of the gain and QBER).
Let us take MDI-QKD as an example. Assuming that Alice and Bob perform decoy-state analysis and
choose intensities µi, µj in the X basis with probabilities Pµi , Pµj , with a total number of N signals. We
can then obtain the gain QXµi,µj , error-gain T
X
µi,µj , and QBER E
X
µi,µj as:
QXµi,µj =
nXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
TXµi,µj =
mXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
EXµi,µj =
TXµi,µj
QXµi,µj
(2.20)
where nXµi,µj ,m
X
µi,µj are the actually observed counts and error counts. Here the error-gain is defined as:
TXµi,µj = Q
X
µi,µjE
X
µi,µj (2.21)
Now, if we would like to consider finite-size effects by applying standard error analysis, we can upper
and lower bound the gain and error gain by applying the confidence interval:
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj + γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj − γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj + γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj − γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
(2.22)
This loosens the bound in the linear constraints as shown in Section 2.4.2.
QXµiµj ≤=
∑
m,n
Pµim P
µj
n Ymn ≤ QXµiµj
TXµiµj ≤
∑
m,n
Pµim P
µj
n emnYmn ≤ TXµiµj
(2.23)
which will result in a worse estimation for the single-photon statistics (i.e. higher QBER and lower yield)
and consequently a lower key rate, in order to secure the protocol when finite-size effects are considered.
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Note that, such an analysis only protects the protocol against “individual attacks” from Eve (i.e.
assuming that she performs the same attacks on each signal independently), since it assumes an i.i.d.
distribution. In practice, Eve could theoretically store all signals and perform a “joint attack” on all
signals (making the distributions different for each signal). In this case, more general finite-size analysis
techniques are required, that relax the aforementioned i.i.d. assumptions. For instance, the Chernoff
bound only requires independent variables (without having to be identically distributed), and it has
been applied to finite-size security analysis for BB84 [95], MDI-QKD [96], as well as TF-QKD [97].
Furthermore, a “composable” security analysis (such as in Ref. [96]) quantifies the success rate of each
one of the security estimation process (e.g. estimation of yields and QBER for different photon numbers,
the privacy amplification process, etc.) as well as the success rate of error-correction, to provide an overall
bound to the probability for correctness and security.
For simplicity, in most parts of this thesis, if not specified, we will use the standard error analysis
described above (secure against individual attacks) when discussing finite-size effects.
2.7 Parameter Optimization
In this section we will discuss the motivation for parameter optimization in QKD and the algorithms
commonly used. This section provides the background knowledge mainly for Chapter 7 (and is also
included in the technical details in Appendix C corresponding Chapter 5). If preferred, one may first
skip ahead and come back later to this section for references when reading Chapter 7.
In the above sections, we have described the important role decoy-state method plays in various
protocols such as BB84, MDI-QKD, and TF-QKD. The choice of intensity values for the decoy states
greatly affects the key rate of QKD - their optimal values are determined by various factors: the channel
loss and the background noise or detector dark counts (which together determine the signal-to-noise
ratio), the basis misalignment, and the asymmetry between channels for MDI-QKD and TF-QKD with
two channels (which we will discuss more in Chapters 5 and 6). A good choice of the set of intensities can
provide a good signal gain (hence key generation rate) while also ensuring low values for the observed
bit error rate and the estimated phase error rate.
Moreover, as described in Section 2.6, the finite-size effect is also an important limiting factor for
the key rate of QKD in practice. When considering finite-size effects, one must carefully choose the
probabilities of sending each signal (e.g. too little decoy-state data will cause statistical fluctuation to
increase and increase the estimated phase error rate, while too little signal data will cause a low key
generation rate, thus creating a trade-off between different states). Such a choice of probabilities for
intensity settings 3 is very important in the finite-data scenario, where a non-optimal set of probabilities
usually results in low or even zero key rate. This is especially important when data size is small, e.g.
1012 or fewer total pulses sent, which is a common data size for systems running at a clock speed near
100MHz, over the course of a few hours. Free-space systems usually have even less data (such as 1010)
due to the very limited communication time over e.g. minutes.
Therefore, generally for QKD using decoy-state method and considering finite-size effects, users would
3Additionally, sometimes one also needs to optimize the basis choice probability. For instance, for BB84, if one assumes
infinite data size, it is possible to set almost all data to Z basis and a fraction of data to X basis, as in efficient BB84,
while in the finite-size scenario, e.g. Ref. [95], probability of basis choice is one of the parameters to be optimized. The
exceptions are some protocols where intensity choice implies basis choice, such as for MDI-QKD in Ref.[86, 65] (for TF-
QKD in Ref.[32, 66]), Z (X) basis uses a different signal intensity setting from the decoy states in X (Z) basis, so choosing
signal intensity automatically means choosing Z (X) basis.
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need to optimize over both the values of intensity settings, and the probabilities of using each setting.
Of course, there are other user parameters that can be optimized in QKD, such as the number of decoy
states (which are discussed in Refs. [98, 99, 100, 101] for BB84. We also briefly discuss this for MDI-
QKD in Appendix C and in Chapter 5, which corresponds to our paper Ref. [65]), but in the context
of this thesis, unless specified, by “parameter optimization” we will be denoting such an optimization of
intensity and probability settings.
Parameter optimization can be considered a problem of searching for a global maximum point over
a given parameter space that maximizes a given function (key rate versus parameters). It is usually
a rather computationally intensive task, due to the large size of the search space. For instance, for
MDI-QKD (suppose Alice and Bob use the same parameter settings and use the 4-intensity protocol in
Ref. [86]), there are six parameters that need optimizing:
{s, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν} (2.24)
and the key rate is a function of these parameters:
R(s, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν) (2.25)
If Alice and Bob are allowed to use different parameters (which we discuss in Chapters 5-6), there can
be as many as 12 parameters to optimize.
When the number of parameters is relatively small (say, 1-5 parameters), a brute-force search may be
applied, which searches all combinations of parameters and finds the global maximum. When there are
more parameters (e.g. ≥ 6 parameters 4), a brute-force search takes too much time or simply becomes
infeasible, and a local-search approach is commonly applied.
For instance, Ref. [62] proposes to use the “coordinate descent” algorithm for MDI-QKD (with
finite-size analysis), which iteratively optimizes the function in each one dimension while fixing all other
dimensions, and moves on to the next dimension when the maximum on this 1-D region is found. After
all dimensions are optimized, the algorithm either enters a new cycle that iterates over the dimensions
again, or stops when multiple cycles provide similar results (suggesting that the current point is a
local maximum), or maximum cycle count is reached. For instance, to illustrate this, for MDI-QKD
mentioned above, based on a given set of current parameters {si, µi, νi, P is , P iµ, P iν}, we can search s over
(smin, smax) to find the value that maximizes the current key rate function:
Ri+1 = max
s∈(smin,smax)
R(si, µi, νi, P is , P
i
µ, P
i
ν)
= R(si+1, µi, νi, P is , P
i
µ, P
i
ν)
(2.26)
where after the iteration, si is replaced by the new optimal value si+1, and Ri is replaced by Ri+1.
The algorithm then continues to the next iteration over µ, and then over ν, and so on (and repeats the
iteration from s again in a new cycle when all six parameters are optimized, until the local maximum is
found or the maximum cycle count is reached). Such an algorithm is shown to be able to find the same
local maximum as gradient descent [62].
Overall, these local search algorithms are based on the assumption that the key rate versus parameters
function for QKD is a convex function where a local maximum is equivalent to a global maximum. This
4Of course, this number depends on the speed of the computer, actual algorithm implementation, user’s tolerance of
computing time, and whether one can accept smaller search range and lower resolution to reduce brute-force search time.
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assumption is generally true in practice (although not proven). There are some cases that deviate from
this assumption. For instance, for asymmetric MDI-QKD, the function does not have a continuous
first-order gradient (which we will show a method to circumvent this problem in Chapter 5). For QKD
protocols whose key rate estimation involves linear programs, the linear solvers usually introduce some
level of non-convexity (with multiple maxima or discontinuities in the function). This can be alleviated
by applying certain global search techniques, such as starting local searches from multiple starting points,
or applying algorithms such as evolution algorithm. However, neither an analytical explanation for such
non-convexities in linear programs nor a method to completely remove them has been found yet, and it
could be a subject for future studies.
Chapter 3
BB84 over a Turbulent Free-Space
Channel
This chapter is largely reproduced from our paper Ref. [63] (with some minor modifications to keep the
consistency with other chapters of the thesis).
3.1 Background
As we have introduced in Chapter 2, there has been increasing interest in implementing QKD through
free-space channels, which can enable QKD over moving platforms, such as airborne or maritime QKD,
or even ground to satellite quantum communications. Free-space QKD holds the potential of enabling a
global quantum communication network.
A major characteristic of a free-space channel is its time-dependent transmittance, which is caused
by the temporal fluctuations of the local refractive index in the free-space channel, i.e. atmospheric
turbulence. Turbulence causes effects such as scintillation and beam wandering [53], which results in
fluctuations in the channel transmittance that, in turn, affect QKD performance. Therefore, addressing
turbulence is a major challenge for QKD over free-space. This fluctuation due to turbulence can be
modelled as a probability distribution, called the Probability Distribution of Transmission Coefficient
(PDTC), i.e. the real-time transmittance η is a random time-dependent variable that can be described
by the PDTC.
As free-space channels have time-varying transmittance due to turbulence, the QBER (and hence
the secure key rate) for QKD changes with time. In previous literature discussing free-space QKD, such
as [40, 104], the time variance of the channel is ignored, i.e. the secure key rate is calculated based
on the time-average of channel transmittance. Having knowledge of the PDTC, however, Vallone et al.
proposed a method named Adaptive Real-Time Selection (ARTS)[102] that acquires information about
real-time transmittance fluctuation due to turbulence, and makes use of this information to perform
post-selection and improve the key rate of QKD.
However, ARTS method needs to “adaptively” choose an optimal threshold by performing numerical
optimization after collecting all the data. A similar proposal by Erven et al. [103] called “signal-to-
noise-ratio-filter (SNRF)” also discusses the idea of using a threshold to post-select high-transmittance
periods, but uses the quantum data itself rather than a secondary classical channel. However, it needs
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Table 3.1: Comparison of transmittance post-selection methods in QKD through turbulence channel
Method Threshold choice Model of signals Sampling of transmittance
ARTS [102] post-determined single-photon secondary probe laser
SNRF [103] post-determined single-photon detector count (coincidence) rate
P-RTS pre-determined general general
to numerically optimize the threshold after collecting all experiment data, too.
Here we ask the question, is scanning through all acquired data after the experiment and finding
such an “adaptive” threshold really necessary? The answer is in fact no. In this chapter, we propose a
new method called “pre-fixed threshold real-time selection (P-RTS)”, and show the important observa-
tion that, for post-selection based on transmittance in a turbulent channel, the optimal post-selection
threshold is independent of the channel, and can be directly calculated from experimental parameters
of the devices beforehand - thus simplifying the implementation and enabling post-selection of signals
in real time, which can also reduce the data storage requirements and computational resources in Bob’s
system. This is because, instead of having to wait until all data is collected to optimize the threshold,
Bob can immediately discard the data that are obtained below the pre-fixed threshold and doesn’t need
to store all collected data. Moreover, he doesn’t need to have a model for the PDTC of the channel, and
no longer need to run a numerical optimization to find the optimal threshold. Thus we can additionally
save software development effort and computing resource for Bob, too.
Furthermore, both ARTS and SNRF are limited to a single photon model only, while decoy state must
be used for QKD with a practical weak coherent pulse (WCP) source. Here we also propose a general
framework for QKD through a channel with fluctuating transmittance, for not only single-photon BB84,
but also practical decoy-state BB84 with WCP source, and decoy-state BB84 with finite-size effects (both
of which we are the first to apply threshold post-selection to), thus greatly improving its usefulness in
practice. We also propose a model to estimate the maximum improvement in key rate from using
threshold post-selection, and show that with P-RTS method we can achieve a key rate very close to
the maximum performance with an optimal threshold. In this chapter, for simplicity, we focus on the
BB84 protocol (with a single-photon source or with decoy states). Nonetheless, our idea of P-RTS is
rather general and can, in principle, be applied to not only other QKD protocols but also other quantum
communication protocols.
A comparison of P-RTS with post-selection methods in previous literature can be seen in Table 3.1. As
shown here, P-RTS has the great advantage of being able to predict the optimal threshold independently
of the channel. This means that one no longer needs to store all the data after experiment and optimize
the threshold, but can perform real-time selection with a single threshold, regardless of the actual channel
turbulence and loss condition. Moreover, our result is valid not only for BB84 with single photons, but
for any general protocol that has a fluctuating transmittance. It is also not restricted to transmittance
sampling with a secondary laser as in ARTS, but for instance can also use observed photon count rates
in a given time interval as in SNRF.
Here a point worth noting is that, for P-RTS, as well as previous post-selection schemes including
ARTS and SNRF, the post-selection depends on things such as the transmittance of the classical channel
or the quantum channel. It might first appear that this would raise concerns about the security of such
schemes, as it is possible for Eve to control the transmittance (or just the classical signal, if one is
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used), thus manipulating the post-selection. But we emphasize here that the channel transmittance
information is classical, and by default, such information is already considered public in QKD (and can
be controlled by Eve), thus using it would not undermine the security of the protocol. Eve is indeed
able to control the classical signal, but by doing so she is only selecting an arbitrary (yet still uniform)
sample among the quantum signals sent by Alice, and this is no more than a denial-of-service attack in
the worst case (e.g. when Eve chooses to deliberately attenuate the classical signal below the threshold,
all quantum signals get discarded by Bob). Moreover, for decoy state, despite Eve’s information on the
transmittance of the classical channel, given an n-photon state prepared by Alice, there is no way for
Eve to distinguish a signal state from a decoy state. This is because the density matrices in the two
cases are exactly the same. For this reason, decoy-state QKD applies to P-RTS.
Lastly, we have performed a computer simulation to show the actual advantage of using P-RTS in
practical decoy-state BB84, with up to 170% improvement in decoy-state BB84 key rate for certain
scenarios, or 5.1dB increase in the maximum tolerant loss at R = 10−7, under medium-level turbulence.
We also include a numerical demonstration for applying P-RTS to BB84 with finite-size effects, which
still shows a significant increase in rate even when the total number of signals is limited, e.g. maximum
tolerant loss at R = 10−7 gains an increase of 1.4dB to 5.2dB, for N = 1011−1013 under high turbulence.
The organization of the chapter is listed as follows: in section 3.2 we first present a brief recapitulation
of ARTS method, and proceed to propose a general framework for QKD key rate in turbulent channel.
We then propose P-RTS method, and discuss how and why an optimal threshold can be pre-fixed, and
show an upper bound for the rate of P-RTS. We also present numerical results from simulations to show
how P-RTS behaves compared to no post-selection. Lastly, we discuss P-RTS in decoy-state BB84, for
the asymptotic case in Section 3.3 and for finite-size regime in Section 3.4, and show with simulation
results that P-RTS works effectively for both of them. Further details including the validity of our
assumption of the strong correlation between the transmittance of the classical channel and that of the
quantum channel can be found in Appendix B.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 The ARTS Method
In Ref. [105], Capraro et al. performed an experiment to study the impact of turbulence on a quantum
laser transmitted through a 143km channel on the Canary Islands, and proposed the idea of improving
SNR with a threshold at the expense of the number of signals. Subsequently, in Ref. [102], Vallone et
al. from the same group performed an experiment of free-space single-photon B92 QKD through the
same channel, and showed the effectiveness of using real-time transmittance information in a turbulent
channel to improve secure key rate, by performing post-selection on signals with a threshold, hence
naming the method adaptive real-time selection (ARTS).
This is realized by using a classical probe signal (a strong laser beam) alongside the quantum channel.
In the quantum channel, the bits are polarization-encoded into quantum signals, which are detected by
single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) that return click events. Meanwhile, the laser passing through
the classical channel is detected by an avalanche photodetector that returns a voltage proportional to
received light intensity, which is also proportional to the channel transmittance at that moment. An
illustration of the setup can be seen in Fig. 3.1.
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The key idea is that the transmittance of the classical channel will correspond to that of the quan-
tum channel. Therefore, by reading the voltage from the classical detector (defined as V ), one can
gain information about the periods of high transmittance. Combined with a threshold on the classical
signal (defined as VT ), this information can be used to post-select only those quantum signals received
by Bob during high transmittance periods (only when V ≥ VT ), thus increasing the overall average
transmittance, at the expense of a smaller number of signals due to post-selection.
This post-selection increases the signal-to-noise ratio among the selected signals, and hence reduces
the QBER, which subsequently increases the key rate. However, post-selection also reduces the total
number of signals. Therefore, this becomes an optimization problem, and the choice of threshold value
becomes critical. By numerically choosing an optimal threshold that maximizes the rate, it is possible
to acquire a secure key rate much higher than before applying post-selection. This, as defined in Ref.
[102], is called the adaptive real time selection (ARTS) method.
3.2.2 General Framework for QKD Key Rate in a Turbulent Channel
In this section, we will expand upon this threshold post-selection idea from ARTS, and apply it to a
general framework of post-selection upon transmittance. We will then discuss the effects of threshold
post-selection based on transmittance on the secure key rate. Our following discussions will be based on
the channel transmittance η only, and they are not limited to the secondary-laser transmittance sampling
as in ARTS, but can be applied to any sampling method of transmittance, including photon count rate
such as in SNRF.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, an important characteristic of a turbulent channel is the time-dependent
transmittance, which follows a probability distribution called the PDTC. There have been multiple
efforts to accurately characterize the PDTC, and a widely accepted model is the log-normal distribution
[106, 107] (a plot of which is shown in Fig. 3.2 (a)):
p(η)η0,σ =
1√
2piση
e−
[ln(
η
η0
)+ 1
2
σ2]2
2σ2 (3.1)
where p is the probability density, η the transmittance, and η0 and σ the mean and variance. The
distribution is solely determined by the two parameters η0 and σ, which are inherent to the channel
itself. η0 is the expected atmospheric transmittance, with a typical value of 10
−3 to 10−4 (corresponding
to 30-40 dB of loss) for a 100km channel, while σ, typically taking a value between 0 and 1, is determined
by the amount of turbulence - the larger the amount of turbulence, the larger the variance. The pair
(η0, σ) hence contains all information of the PDTC.
Now, we make an important observation: For any given protocol implementation (say, single-photon
Figure 3.1: The ARTS setup by Vallone et al., where Alice and Bob are linked by a quantum channel
and a classical channel. One can post-select quantum signals passing through the channel with high-
transmittance, using a threshold on the corresponding classical channel signal. Reproduced from [63]
@2018 APS.
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BB84, or decoy-state BB84), if all experimental parameters in the system except η are fixed - i.e. the
device parameters including background and dark count rate, detector efficiency, laser intensities, and
optical misalignment are all fixed - then the key rate solely depends upon the transmittance η, and can
be written as a single-variable function of η, i.e. R(η).
To estimate secure key rate of QKD through turbulent channel, the question therefore becomes
studying how the function R(η) changes, when η is a random variable following a probability distribution
that we know, the PDTC.
Here, we will propose two models for R(η) under turbulence:
1. Rate-wise integration model, RRate-wise, which is the case where we integrate the rate over
PDTC, thus making use of all information of the PDTC. This rate only depends on the rate
function and the PDTC, and is independent of what actual threshold we choose.
2. Simplified model, RSimplified(ηT ), which estimates the performance of decoy-state QKD with
P-RTS, using post-selection with a threshold ηT on channel transmittance. It is a function of the
threshold ηT that one uses.
Let us first start with the rate-wise integration model. We can begin by considering an ideal case,
where we assume that we have complete knowledge of the channel transmittance η when each single
signal passes through the channel. Moreover, here we discuss the asymptotic case where there is an
infinite number of signals sent. Then, it is possible to order all signals from low to high transmittance η
when they pass through the channel, and divide the signals into bins of [η, η + ∆η) (which ranges from
0 to 1), as shown in Fig. 3.2 (b).
Therefore, within the bin [η, η + ∆η), we can assume that all signals pass through the channel with
the same transmittance η, given that the bin is sufficiently small, i.e. ∆η → 0. That is, the signals in the
same bin can be considered as in a “static channel”, and enjoy the same rate formula R(η) and security
analysis as if η is a static constant.
Then, we can calculate the number of secure key bits from each bin, according to their respective η,
and add all bins together. In the limit of ∆η → 0, this is an integration of R(η) over η, with pη0,σ(η)
being the weight (i.e. the proportion of signals in each bin). We call this model the “rate-wise integration
model”. Its rate RRate-wise satisfies:
RRate−wise =
∫ 1
0
R(η)pη0,σ(η)dη (3.2)
RRate-wise makes use of all PDTC information from turbulence. Since all bins have either zero or
positive rate, using a threshold ηT in the rate-wise integration model will always result in either the
same or lower rate. i.e.
RRate−wise(0) =
∫ 1
0
R(η)pη0,σ(η)dη
≥
∫ 1
ηT
R(η)pη0,σ(η)dη
= RRate-wise(ηT )
(3.3)
Hence, from here on if ηT is not specified, by R
Rate-wise we will always mean RRate-wise(0), which is a
constant-value “max possible performance” of the key rate that is only dependent on the PDTC of the
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channel and the experimental device parameters.
Now, let us consider applying post-selection to free-space QKD. Using a similar model as in ARTS
method (instead of using classical detector voltage V, here we will directly use η, which is proportional
to V). We can set a threshold ηT and perform post-selection: we select quantum signals received when
transmittance η ≥ ηT , and discard all signals received when η < ηT .
Unlike the ideal case of the rate-wise integration model, in reality we do not have an infinite resolution
from the classical detector, nor do we have an infinite number of signals. In practice, we are post-selecting
signals with only two statuses: “pass” or “fail”. To make use of this “pass/fail” information, here we
propose a practical model that estimates the rate with only the mean transmittance of the post-selected
signals. We name it the “simplified model”. First, with no post-selection applied, the rate is:
RSimplified(0) = R(η0) (3.4)
which means that we simply use the mean value of transmittance η0 in the channel for all calculations and
assume a “static channel”, using the same rate formula for a static channel, too. This is, in fact, what
has been done in most literature for free-space QKD that don’t consider fluctuations due to turbulence,
such as in [40, 104].
Now, when a threshold is used and post-selection is performed, RSimplified is written as:
RSimplified(ηT ) =
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη ×R(〈η〉) (3.5)
Figure 3.2: (a) The Probability Distribution of Transmittance Coefficient (PDTC), where η is the
transmittance, taking a value between [0,1], while p(η) is the probability density function of η. Here
we are showing a plot generated from the log-normal model of the PDTC, with η0 = 0.3, σ = 0.9; (b)
Dividing signals into bins according to their respective η, in the rate-wise integration model. Reproduced
from [63] @2018 APS.
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here we again treat all post-selected signals as having passed through a “static channel”, and use the
same rate expression for static case. But the difference is that we use the new mean transmittance
among only the post-selected signals, denoted as 〈η〉, as the transmittance of the channel. 〈η〉 satisfies
(using expected value formula for a truncated distribution):
〈η〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(3.6)
When we apply post-selection (like the case with ARTS), in the rate formula for RSimplified, we take
into account the loss of signals due to post-selection, and only a portion of
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη remains. This
portion is always no larger than 1, and strictly decreases with ηT . On the other hand, 〈η〉 is always
increasing with ηT , because we are post-selecting only the signals with higher transmittance. So, just
like for the single photon case discussed in Section 3.2.1, we have an optimization problem, where the
choice of ηT is crucial to the rate we acquire. Using optimal threshold and applying post-selection, as
we will later show in the numerical results in the next sections, can dramatically increase the rate over
using no post-selection at all.
Therefore, using the simplified model, we can effectively treat the static channel QKD protocol as a
“black-box”. We enjoy the same rate formula and security analysis as a static channel, while the only
difference is that we use a higher 〈η〉 after post-selection as the input, and multiply a reduced portion∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη to the output.
Now, let us compare the performance of the two models. From an information theory perspective, the
rate-wise integration model makes use of all possible information on fluctuating transmittance (i.e. the
whole PDTC), while the simplified model discards all distribution information and only acknowledges
“pass or fail”, and keeps only the single mean transmittance after post-selection. Therefore, we expect
that the rate-wise integration model, which makes use of the most information, would have a higher rate
than the simplified model. We can write the relation as:
RRate-wise ≥ RSimplified (3.7)
This relation suggests that the Rate-wise integration model is an upper bound for the Simplified
model key rate. This result can be shown rigorously by Jensen’s Inequality (we include the detailed
proof in Appendix B.2), under the condition that the rate function R(η) is convex. Numerically, we
show that (in the next section) the rate for single-photon BB84 and decoy-state BB84 are both convex.
Therefore, the relation Eq. 3.7 always holds true.
The next question is, naturally, what is the optimal threshold to choose, such that RSimplified ap-
proaches the upper bound RRate-wise? Moreover, how closely can it approach the upper bound? We will
discuss this optimal threshold in the next section, and show that it is only dependent upon R(η) and
independent of the PDTC.
3.2.3 Optimal Threshold and Near-Tightness of Upper Bound
In this section, we propose the “Pre-fixed threshold Real Time Selection” (P-RTS) method, and show
that the optimal threshold is independent of the PDTC and can be pre-fixed based on experimental
parameters only. We also show that with this pre-fixed threshold the simplified model can approach its
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Figure 3.3: Single-photon rate and PDTC vs Transmittance η. As can be seen, there is an ηcritical such
that RS−P (η) = 0 for all η ≤ ηcritical. For this example, we have plotted the single-photon rate R, using
experimental parameters are listed in Table 3.2. We acquire an ηcritical = 0.00020 for single-photon case.
Note that ηcritical is only determined by the experimental parameters of our devices (e.g. dark count
rate, and misalignment, and the chosen intensities), and is independent of the actual PDTC. Linear
interpolation of the asymptotic η  Y0 case shows that the function is very close to linear. Here an
instance of p(η), the PDTC function, is also plotted for comparison. Reproduced from [63] @2018 APS.
upper bound very closely.
Here, to describe the key rate function, we have to bring it into the context of an actual protocol
model. We will first discuss single-photon BB84, using the Shor-Preskill [70] rate:
R = 1− 2h2[QBER] (3.8)
here to keep the consistency of notations with following discussions, we will use parameters from
Table 3.2 (which is also used as the channel model for decoy-state discussion), where detector dark
count/background count rate is Y0, basis misalignment is ed, and total system transmittance is ηsys =
ηηd:
RS−P = (Y0 + ηsys){1− 2h2[e(ηsys)]} (3.9)
while the single-photon QBER is
e(ηsys) =
1
2Y0 + edηsys
Y0 + ηsys
(3.10)
A point worth noting is that RS−P (η) has the unique property of having an ηcritical such that
RS−P (η) = 0 for all η < ηcritical, and RS−P (η) ≥ 0 for η ≥ ηcritical. This critical position can be
expressed as:
ηcritical =
Y0
ηd
1
2 − ecritical
ecritical − ed (3.11)
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where ecritical is the threshold QBER satisfying
1− 2h2(ecritical) = 0 (3.12)
that returns zero rate. For Shor-Preskill rate, this threshold is ecritical = 11%. More details can be seen
in Appendix B.4.
As can be shown in Fig.3.3, we plot out the single-photon rate RS−P (η), where a sharp turning
point ηcritical exists. Moreover, within the [ηcritical, 1] region, numerical results show that R(η) is
slightly convex but very close to linear. (For larger η  Y0, the rate is completely linear. Using this
approximation we can make an interpolation of the “linear” part of the rate. As shown in the plot, this
linear interpolation is very close to the rate function itself.)
This can lead to a very interesting result: We showed in Section 3.2.2 that RRate-wise predicts the
maximum possible performance of QKD with threshold post-selection in a turbulence channel. If we
choose the threshold ηT = ηcritical for the simplified model, we can apply Jensen’s Inequality for the
truncated p(η) distribution within region [ηcritical, 1], and acquire
RSimplified(ηcritical) ≈ RRate-wise(ηcritical) (3.13)
given that RS−P (η) is very close to linear within the region (but still convex, so RSimplified is still slightly
smaller), since Jensen’s Inequality takes equal sign for a linear function. There is also no loss in RRate-wise
from truncating [0, ηcritical), as R(η) = 0 for all η < ηcritical.
RRate-wise(ηcritical) = R
Rate-wise(0) (3.14)
Therefore, RSimplified can approximately reach the upper bound with ηT = ηcritical, and the upper bound
given by RRate-wise is near-tight, due to the near-linearity of R(η). A more rigorous proof showing that
the optimal threshold for the simplified model is indeed ηcritical can be found in Appendix B.3.
Also, despite that there is no explicit analytical expression for ηcritical, we can show that it depends
more heavily on the background/dark count rate (approximately proportional to Y0, if η  1, and
Y0  η). Details can be seen in Appendix B.4.
This result for the optimal threshold has two significant implications for using threshold post-selection
and applying the simplified model:
• Since R(η) is only a function of η, and not (η0, σ), this optimal threshold position ηcritical is
only determined by the experimental parameters of the devices (e.g. detector efficiency, dark
count rate, misalignment, and Alice’s intensities - although here we make an assumption that the
misalignment is independent of η), and thus ηcritical is independent of the channel itself and its
PDTC. This means that, regardless of the turbulence level, we can use the same threshold to get
optimized performance - although the actual amount of performance improvement over not using
post-selection will be determined by the average loss and the amount of turbulence (i.e. the actual
PDTC), as will also be shown in numerical results in the next section.
• Given that we choose the optimal threshold and apply P-RTS, not only are we optimizing the
rate for the simplified model, but we are also achieving the maximum possible performance for the
turbulent channel, even if we make use of all information on transmittance fluctuations. This is
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Table 3.2: Experimental parameters for free-space QKD over an 144km channel in Ref.[40]
dark count rate Y0 pulse rate detector efficiency ηd misalignment ed error-correction efficiency f
1× 10−5 (per signal) 10MHz 25% 3% 1.22
because, at ηcritical, the max value for R
Simplified can almost reach the upper bound given by the
rate-wise integration model - meaning that the upper bound is nearly tight. We will illustrate this
point further with numerical results in the next section.
The significant implication is that, as long as we know the experimental parameters, we can determine
the optimal threshold in advance, without the need to know any information about the channel (such
as to measure the turbulence level), and perform post-selection in real time using the fixed threshold.
Therefore, we show that it is possible to perform post-selection on the channel transmittance with
a pre-fixed threshold - which we will call “Pre-fixed threshold Real Time Selection” (P-RTS). This is
significantly more convenient than protocols that perform optimization of threshold after the experiment
is done. It will substantially reduce the amount of data storage requirements in the experiment, since
Bob doesn’t need to store all data until after the experiment for optimization of the threshold, and will
also save the computational resource since Bob no longer needs to perform optimization of the threshold.
3.2.4 Numerical Results
In this section we put the above models into a simulation program for single-photon BB84 in a turbulent
channel. We use the experimental parameters from Ref. [40], as listed in Table 3.2. One note is that,
though the dark count and stray light contribution is reported to be as high as 1700/s in the paper,
because of the gated behaviour of the detector and the post-selection, only the counts within a 5.9ns
time window (in 100ns period between two pulses, for the 10MHz source used) will affect the result.
Therefore, here we take dark count rate as Y0 = 1× 10−5 in the simulations.
Here, we first take a turbulence level of σ = 0.9, and compare the performance of the two models
plus the static model (which is a simplified model with no post-selection, i.e. RS−P (η0)) at a fixed
loss of 37dB. We plot the results in Fig.3.4. As shown in the figure, RSimplified(ηT ) first increases with
the threshold ηT (because of post-selecting high-transmittance signals) and then decreases when the
threshold is further increased (because the decrease in rate due to loss of signals starts to dominate).
Just as predicted in Section 3.2.3, the simplified model can achieve a very similar performance as the
upper bound given by the rate-wise integration model, when the optimal threshold is chosen. For this
case, at the optimal threshold ηT = 0.00020, which, as we predicted, is the same as ηcritical = 0.00020 in
Fig.3.3, we get RSimplified = 1.18×10−5, very close to the upper bound RRate-wise = 1.22×10−5 (only by
3% difference - which is due to the rate above ηcritical not perfectly linear), and with dramatic increase
in key rate compared with the default static model (using mean transmittance) RStatic = 3.5 × 10−6,
demonstrating the significant performance gain from using P-RTS in turbulence channel.
Furthermore, we compare the rate-wise integration model RRate-wise, the optimized RSimplified(ηT )
with ηT = ηcritical, and the non-post-selected model (whose rate is equivalent to static model, i.e. R(η0),
as in Eq. 3.4) , by generating the rate vs loss relation for different average loss in the channel. Results
can be seen in Fig. 3.5. We see that indeed the rate for simplified model with fixed threshold is extremely
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of the rate-wise integration model and simplified model vs no post-selection
(static model), for single-photon case. Here we fix loss=36.5dB and σ = 0.9, and scan through different
threshold ηT . Experimental parameters are also from Table 3.2. As can be seen, choosing an optimal
threshold, which is approximately ηT = 0.00020 here, can allow the simplified model R
Simplified to achieve
a rate as much as 97% of - though still lower than - the upper bound given by rate-wise integration
model, RRate-wise(0). Reproduced from [63] @2018 APS.
close to its upper bound (as suggested in Eq. 3.13), the rate-wise integration model. Comparing with
the static case, we see that the P-RTS method works best for high-loss regions, where post-selection can
“salvage” some rate where the static case would fail entirely, hence “getting something out of practically
nothing”. Therefore, one of the major improvements we acquire from using P-RTS in free-space QKD
is a dramatically increased maximum tolerant loss (which would mean longer maximum distance).
3.3 Decoy-State BB84
On the other hand, for decoy-state BB84 QKD, we follow decoy-state BB84 QKD theory from Ref.
[15, 14, 16], and adopt the notations as in Lo, Ma, and Chen’s Paper in 2005 [14]. Using the GLLP
formula [71], in the asymptotic limit of infinitely many data, we can calculate the secure key rate as:
RGLLP = q{−f(Eµ)Qµh2(Eµ) +Q1[1− h2(e1)]} (3.15)
where h2 is the binary entropy function, q =
1
2 or q ≈ 1 depending on whether efficient BB84 is used,
and f is the error-correction efficiency. Qµ and Eµ are the observed Gain and QBER, while Q1 and e1
are the single-photon Gain and QBER contributions estimated using decoy-state. (For a more detailed
recapitulation of decoy-state, see Appendix B.1.1. We have also discussed the channel model that we
use for P-RTS in Appendix B.1.2).
Here for free-space decoy-state QKD. We fix the signal and decoy-state intensities as µ = 0.3,
ν = 0.05, and the vacuum state ω = 0, and use the vacuum+weak method to estimate single-photon
contribution, as in Ma et al.’s 2005 paper [72] for practical decoy-state QKD.
Like for the single-photon case, again we generate the rate vs η function. As can be observed in Fig.
3.6, the decoy-state rate function RGLLP (η) behaves similarly as the single-photon rate RS−P (η), with a
critical transmittance ηcritical (ηcritical = 0.0012 for this parameter set) such that all η below it returns
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the rate-wise integration model, simplified model with optimal threshold,
and no post-selection (static model) under σ = 0.9, for the single-photon case. Parameters are from
Table 3.2. We can see that the simplified model, with optimized threshold, approaches the rate-wise
integration model extremely closely, and both cases have significant improvement in key rate over static
(no post-selection) model, especially in high-loss region. Reproduced from [63] @2018 APS.
zero rate, and a nearly linear rate-transmittance relation for η ≥ ηcritical. Therefore, using the same
proof from section 3.2, we can conclude that ηcritical is the optimal (and fixed) threshold for decoy-state
BB84 with post-selection too.
Using the fixed threshold ηT = ηcritical to get the optimized rate R
Simplified(ηcritical), we generate
the rate vs loss relation for different levels of turbulence, as shown in Fig.3.7. As can be seen, the P-RTS
method works in the same way as decoy-sate BB84. We can also see that the higher the turbulence
level is, the larger the performance gain from applying P-RTS will we be able to achieve. As described
in Section 3.2.3, the optimal threshold is only determined by the parameters of the equipment, but the
actual optimal performance is determined by the amount of turbulence present in the channel that we
can utilize. As can be seen in the plot, even for a medium-level turbulence of σ = 0.6: for the same
loss=29dB, RSimplified = 8.453× 10−6, a 170% increase over RStatic = 3.119× 10−6 at loss=29dB. Also,
for a minimum rate of R = 10−7, the simplified model has a maximum tolerant loss of 34.4dB, versus
29.5dB for the static model, with a 5.1dB increase in tolerant loss.
3.4 Decoy-State BB84 with Finite-size Effects
We now turn to the case with finite data size, and apply the simplified model and P-RTS to decoy-state
BB84 under finite-size effects. We also use simulations to numerically demonstrate the improvements
in the key rate for the finite-size case. The protocol is based on C. Lim et al.’s finite-size decoy-state
BB84 paper [95], and we have adopted the same channel model as in Ref. [72]. Here we use the same
experimental parameters (including dark count rate, detector efficiency and misalignment) as in Table
3.2, same as the ones used in our previous asymptotic-case simulations. Also, we fix the signal and decoy
intensities to µ = 0.31, ν = 0.165 (in addition to the vacuum intensity ω = 2×10−4), the probabilities of
sending them pµ = 0.5, pν = 0.36, and the probability of sending X basis qx = 0.75. Unlike in Ref. [95],
however, we do not scan through the decoy-state intensities and probabilities to perform optimization.
Instead, since we only concentrate on high-loss region, we use fixed parameters that are already very close
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Figure 3.6: Rate and PDTC vs Transmittance η for (asymptotic) decoy-state BB84 with infinite data
size. Intensities are µ = 0.3, ν = 0.05, and experimental parameters are from Table 3.2. As can be
seen, there is also an ηcritical = 0.0012 such that RGLLP (η) = 0 for all η ≤ ηcritical, just like for single
photons. Here an instance of p(η), the PDTC function, is also plotted for comparison. Reproduced from
[63] @2018 APS.
to optimal (while changing them with distance does not provide much improvement in performance).
Using intensities that do not change with channel loss also avoids changing the expression for RGLLP (η)
(which depends on intensities µ, ν), and ensures that ηcritical is independent of the actual loss of the
channel.
As described for the simplified model, we can use the same “black box” idea, and simply substitute
RGLLP for asymptotic BB84 with rate for finite-size BB84. However, one difference from the asymptotic
case is that N, the number of signals sent by Alice, matters when calculating the rate, i.e. the rate
becomes RFinite−Size(η,N) instead of RGLLP (η). Then, instead of using Eq. 3.5 for RSimplified, we use
RSimplified =
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
×RFinite−Size(〈η〉, N ×
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη)
(3.16)
which means that the post-selection not only affects the overall rate due to the portion of lost signals,
but also affects the rate for the selected signals, since fewer signals than N are used to actually perform
the protocol, and higher statistical fluctuations will be present among the selected signals. For rate-wise
integration model, the finite-size effect is a bigger problem, because the data size will become smaller
for each bin. Overall, this means that we need to be more prudent with post-selection when treating
finite-size BB84.
The numerical results are shown in Fig.3.8. As can be seen, P-RTS has a similar effect on finite-size
BB84 as on the asymptotic case: we gain a significant advantage in the high-loss region, and have an
improved maximum tolerant loss, when a minimum acceptable Rate is required. For instance, at σ = 0.9
and for a minimum R = 10−7, the maximum loss increases by 1.4dB, 3.5dB, 5.2dB, and 6.2dB, respec-
tively, for the cases with N = 1011, 1012, 1013, and near-asymptotic case, while not much improvement
can be gained from P-RTS with N smaller than 1010. As shown, the improvement increases with the size
of N (which is understandable, since the smaller N is, the more sensitive the rate will be to post-selection
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of the optimized Simplified model vs no post-selection (static model) under
different levels of turbulence, for (asymptotic) decoy-state BB84 with infinite data size. Here we use
σ = 0.3, 0.6, 0.9 and ηT = 0.0012. Intensities are µ = 0.3, ν = 0.05, and experimental parameters are
from Table 3.2. We see that the improvement in rate from using P-RTS increases with the level of
turbulence, and has a significant improvement over static model even under medium-level turbulence of
σ = 0.6. Reproduced from [63] @2018 APS.
- because we are cutting off a portion from the already-insufficient number of signals and further ag-
gravating the statistical fluctuations - while for the asymptotic case, for instance, the performance of
selected signals does not depend upon how big is the selected portion of signals, and the only negative
effect that post-selection has is the lost portion of signals). For a free-space QKD system with 100MHz
repetition rate, N = 1011 would require about 17 minutes of communication.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussions
In this chapter we have proposed a post-selection method with pre-fixed threshold for QKD through a
turbulent channel, and have also proposed a general framework for determining the optimal threshold
beforehand and predicting the maximum possible performance. By choosing the threshold in advance, we
can perform post-selection in real time regardless of the channel condition. This real-time post-selection
also provides an additional benefit of reducing the amount of data that is required to be stored in the
detector system on Bob’s side. We also performed simulations to show the method’s effectiveness in not
only single-photon BB84, but also practical decoy-state QKD in both the asymptotic case and the case
with finite-size effects.
This method is especially effective for regions of high turbulence and high loss, and can even “salvage
something out of nothing”, when the secure key rate could have been zero without P-RTS method. In
order to sample the real-time transmittance condition, the P-RTS method can use only an additional
classical channel for each quantum channel, which would be easily implemented (or may even be already
implemented as a beacon laser is often required for alignment in free-space QKD). Moreover, since our
results only depend on post-selection of η, in essence our method is even possible without an additional
classical channel, such as in Erven et al.’s SNRF setup [103] (which samples transmittance by observing
quantum signal count rate). The thresholding, on the other hand, is purely implemented in post-
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the no post-selection static model (upper figure) vs optimized simplified
model (lower figure), for decoy-state BB84 with finite-size effects. For each model, we test different data
sizes N = 1011, 1012, 1013, and the near-asymptotic case N = 1099. Here we use a high turbulence of
σ = 0.9. The experimental parameters both follow Table 3.2, and intensities and probabilities used are
µ = 0.31, ν = 0.165, ω = 2×10−4, pµ = 0.5, pν = 0.36, and the probability of sending X basis qx = 0.75.
Lines in the upper figure shows the case where no post-selection is applied, while lines in the lower figure
have post-selection applied with fixed ηT = 0.0012. We can see from the figures that the improvement
in rate from using P-RTS increases with the data size N, and at R = 10−7, maximum tolerant loss still
increases by 3.5dB and 1.4dB respectively when N = 1012 and 1011. Reproduced from [63] @2018 APS.
processing, therefore does not require any additional resource, and could be readily deployed into existent
infrastructure, and gain a ready increase in secure key rate performance over existing implementation
for free-space QKD.
One requirement for the proposed method to work is that the transmittance for the quantum signal
has good correlation with the transmittance of the classical signal. We provide some additional discussion
on this point in Appendix B.6.
Another requirement is that the turbulence time scale is not too much faster than what the classical
sampling could observe. From the experiment of Ref. [102], it is mentioned that the repetition rate for
the classical signal is 1kHz, which is faster than the time scale of e.g. beam wandering of 10-100ms, as
mentioned in Ref. [53], meaning that the post-selection method can effectively work. If one physically
uses a classical probe signal alongside the quantum signal as in Ref. [102] (rather than post-selecting
the quantum signal itself as in Ref. [103]), in principle one can make the sampling rate of the classical
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laser even faster, as long as it is equal to or slower than the repetition rate of the quantum signal - which
can be at the order of MHz or even GHz. In Ref. [102] each classical signal corresponds to multiple
quantum signals in a “packet”, but in principle each classical signal can even correspond to one signal
timestamp of a quantum signal. Note that eventually the quantum signals are divided into just two bins:
accepted or discarded (depending on whether the corresponding classical signal passed the threshold),
and the accepted quantum signals are collected post-processed together as one data block. This means
that increasing the sampling rate of the classical signal (and decreasing the number of quantum signals
in each “packet” being accepted or discarded) will not introduce more finite-size effect.
Lastly, throughout the text we have not discussed the possible cross-talk between the quantum
channel and the classical channel (for which no information was provided in Ref. [102] either). Taking
the setup of Ref. [102] as an example, the quantum signal comes from a WCP source at 850nm, while
the classical signal is an 808nm 30mW laser. The channel is a 143km free-space channel between two
observatories on La Palma and Tenerife Islands. In such a free space channel, the dominating effects on
the signals are absorption, Rayleigh scattering, and turbulence-induced beam wandering and scintillation.
Non-linear scattering such as Raman scattering is negligible in such a free-space scenario and for the
energy level of the 30mW laser, so there is little cross-talk due to the frequency shift caused by Raman
scattering. For the setup of e.g. Ref. [103] where the quantum signal count rate is used for post-selection,
there is only a single channel and cross-talk is not present.
In the next chapter, we will apply a similar idea to the MDI-QKD protocol, which is able to eliminate
all detector side channels. We will discuss how two independently fluctuating free-space channels, as
well as a pre-fixed 2-dimensional threshold (instead of a single value for BB84) on the transmittances in
the two channels, can affect the performance of free-space MDI-QKD in the presence of turbulence.
Chapter 4
MDI-QKD over Turbulent
Free-Space Channels
This chapter is largely reproduced from our draft paper Ref. [64], which is posted on the preprint server.
The work is also presented at QCrypt 2019 as a poster.
In the previous chapter we have discussed the BB84 protocol through a turbulence channel. We
showed that by applying a threshold on classical transmittance to perform selection on signals, we can
greatly improve the performance of free-space BB84 in high-loss, high-turbulence scenarios. Moreover,
we showed that the optimal value for such a threshold can be obtained before the experiment begins,
independent of the channel condition. Such a prefixed threshold is convenient to implement, and also
reduced data storage requirements for the receiver (as data not passing the threshold can be discarded
on-the-fly).
In this chapter, we will apply a similar idea to the MDI-QKD protocol through free-space channels.
4.1 Background
As we introduced in Chapter 2, MDI-QKD eliminates all detector side channels and can prevent attacks
on detectors. Here instead of Alice sending signals to Bob, they both send signals to a third-party
Charles, who performs Bell-measurements on incoming signals and acts as an untrusted relay.
Since its proposal, MDI-QKD has attracted much worldwide attention, and has seen many demon-
strations in fibre systems and even fibre-based networks [18, 19, 20, 23, 57]. Meanwhile, another highly
desirable (yet challenging) application of MDI-QKD would be its implementation over free-space chan-
nels, which could allow mobile platforms such as ships, planes, satellites to communicate without detector
susceptibilities It would also allow these users over moving platforms to join a dynamic quantum net-
work with untrusted relays based on MDI-QKD. However, up to now, an experimental demonstration
of free-space MDI-QKD remains challenging. In addition to the high level of loss in free-space channels,
the atmospheric turbulence - which causes fluctuations in channel transmittances - also plays a large
part in affecting the secure key rate.
In this chapter, we present two important results: Firstly, we show that in the presence of turbulence
(scintillation of light, which causes transmittances to fluctuate in Alice’s and Bob’s channels), the key
rate of MDI-QKD will decrease significantly due to turbulence-induced real-time asymmetry between
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of MDI-QKD setup. Alice and Bob each send quantum signals to a third-
party Charles, who acts as an untrusted relay. To perform real-time post-selection, Alice and Bob can
each establish a classical channel alongside the quantum channel, to sample the channel transmittance
in real time, and select only the sections where both channels have good transmittance. Note that, this
classical channel could be either a strong laser at a slightly different wavelength, or observables such as
the count rate of the quantum detectors, which could also serve as an indicator of channel transmittance.
the channels. This is contrary to many people’s popular belief and different from the results we observe
for BB84 (where fluctuation of transmittance does not affect the key rate - and post-selection can make
use of turbulence to increase key rate). We show that, without post-selection, the key rate for MDI-QKD
will drop significantly for turbulent channels.
Secondly, we extend our P-RTS method to MDI-QKD, and show that by selecting a good threshold
we can achieve a much higher key rate and an extended maximum tolerable channel loss. Moreover,
our threshold does not depend on the channel condition and allows a semi-blind approach where “bad”
signals can be immediately discarded, which reduces storage and compute resource requirements. As
atmospheric turbulence is very common in free-space channels, we believe that this work will be an
important step towards the future experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD.
While Ref. [64] is still under preparation, we notice a paper on a similar subject published at
[108] and made online in December 2018. While it also applies post-selection to free-space MDI-QKD,
importantly, it only uses a rather naive model of the problem that does not consider the turbulence-
induced asymmetry (and assumes the key rate does not change in the presence of turbulence), which
we show is a rather inaccurate overestimation of the key rate. Moreover, it suggests a simple “square”
threshold for post-selection (which needs optimization and depends on channel condition), while we show
that Charles in fact has a much larger parameter space for threshold choice, and we propose a threshold
that can closely approach optimality, and can be pre-determined prior to the experiment without the
need to know the channel condition.
4.2 Theory
In this section we define the models we use for the turbulent channel, for the post-selection, and also the
models for a reliable estimation of the secure key rate. We point out an important point that, contrary
to BB84 where fluctuation due to turbulence does not detrimentally affect the key rate, in MDI-QKD
even without post-selection, the key rate will decrease due to turbulence-induced channel asymmetry
in real-time. To address this, we then propose solutions to set a good threshold for the post-selection.
We will show in the next section with numerical results the effectiveness of the post-selection with our
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proposed thresholds.
4.2.1 Channel Model under Turbulence
In a free-space channel subject to atmospheric turbulence, the transmittance fluctuates with time and
follows a probability distribution, which is often denoted as a probability distribution of transmission
coefficient (PDTC) [109]. There are multiple models for such a PDTC function, a commonly used model
is the log-normal distribution [107]:
pη0,σ(η) =
1√
2piση
e−
[ln(
η
η0
)+ 1
2
σ2]2
2σ2 (4.1)
where the channel is described by two parameters (η0, σ) that respectively represent the mean trans-
mittance and the variance of the channel. The log-normal distribution satisfies normalization condition
when η is small
∫ 1
0
pη0,σ(η)dη ≈ 1 (4.2)
When η is comparable to 1, there is a non-negligible portion of the probability that η > 1, in this case
we should calculate the integral from 0 to 1 to obtain a constant normalization factor (smaller than 1),
and divide the PDTC with this factor, i.e. forming a truncated log-normal distribution. 1
By post-selecting η with a threshold ηT , we can have a higher average transmittance among post-
selected signals:
〈η〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(4.3)
Again, the post-selected signals follow a truncated log-normal distribution between [ηT , 1], hence a nor-
malization factor (total probability within the post-selected region) is included.
Now, let us consider MDI-QKD, where Alice and Bob are each connected to Charles with a channel.
Intuitively, here we can first assume that both channels are subject to atmospheric turbulence, and that
their fluctuations are independent and non-correlated. We can denote the channel transmittances as
ηA, ηB , respectively. Then, the joint PDTC for the two channels can be written as
pAB(ηA, ηB) = pηA0 ,σA(ηA)× pηB0 ,σB (ηB) (4.4)
where the two channels are described by the (ηA0 , σA), (ηB0 , σB) channel condition parameters. The
1Note that, although for simplicity of discussion we have used a truncated log-normal distribution here, it is an inaccurate
representation of the PDTC for large η0 close to 1. There have been proposals for more accurate PDTC models, e.g. in
Ref. [140]. Here we’d like to note that the threshold we choose (as we will show in Fig. 4.2 (c)) is independent of the
channel model, hence a “prefixed threshold”, although the actual amount of performance gain will depend on the form of
PDTC. Applying more accurate PDTC models will be a subject of future studies.
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Figure 4.2: (a) A joint PDTC function for Alice’s and Bob’s real-time transmittances. (b) The contours
of key rate function R(ηA, ηB) for 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol, for fixed intensities and infinite data
size (plotted in log10 scale). We can see that the R = 0 contour follows a near-hyperbolic shape, whose
asymptotic lines represent the maximum and minimum acceptable channel mismatch x = ηA/ηB . There
is also a “gap” near the origin mainly determined by the noise (e.g. dark counts). (c) Choice of thresholds.
We can choose the R=0 boundary as the threshold. Or for simplicity, we can also approximate it using
the horizontal/vertical tangents ηcriticalA , η
critical
A of the R = 0 contour (which discard signals with low
signal-to-noise ratio), combined with the asymptotic lines xmax, xmin (which discard signals with strong
channel asymmetry). Importantly, all the information in this plot comes from the structure of R(ηA, ηB)
and are independent of the actual channel PDTC, i.e. they can be pre-determined before the experiment.
In this plot ηcriticalA = η
critical
B = 0.0042, xmin = 1/xmax = 0.184.
joint PDTC also follows the normalization condition:∫∫
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
=
∫ 1
0
pηA0 ,σA(ηA)dηA ×
∫ 1
0
pηB0 ,σB (ηB)dηB
≈ 1
(4.5)
The joint PDTC can be considered as a two-variable function on a plane defined by (ηA, ηB), as
shown in Fig. 4.2 (a). Now, we observe that for a post-selection on the signals received by Charles,
he can actually observe both Alice’s and Bob’s channel transmittances (ηA, ηB), and make a decision
based on these two observables. Importantly, he does not have to independently set a threshold for each
channel respectively (and select events where both transmittances pass the threshold), but rather, he is
able to make a joint decision based on the two observables - for instance, selecting events based on a
high level of symmetry between (ηA, ηB) is present, instead of based on the respective signal strength of
ηA, ηB alone. Mathematically, Charles is selecting a domain Ω ⊆ R2 in the 2D space defined by (ηA, ηB).
In the selected domain, we can perform a 2D integral to obtain the expected values of the transmit-
tances.
〈ηA〉 =
∫∫
Ω
ηApAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
〈ηB〉 =
∫∫
Ω
ηBpAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
(4.6)
In the simple case of a ”square” threshold, i.e.
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Ωsquare = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 : ηAT ≤ ηA ≤ 1, ηBT ≤ ηB ≤ 1} (4.7)
the post-selection follows two independent thresholds ηAT , ηBT . This is the simplest form of threshold
Charles can implement, and the probability distribution can be decoupled between ηA and ηB , hence
one can simply use Eq. 4.3 to calculate the mean transmittances. However, note that there are more
careful (and potentially better) ways to select such a threshold, to make use of Charles’ joint knowledge
of (ηA, ηB), which we will discuss in later sections.
4.2.2 Models for Key Rate
In [63], for BB84 protocol with a single free-space channel, we have proposed two models:
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) =
(∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
)
×R(〈η〉)
RIntegrationBB84 =
∫ 1
0
R(η)pη0,σ(η)dη
(4.8)
where R(η) is the key rate function (where all other experimental parameters are fixed, e.g. dark count,
detector efficiency, misalignment, etc.), and ηT is the threshold used to post-select signals according to the
real-time transmittance. The “simplified model” RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) finds the mean transmittance among
the post-selected signals, and calculates the key rate with a static model with this new transmittance,
i.e. it assumes that all the signals are transmitted with this mean transmittance. It is also multiplied by
the proportion of selected signals (since the total number of signals decreases due to post-selection). On
the other hand, the “rate-wise integration model” RIntegrationBB84 (for simplicity in the following text
we will just call it integration model in short) divides all signals into bins of [η, η+ ∆η) and adds up the
key rate in all bins. In the asymptotic (infinite-data) limit, the integration model can make use of the
entire probability distribution’s information, and always produces higher key rate than the simplified
model. Effectively, it provides an upper-bound to the maximum key rate RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) can achieve by
adjusting the threshold ηT :
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) ≤ RIntegrationBB84 (4.9)
For BB84, the near-linearity of the rate function R(η) guarantees a fixed optimal threshold ηcritical
exists, where R = 0 for all η ≤ ηcritical. This optimal threshold position is calculated with R(η) only,
and is independent of the channel condition (η0, σ). Hence, we can find a prefixed threshold ηcritical
that maximizes the performance of BB84 with post-selection, satisfying:
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηcritical) = R
Integration
BB84 (4.10)
Now, for MDI-QKD, we can firstly extend the concepts in the BB84 case, and define the simplified
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model and the integration model as following:
RSimplified(Ω) = R(〈ηA〉, 〈ηB〉)
×
(∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
)
RIntegration =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
R(ηA, ηB)pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
(4.11)
However, a crucial point here is that, for MDI-QKD, the simplified model does not accurately rep-
resent the key rate. The reason is that MDI-QKD heavily depends on the symmetry between channel
transmittances (because it makes use of a two-photon interference in the X basis, and its quantum bit
error rate (QBER) will depend on the interference visibility). Suppose the mean transmittances in the
channels ηA0 , ηB0 are equal, and Alice and Bob choose the same intensities. Then, without post-selection,
we can obtain 〈ηA〉 = ηA0 , 〈ηB〉 = ηB0 . This means that, when calculating the simplified model based on
R(〈ηA〉, 〈ηB〉), we are assuming a perfectly symmetric setup (which will presumably result in low QBER
in the X basis and a high estimated key rate). However, in reality, ηA, ηB are independent variables,
and they are very likely not equal in real-time for the majority of times. This means that, any deviation
from ηA = ηB will result in an increase in the QBER in the X basis. Overall, when one collects the
observables (counts and error-counts), he/she will find a much larger-than-expected QBER in the X
basis, preventing him/her from acquiring a good estimation of the phase-error rate and a good key rate.
Therefore, the simplified model overestimates the key rate.
In other words, we make the observation that turbulence-induced channel asymmetry in real-time
will decrease the key rate of MDI-QKD. This is very different from what we observed for BB84, where
key rate, gain, and error-gain are all near-linear functions, and any increase/decrease in error-gain due to
fluctuations cancel out when computing the mean value. On the other hand, for a pair of channels with
symmetric mean transmittances, fluctuation always decreases the visibility and increases the QBER.
Since simplified model is not an accurate model anymore for MDI-QKD, here we propose a better
representation of the key rate in turbulence. Consider the process of obtaining key rate for MDI-QKD,
for instance, for the 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol [86]:
R = P 2s {(se−s)2Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(4.12)
This protocol uses one signal intensity s for the Z basis to generate the key, and three decoy intensities
each for Alice and Bob {µ, ν, ω} to perform decoy-state analysis in the X basis. Here the constants
include the intensities and the probabilities of sending them, such as s, Ps, and the error-correction
efficiency fe. We can see that the “variables” that change with ηA, ηB are the observed gain and QBER
in the Z basis QZss, E
Z
ss, and the single-photon contributions Y
X,L
11 , e
X,U
11 estimated from the X basis
observables QXij , E
X
ij where i, j ∈ {µ, ν, ω}. Overall, the key rate can be considered as a function of the
observables:
R(ηA, ηB) = R[Q
X
ij (ηA, ηB), T
X
ij (ηA, ηB),
QZss(ηA, ηB), T
Z
ss(ηA, ηB)]
(4.13)
here TXij = Q
X
ijE
X
ij are the error-gains (which correspond to the actual observed error-counts) in the X
Chapter 4. MDI-QKD over Turbulent Free-Space Channels 50
Figure 4.3: (a) Comparison of key rate models without post-selection. As can be seen, the simplified
model incorrectly assumes the same rate as a static model, while from the observable model we can see
that MDI-QKD key rate decreases significantly with turbulence. (b) Comparison of key rate obtained
with different thresholds. As can be seen, both the R=0 boundary and the straight-line approximations
(xmin, xmax, η
critical
A , η
critical
B ) greatly increase key rate and maximum distance/loss in the channel. Here
for convenience we’ve plotted the key rate versus distance between Charles and Bob in standard optical
fibre (0.2dB/km), but in terms of dB we can also see over 30dB of maximum increase in channel loss
between Alice and Bob.
basis. Similar goes for TZss = Q
Z
ssE
Z
ss. All the error-gains and gains are functions of ηA, ηB too.
In an actual experiment, the users collect the corresponding counts and error-counts over the entire
session, and divide them by the number of signals sent respectively for each intensity combination
to acquire the average gain and error-gain. The X basis gain and error-gain are used in decoy-state
analysis for privacy amplification, and the Z basis error-counts and counts follow error-correction and
key generation. We can see that, since an experiment actually performs privacy amplification and error-
correction on the observables collected over the entire session and calculates their average values, we can
define an observable model that accurately represents the expected key rate in an experiment:
RObservable(Ω) = R[〈QXij 〉, 〈TXij 〉, 〈QZss〉, 〈TZss〉] (4.14)
This model represents the actual observables one would get in an experiment, and takes into consideration
the effect turbulence-induced fluctuations can have on the average QBER (error-counts) in the X basis.
We plot the observable model versus static and simplified model in Fig. 4.3 (a) (without applying any
post-selection). We can see that the simplified model fails to characterize the effect of turbulence and
assumes the same key rate as a static channel, while the observable model shows that MDI-QKD key
rate greatly decreases with turbulence if not addressed actively.
4.2.3 Choice of Post-selection Thresholds
In this subsection we discuss some good choices for the threshold Ω Charles uses when post-selecting
signals.
Let us first plot out the key rate versus ηA, ηB function in Fig. 4.2 (b). Note that this function is
only determined by the experimental parameters (misalignment, dark count, detector efficiency) and the
intensities Alice and Bob choose, and it does not depend on the joint PDTC of the channels.
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From it we can see that the key rate follows a near-parabolic shape, with two asymptotic lines corre-
sponding to the maximum and minimum channel asymmetry x = ηA/ηB (which graphically correspond
to the reciprocal of slope). This is reasonable because the QBERs (mainly EXij , but also E
Z
ss which is
less sensitive but still affected) depend on the channel asymmetry, and the key rate becomes zero at two
cut-off points xmax, xmin. The existence of these two cut-off lines for asymmetry is analytically proven
for the infinite-decoy case in Ref. [65], which shows that for R = 0 there are two groups of solutions at
xmax, xmin, regardless of the actual amplitudes of ηA, ηB , while for the case of finite-decoys the result is
numerically shown (although yet to be proven analytically because there is no simple analytical formula
for EXij ).
In BB84, the optimal threshold we select was ηcritical such that all η < ηcritical satisfy R(η) = 0.
Similarly, for MDI-QKD, since we know all the information in the R(ηA, ηB) plot, here we can propose
to use a threshold Ωboundary defined by where R(ηA, ηB) ≥ 0:
Ωboundary = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 : R(ηA, ηB) ≥ 0} (4.15)
To simplify the implementation, it’s also possible to approximate this boundary (which takes a near-
parabolic shape) with four straight lines, representing two characteristics: ηcriticalA , η
critical
B (which are
mainly determined by the dark counts), and xmax, xmin (which are mainly affected by basis misalign-
ment). We can then require the signals to jointly satisfy the conditions on signal-to-noise ratio and
symmetry, i.e.
Ωjoint = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 :ηAT ≤ ηA ≤ 1, ηBT ≤ ηB ≤ 1,
xmin ≤ ηA/ηB ≤ xmax}
(4.16)
The two thresholds are plotted in Fig. 4.2 (c). Importantly, the plot R(ηA, ηB) is generated without any
information of the PDTC, and all the above information including R = 0 boundary, ηcriticalA , η
critical
B ,
and xmax, xmin are all acquired from the plot of R(ηA, ηB) alone, which only depends on the intensi-
ties and the experimental parameters (misalignment, dark count rate, detector efficiency etc.), but are
independent of the actual joint PDTC of the channel. This means that they can be very conveniently
pre-determined before the experiment for real-time post-selection of signals (instead of having to opti-
mize the threshold after the experiment).
4.3 Numerical Results
Here we present a numerical simulation for the post-selection method we proposed. For simplicity, here
we consider a 4-intensity protocol with infinite-data size and fixed intensities. First, we tested the key
rate of MDI-QKD in the presence of turbulence without post-selection. As can be seen, the simplified
model “overestimates” the key rate since it assumes the same key rate as a static model. The observable
model correctly captures the decrease in key rate due to turbulence-induced asymmetry. We can see that,
without post-selection, the performance of MDI-QKD greatly decreases in the presence of turbulence.
In Fig. 4.3(b), we plot the observable model obtained from the two threshold methods versus no
post-selection. As can be seen, the R = 0 boundary Ωboundary (and the approximated Ωjoint which has
a key rate just slightly less than the former) captures the most information of the key rate function and
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results in a key rate very similar to the upper bound of integration model RIntegration, which asymptot-
ically utilizes all information of the probability function and is expected to always produce higher key
rate than models that utilize average values - i.e. an upper-bound for the observable model. Nonetheless,
we can see that using the thresholds, the performance we obtain with observable model approaches this
upper bound very closely, meaning that the thresholds we propose are near-optimal.
4.4 Discussions
In this chapter we make an important observation that turbulence-induced channel asymmetry decreases
the key rate of MDI-QKD. This means that using post-selection is not only a potential means of im-
provement, but actually might be a necessity in acquiring a good rate, since simply not addressing the
turbulence will result in a low rate. We then proposed the powerful solution of a prefixed-threshold post-
selection method for MDI-QKD, which can greatly increase the maximum tolerable loss in MDI-QKD
communications, paving the way towards future experimental implementations of MDI-QKD.
A few remaining questions include: (1) although we numerically show that certain threshold choices
can result in a near-optimal key rate, it remains to be shown analytically why such a boundary of
R = 0 gives maximum key rate after post-selection. (2) In reality, the free-space channels between Alice
and Bob are likely not of equal mean transmittances (e.g. due to different distances). The R(ηA, ηB)
map (and R=0 boundary) method in principle holds true for asymmetric cases where the two channels
have different mean transmittances ηA0 6= ηB0 (which will be represented by a lopsided joint PDTC),
and the users can also choose different intensities (which results in a lopsided R(ηA, ηB) contour too).
More testing remains to be shown for these cases. (3) finite-size effects are important considerations in
practical QKD. For this case the intensities (and the probabilities of sending them) need to be highly
optimized for a good key rate, and the optimal parameters change with distance - which changes the
rate function too. Moreover, post-selection not only decreases the total amount of signals, but will also
result in stronger statistical fluctuation among post-selected signals too, hence affecting the key rate. In
this case a more careful discussion is needed. These questions will be the subject of our future studies.
Chapter 5
MDI-QKD over Asymmetric
Channels
This chapter is largely reproduced from our paper Ref. [65].
5.1 Background
As we introduced in Chapter 2, there is great interest in the community to apply QKD to a network
setting, i.e. designing quantum networks that can connect and provide service to numerous users, who
may freely join or leave a network. There have been multiple field implementations of point-to-point QKD
networks, e.g., Refs.[54, 55, 56], but they all rely on trusted relays, which could become susceptibilities
in the security of the system. MDI-QKD addresses this problem by allowing untrusted relays. This
makes MDI-QKD a great candidate for future quantum networks. A first three-user MDI-QKD network
experiment has been reported in Ref. [57].
However, because MDI-QKD makes use of two-photon interference between the incoming signals of
Alice and Bob, in order to obtain a good interference visibility, a major limitation is imposed on MDI-
QKD: all users need to have near-identical (i.e. symmetric) distances to the untrusted relay [58, 59],
and the key rate will quickly decrease (due to reduced interference visibility and increased QBER) with
an increased level of asymmetry between channels.1
To circumvent this limitation, previous experiments of MDI-QKD either were performed in the
laboratory over symmetric fibre spools [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], or had to resort to a makeshift solution of
deliberately adding a tailored length of fibre to the shorter channel, which introduces additional loss in
exchange for better symmetry [24]. Such a strategy of adding additional fibres not only is cumbersome
as it requires halting the system (and it is also not practical when there are many pairs of connections
in a quantum network, or when channel loss is changing with time), but also results in suboptimal key
rate when channels are asymmetric. An intuitive illustration of this can be found in Appendix C.1.
In reality, it is very likely for a quantum network to have asymmetric channels due to e.g. different
geographical locations of sites. For instance, the channel losses in Ref.[54, 55] are largely different. Here
1Note that, there have also been proposals for continuous variable (CV) MDI-QKD [110, 111], which provides high key
rate for short distances, but is typically limited to distances < 25km even when assuming a high detector efficiency of 98%.
In this work we will focus on only discrete-variable MDI-QKD.
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Figure 5.1: An example schematic setup of MDI-QKD, reproduced from Ref. [17]. Alice and Bob
respectively send signals through two channels, and Charles measures the signals with a Bell-state
measurement (by observing the coincidence click events in detectors D1H , D1V , D2H , D2V , behind the
beam-splitter (BS) and polarizing beam-splitters (PBS)) and announces the results. Here weak coherent
pulse (WCP) sources are used, in combination with decoy states created with intensity modulators
(Decoy-IM). In this particular setup, polarization encoding is used (with polarization modulators (Pol-
M)), but MDI-QKD can be performed with other degrees-of-freedom, such as time-bin phase encoding,
too. Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
we select 5 nodes from the Vienna QKD network [54] and show them in Fig. 5.2(a), where the biggest
difference between channels is as large as 66km. If we’d like to perform MDI-QKD over these locations,
although one can add additional fibres to each channel to compensate for channel differences, users will
have to accommodate for the lowest-transmittance channel – just like in “Liebig’s barrel” – and have
sub-optimal rate. Moreover, in a scalable network with large numbers of dynamically added/deleted
users, it is not practical to add fibres and maintain symmetry between each pair of users all the time.
Additionally, if one is to implement a MDI-QKD network over free-space between mobile platforms
(e.g., satellite-based MDI-QKD [112] or maritime MDI-QKD between ships), the losses in the channels
are constantly changing, and the channels will often be highly asymmetric, as shown in Fig. 5.2(b).
In summary, in a practical quantum network, the requirement on symmetric channels will significantly
limit the key rate of previous MDI-QKD protocols, and seriously hinder the widespread deployment of
MDI-QKD.
The issue of MDI-QKD with asymmetric channel losses was first considered in Ref. [4], which
provided a rule of thumb on the ratio of intensities between Alice’s and Bob’s signals. However, Ref. [4]
assumes infinitely large data size, and was also restricted to protocols where the same set of intensities
for the optical signals are used in the two bases, X and Z. In this paper, we make no such assumptions.
In this chapter, we present a new method to overcome this crucial limitation directly, and enable high-
rate MDI-QKD with arbitrary user locations. First of all, our work provides an important conceptual
insight: a common folklore in the field is that MDI-QKD relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) dip and,
therefore, it is important to use matched intensities at the beam-splitter of the receiver, Charles, in MDI-
QKD. Here, we show that such a folklore is, in fact, a misconception. We show that there is an intrinsic
asymmetry between the two bases of MDI-QKD: only the X-basis relies on the indistinguishability of
Chapter 5. MDI-QKD over Asymmetric Channels 55
Figure 5.2: (a) Part of the QKD network setup from Ref.[54]. Here as an example, we focus on the five
nodes with high asymmetry (Nodes A1, A3, A4, A5 connected with A2, corresponding to nodes 1-5 in
Ref.[54]), where A2 can be set up as an untrusted relay. We keep the same topology and redraw it as a
star-shaped MDI-QKD network with four users connected to a single untrusted relay. When performing
MDI-QKD, all users need to accommodate for the longest channel (i.e. A1) and add losses to their
channels (e.g. extending to A′3, A
′
4, A
′
5), if previous protocols are used. (b) Ship-to-ship communication
and ground-satellite communication, where the participants’ distances to the detector are constantly
changing, and the channels will thus have quickly varying asymmetry. Reproduced from [65] @2019
APS.
photons from the two beams, while the Z basis does not. We will later show that one can make use of
such asymmetry to create protocols resilient against asymmetric channels. We also show that this is a
general theoretical result applicable to many protocols, including various types of MDI-QKD protocols,
and potentially other protocols such as MDI-quantum-digital-signature [113, 114], and twin field QKD
[25] in asymmetric settings.
Following this conceptual insight, we present a novel method in this chapter to combat channel
asymmetry. We make use of the inherent asymmetry between bases in MDI-QKD, and propose a type
of asymmetric MDI-QKD protocols where intensities are not only different for Alice and Bob, but also
different in X and Z bases. In this way, by decoupling the bases and also allowing Alice and Bob
to independently vary their intensities, the users can effectively compensate for channel asymmetry in
one basis, and optimize the key generation rate in another basis, enabling a much higher key rate for
our asymmetric protocols in the presence of channel asymmetry. Additionally, we present a technique
that makes it possible to efficiently perform local search for high-speed parameter optimization over the
extremely large parameter space for such asymmetric protocols (which would be otherwise impossible
to optimize using previous algorithms such as in Refs. [62, 58]).
The protocols we propose have important practical impacts. We show that, when channels are
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asymmetric, our protocols can provide a much higher key rate than previous protocols [86]2 that were
designed for symmetric channels (for instance, one to two orders of magnitudes higher rate at mid-to-close
distances e.g. (60km, 10km) for (Alice’s, Bob’s) channels, with 50km difference in channel distances).
Moreover, it enables a much larger region of possible combinations of channels: for instance, even at
a small data size of N = 1011 (N is defined as the total number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob),
one can generate a high secret key rate of R = 10−7 per pulse even through an extremely asymmetric
channel pair of (0km, 90km) for (Alice’s, Bob’s) channels, whereas with previous protocols no key could
be generated at all. Using the type of protocol we proposed, one can completely remove the requirement
of symmetric channels in MDI-QKD. This makes our proposal a powerful solution that enables high-rate
MDI-QKD under arbitrary asymmetry, which paves the way for practical MDI-QKD networks where
users can be placed at arbitrary locations.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 5.2.1, we point out a theoretical insight that
there is an inherent asymmetry between the two bases of MDI-QKD. In section 5.2.2 we make use of this
insight and propose a type of asymmetric protocols that simultaneously have two kinds of asymmetries:
the asymmetry between Alice and Bob, and the asymmetry between X and Z bases, which, together,
enable the protocol to effectively compensate for different pairs of channels and maintain good key
generation rate. We show the security of such a scheme in section 5.2.3. We then describe how to
optimally choose the asymmetric parameters in Subsection II.D. While our proposal applies to a general
type of MDI-QKD protocols, we also highlight a specific implementation, a “7-intensity protocol”, and
show that it is a good trade-off between key rate and ease of implementation. Lastly, we present the
simulation results to show the effectiveness of our protocol compared with prior protocols in section 5.3.
5.2 Asymmetric Protocols
In this section, we present a general theoretical framework for designing protocols that can effectively
compensate for channel asymmetry and provide a good key rate.
Note that, our method proposed here is a general result that can be applied to any decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol with WCP source, for both asymptotic and finite-size cases, as long as (1) decoupled
bases are used and (2) Alice and Bob have asymmetric intensities. We show in Appendices C.2 and C.3,
that the scaling of key rate versus distance is determined by the signal states, so in principle any number
of decoy states (e.g. two-decoy, three-decoy, and four-decoy) can be used so long as they can effectively
estimate the single-photon contributions. In principle, such method can potentially even be applied to
other types of protocols in asymmetric settings, such as MDI-quantum-digital-signature [113, 114], and
twin field QKD [25], which are also currently limited to symmetric intensities between Alice and Bob,
and which also use two asymmetric bases X and Z.
2A previous protocol of interest for MDI-QKD is the 4-intensity protocol proposed by Zhou et al. [86]. In this protocol,
Alice and Bob each use three intensities {µ, ν, ω} in the X basis to perform decoy-state analysis [14, 15, 16], and uses
one signal intensity {s} in the Z basis to generate the secret key. The 4-intensity protocol can greatly improve MDI-
QKD performance under limited data size. However, it limits its discussions to the symmetric case only (Alice and Bob
using identical parameters), which is suboptimal in an asymmetric setting. Although Ref. [86] mentioned on passing
the possibility of using different intensities of optical signals for Alice and Bob, little analysis on this important case was
performed there. So, up till now, it has not been clear how exactly Alice and Bob could compensate for asymmetric channel
losses with different signal intensities.
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5.2.1 Asymmetry between Bases in MDI-QKD
Here, we start by making a key theoretical observation on MDI-QKD:
Figure 5.3: An example of the respective quantum bit error rate (QBER) in X basis and Z basis,
EXµµ and E
Z
ss (we consider a pair of decoy states with intensities µA, µB in the X basis, and signal
state intensities sA, sB in the Z basis) versus ratio of intensities, for MDI-QKD using WCP sources.
Parameters from Table 5.2 are used. Here we consider the case where the respective distances from Alice
and Bob to Charles are LA = 60km,LB = 10km (i.e. the ratio of transmittances in the two channels
satisfies ηB/ηA = 10). We fix sAηA + sBηB = 0.17 (or µAηA + µBηB = 0.07) and scan over different
sA/sB (or µA/µB). Specifically, we also mark out the position where sAηA = sBηB (µAηA = µBηB).
Because QBER in the X basis heavily depends on the visibility of two-photon interference, it is lowest
when intensities arriving at Charles’ beam-splitter are equal (Similar observation has been made in
Ref.[59].) However, importantly, the Z basis does not require signal indistinguishability, and its QBER is
determined mainly by misalignment. The misalignment makes the Z basis QBER also slightly dependent
on the interference visibility, and lowest when arriving intensities are equal, but such QBER is much less
sensitive to unbalanced intensities and is relatively low even if sAηA 6= sBηB. Therefore, by decoupling X
and Z basis, we can maintain highly balanced decoy state intensities arriving at Charles in the X basis,
while further optimizing signal intensities to obtain higher key rate. As a quantitative example of such
difference in sensitivity, let us consider LA = 60km, LB = 10km and N = 10
11 (Table 5.4 line 1), and
focus on two pairs of decoy states with intensities µA, µB , νA, νB . An optimal key rate of R = 3.1×10−5
can be achieved, where optimal decoy state intensities satisfy µA/µB = νA/νB = 9 ≈ ηB/ηA, and
EXµµ, E
X
νν are both close to 25% (see Table 5.4 for the full list of intensities and probabilities). Deviating
from “balanced arriving intensities” results in low or zero rate (for instance when choosing symmetric
µA/µB = νA/νB = 1, E
X
µµ and E
X
νν are almost 42%, and rate R = 0). On the other hand, the optimal
signal states satisfy sA/sB = 3.5, which deviates from ηB/ηA, but E
Z
µµ is still a rather small 0.013. In
fact, here even if we choose sA = sB = 0.245, we can still get R = 1.1× 10−5 while EZss = 0.029. Figure
based on [65] @2019 APS, but re-generated with fixed sAηA +sBηB and µAηA +µBηB to make the curves
symmetric.
Observation 1: For MDI-QKD, there is an inherent asymmetry between the bases: only the diagonal
(X) basis requires the indistinguishability of the signals from Alice and Bob, while the rectilinear (Z)
basis does not.
Chapter 5. MDI-QKD over Asymmetric Channels 58
Such an observation is because, in MDI-QKD, Charles performs a Bell-state measurement with
post-selection, making the protocol different from a simple two-photon interference in standard Hong-
Ou-Mandel (HOM) dip. Here let us follow the discussions in Ref. [17] (and consider the experimental
setup from Fig. 1 in Ref. [17]). Note that while Alice and Bob randomly send signals in the X and
Z bases, Charles always measures in the Z basis (as defined by his polarizing beam-splitter(PBS)) and
post-selects detector click events that correspond to the two Bell states |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉+ |V H〉) and
|ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉). Such a post-selection results in an asymmetry between the two bases. In
the Z basis, only events where Alice and Bob sent opposite states (e.g. |HV 〉 or |V H〉) are accepted as
bits. In these cases no photon interference takes place, and indistinguishability between the two input
photon beams is not required, because each of the clicking detectors respectively receives only a signal
from either Alice or Bob but never both. For WCP sources, in the ideal case with no misalignment or
dark counts, the intensities of the pulses and even their spectrum and timing need not be matching at
all. In the X basis, however, the events may correspond to identical states sent by Alice and Bob (e.g.
|++〉 and |−−〉 corresponding to |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|++〉 − |−−〉)), which do interfere at the beam splitter.3
To ensure that the correct events are triggered, a good visibility of such a two-photon interference is
required. Note that for WCP sources, the interference visibility is at most 50% (resulting in a 25%
observed QBER in the X basis even in the ideal case - for instance EXµµ, E
X
νν when Alice and Bob use
decoy states with intensities µA, µB and νA, νB - but we can perform decoy-state analysis to correctly
estimate a low QBER among single photon components, eX,U11 ) and the visibility will quickly drop when
intensities are mismatched, such as observed in [59].
Therefore, a low QBER in the X basis heavily relies on the indistinguishability of the signals and
the balance of incoming intensities at Charles, while such dependence is not present in the Z basis.4
Such a conclusion is rather general and also not dependent on the degree-of-freedom used for qubit
encoding - such as polarization encoding or time-bin phase encoding (where |HV 〉 and |V H〉 in the Z
basis correspond to pairs of early and late pulses, which will similarly not interfere at the beam splitter
since they have different timing).
5.2.2 Using Decoupled Bases and Asymmetric Intensities
Here, let us consider the key rate formula of MDI-QKD [17, 86]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(5.1)
where sA, sB are the intensities of signal states, Q
Z
ss, E
Z
ss are the gain and QBER in the Z (signal) basis,
Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 are the lower (upper) bounds of single-photon yield and QBER, estimated from the decoy
state statistics in the X basis (i.e. the observed gain and QBER for decoy states QXij , E
X
ij , where i, j
are decoy intensities, such as in {µA, νA, ω} and {µB, νB, ω} if Alice and Bob each chooses three decoy
3Another case where Alice and Bob sent |+−〉 or |−+〉 corresponds to the other Bell state, |ψ−〉. A two-photon
interference happens not at the beam splitter but at the polarizing beam splitter (PBS) instead. This setup is slightly
different from HOM interference but similar to that of Ref. [115], and also requires indistinguishability of e.g. spectrum,
timing, and matching intensities. For simplicity, here we will use the term “two-photon interference” for both cases.
4In the non-ideal case with basis misalignment, there may be a slight dependence in the Z basis too, as we see in Fig.
5.3, because misalignment results in crosstalk between signals from the two bases, but it will be a much smaller dependence
than that in the X basis.
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states), h2 is the binary entropy function, and fe is the error-correction efficiency.
In the key rate formula, the first part corresponds to key generation (where the privacy amplifica-
tion depends on the single-photon contributions estimated from decoy-state analysis), and the second
part corresponds to error-correction for the signal states. We can make another key observation on the
intensities used in the two bases:
Observation 2: In our protocol, the intensities of the signal states {sA, sB} used in the Z basis are in-
dependent from those of the decoy states used in the X basis, which means that the privacy amplification
process (to bound Eve’s information on the final key, i.e. estimate the phase error rate) in the X basis
is completely decoupled from error-correction in the Z basis for key generation.
This means that, it is possible for us to independently adjust the decoy states and the signal states
in their respective bases, to compensate for channel asymmetry, or to optimize key rate.
For the decoy states, their role is to estimate the single-photon contributions as accurately as pos-
sible. As mentioned above, when channels are asymmetric, using the same intensities for Alice and
Bob (hence different intensities arriving at Charles after the channels’ attenuation) will result in poor
interference visibility and high QBER in the X basis, and consequently poor estimation of eX,U11 . For a
good interference visibility, Alice and Bob should try to maintain similar intensities arriving at Charles,
so the decoy intensities should be chosen to roughly satisfy
µAηA = µBηB (5.2)
where ηA and ηB are the channel transmittances in Alice’s and Bob’s channels. A similar equation holds
true for νA and νB.
In contrast, for the signal states, they are not involved in privacy amplification. On the other hand,
they affect the signal state gain and QBER QZss, E
Z
ss (which determine the amount of error-correction),
and the probability of sending single photons for key generation sAe
−sAsBe−sB . The key point is, the
QBER EZss does not require indistinguishability of the signals. If there is no misalignment or noise, E
Z
ss
would be zero regardless of incoming intensities. In practice, due to imperfections such as misalignment,
the QBER EZss (whose full expression can be found in Appendix C.3 Eq. C.7) still slightly depends
on channel asymmetry and is also minimal if incoming intensities at Charles are balanced - but this is
for a much different reason (due to misalignment) than that in the X basis (mostly due to two-photon
interference). Furthermore, EZss is much less sensitive to channel asymmetry than QBER in the X basis.
We can observe this from Fig.5.3.
Note that, not only do signal intensities affect the signal state QBER, they also determine the
probabilities of sending single photons, hence affecting key generation too. This means that, while
having similar received signal intensities at Charles is surely one important criterion in achieving a good
key rate, the optimal choice of signal state intensities requires a trade-off between the single photon
probabilities and the error correction (and their optimal values can be found by numerical optimization).
Generally speaking, the ratio of signal intensities sA/sB does not satisfy a similar relation as Eq. 5.2,
i.e. generally
sAηA 6= sBηB (5.3)
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Therefore, the protocols we propose have two inherent asymmetries: an asymmetry between Alice
and Bob (so that they can have different intensities, and establish good two-photon interference in the
X basis), and an asymmetry between the X and Z bases (which allows decoy and signal states to be
independently optimized). Such inherent asymmetries in the protocols allow us to have a novel choice
of parameters and maintain a good key rate of MDI-QKD, even when Alice’s and Bob’s channels have
very different levels of loss. A more detailed discussion on how such independent choices of decoy and
signal states affect the key rate can be found in Appendix C.4.
We will discuss the security of such a scheme in section 5.2.3, and in section 5.2.4 we will discuss
how to actually choose the optimal decoy and signal intensities. We introduce the main challenge
in implementing such asymmetric protocols - performing efficient parameter optimization over a huge
parameter space - and how we address this problem by proposing two important theoretical results
for the key rate function of asymmetric MDI-QKD, and using them to design an efficient optimization
algorithm.
5.2.3 Security
In this subsection, we show that the security of our protocol with decoupled bases and asymmetric
intensities is not compromised compared to prior art protocols. Here we state two facts that its security
relies upon, both of which have been proven in established papers [17, 14]:
(1) Given the same photon number i in a pulse, Eve has no way of differentiating whether it came
from the decoy states or the signal states in the same basis;
(2) the single photons pairs in X and Z bases cannot be distinguished from each other.
The first fact is proven in Ref. [14], which ensures the decoy-state analysis works even with asymmet-
ric intensities, and the second fact is proven in Ref. [17], which ensures that the decoupling of bases works.
For fact (1), note that the density matrices for the two states are the same, independent of whether
they came from the decoy states or signal states. In quantum mechanics, whenever two density matrices
are the same, they are indistinguishable. Similarly, for fact (2), note that the density matrices for the
two cases are the same. Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish them even in principle.
In more detail, for fact (1), let us first consider a very similar process in traditional decoy-state BB84
[15, 14, 16]. Consider Alice using a laser with intensities µ or ν to send weak coherent pulses to Bob.
The photon number i follows a Poissonian distribution, e.g.
p(i|µ) = e−µµ
i
i!
p(i|ν) = e−ν ν
i
i!
(5.4)
The crucial point is that, the conversion from such a probability distribution described by intensities
µ or ν to a certain photon number i is a Markov process, i.e. it is memoryless, and for any given
photon number i in the channel, it does not contain any information of the intensity it came from.
Surely, Eve can guess with a conditional distribution, e.g. p(µ|i), the likelihood that it comes from a
certain intensity, but whatever actions Eve chooses to perform on the signal (e.g. choosing different
levels of yields Y E1i , Y
E2
i , ... with different probabilities for a given photon number i) will be completely
independent of the intensities Alice chose when sending the signal. This means that, in the asymptotic
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case with infinite data5, given the same photon number i in a pulse, we will still always have yield Yi
and QBER ei satisfying
Yi(µ) = Yi(ν)
ei(µ) = ei(ν)
(5.5)
when Alice uses intensities µ, ν. This is the exact observation as made in Ref. [14] (in Eqs. 4,5).
Similarly, for MDI-QKD, for any given pair of i-photon and j-photon pulse, there is no information
on which pair of intensity settings (e.g. µ1A, µ
1
B or µ
2
A, µ
2
B) they came from. That is, the yield Yi,j and
QBER ei,j will satisfy
Y Xi,j (µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
X
i,j (µ
2
A, µ
2
B)
eXi,j(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = e
X
i,j(µ
2
A, µ
2
B)
Y Zi,j(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
Z
i,j(µ
2
A, µ
2
B)
eZi,j(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = e
Z
i,j(µ
2
A, µ
2
B)
(5.6)
for signals in each of the bases X and Z (the latter two equations are meaningful if one also uses multiple
decoy intensities in the Z basis, although here we only use the first two equations as decoy-state analysis
is only performed in X basis for our protocols). This, again, is a well-established result for decoy-state
MDI-QKD as used in the original MDI-QKD paper [17]. Note that, this result (which simply comes from
the fact that the sending of photon number i from an intensity µ is a Markov process) does not rely on the
fact that Alice and Bob use the same intensities, and will remain unchanged for asymmetric intensities
too, i.e. µ1A 6= µ1B and µ2A 6= µ2B . Also, note that for successful decoy-state analysis we do not require
the symmetry between the two bases, i.e. Y Xi,j (µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
Z
i,j(µ
2
A, µ
2
B) or e
X
i,j(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = e
Z
i,j(µ
2
A, µ
2
B) for
multi-photon pulses are not required.
Fact (2) stems from the fact that, for single-photon components, Alice and Bob send the same
density matrices ρX1,1 = ρ
Z
1,1, that is, the single-photon pairs are basis-independent. This is an important
result explicitly stated in the original MDI-QKD paper [17] (in the “Security Analysis” section in the
Supplemental Information). Using decoupled bases (i.e. a different set of intensities for X and Z bases)
does not affect the single-photons themselves at all, but only affects the probability of sending these
single-photon pairs. However, this process of sending single-photon pair is again a Markov process.
That is, although the single-photon pairs might have different probabilities of coming from either X or Z
bases (which Eve can fully be aware of, just like in “efficient BB84” [116], where basis choice probability
is biased on purpose), for any given pair of single-photons that are sent, they are described by exactly
the same density matrix and there is no information contained on which basis they came from, i.e. they
are basis-independent. Therefore, we can safely conclude that Y X11 = Y
Z
11, which is the reason we can
perform decoy-state in the X basis only to estimate Y X11 , and use Y
Z
11 = Y
X
11 to obtain single-photon yield
in the Z basis.
The security of a scheme of decoupling the bases in MDI-QKD and using Y Z11 = Y
X
11 has also been
theoretically studied in Ref. [86] and (in the Appendix of) Ref. [22] 6, and the scheme has also been
5For the finite-size case, the yield and QBER in Eq. 5.5 are replaced with their expected values, 〈Yi〉 and 〈ei〉, and the
result still holds true, i.e. 〈Yi〉(µ) = 〈Yi〉(ν), 〈ei〉(µ) = 〈ei〉(ν). Similar applies to the yield and QBER in MDI-QKD. More
details on finite-size analysis can be found in Appendix C.8.
6The idea of decoupling the bases was first studied for BB84 in Ref. [117]. There the relation Y Z1 = Y
X
1 was used for
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Table 5.1: Example key rate comparison among MDI-QKD protocols where Alice and Bob use different
numbers of decoy states in X basis (and each keeps one signal state in the Z basis). The protocol
in Ref. [58, 118] where bases are not decoupled is also included for comparison. We use parameters
from Table 5.2, LA = 60km, LB = 10km, and N = 10
11. We can see that, regardless of the protocol,
using asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob always provides a higher key rate when channels
are asymmetric. The three-decoy protocol has a significantly higher key rate than either the prior art
protocol (which also uses three decoy states but uses non-decoupled bases) or two-decoy case. While the
asymmetric four-decoy case can provide the highest key rate, it provides a limited performance increase
of 60%, but comes at a cost of a more complex experimental implementation and more difficult data
collection and analysis. Therefore, in the presence of channel asymmetry, the three-decoy case, whose
asymmetric case corresponds to the “7-intensity protocol” (marked in bold), provides a good trade-off
between ease of implementation and performance.
Parameters prior art protocol in [58, 118] two-decoy three-decoy four-decoy
Symmetric 6.834× 10−10 0 3.890× 10−7 1.057× 10−5
Asymmetric 5.378× 10−7 7.715× 10−6 3.106× 10−5 4.932× 10−5
experimentally demonstrated in Ref. [23] and Ref. [22] - although all these works were focused on the
scenario of symmetric channels only, and did not discuss the role of decoupled bases in compensating
channel asymmetry, which is one of the main novelties of our work. However, physically, the only
difference between the signals sent from Alice and Bob in our protocol and those in prior protocols will
be the different intensities on the two arms (which we know, from fact (1) Y Xi,j (µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
X
i,j (µ
2
A, µ
2
B),
will not affect the security of decoy-state analysis), and for decoupled bases we use the same result
Y Z11 = Y
X
11 for single-photon pairs, which is no less secure than prior works either.
5.2.4 Parameter Optimization
In this section we discuss how to perform efficient parameter optimization for such asymmetric protocols.
Here we highlight an implementation that we denote as “7-intensity protocol” (which is the case where
three decoy intensities are used in the X basis). We show that it is a good trade-off between key rate
and ease of implementation, and focus on this implementation when discussing parameter optimization
(and the following numerical simulations). Nonetheless, we also show the generality of our method by
including the results for other protocol cases (e.g. two-intensity and four-intensity) in Appendix C.5.
Note that, results in the previous subsection are general and not limited to the number of decoys
Alice and Bob use in the X basis. For instance, while using signal states {sA, sB} in the Z basis, in the X
basis Alice and Bob can each use a different set of two decoy states {µ, ν}, three decoy states {µ, ν, ω},
or even four decoy states {µ, ν, ν2, ω}. The concept of asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob can
in principle also be applied to prior art protocols with non-decoupled bases, such as in Refs. [58, 118]
(where Alice and Bob use the same three decoy states {µ, ν, ω} for both bases, and the Z basis µ is used
as the signal state for key generation) - it is just that such protocol will have lower key rate since µ
cannot simultaneously satisfy asymmetry compensation and key rate optimization.
As an example, in Table 5.1 we list a comparison between the key rate of using different numbers
of decoy states (with and without asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob) in the presence of
asymmetric channels. We include the non-decoupled-bases case [58, 118] too. We can see that, regardless
single photons instead of single photon pairs.
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of the protocol, using asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob always provides a higher key rate
when channels are asymmetric. Also, the three-decoy case provides significant performance improvement
over either the two-decoy case or prior art protocol (which also has three decoy states, meaning that
decoupled bases are crucial in the compensation for channel asymmetry). While the asymmetric four-
decoy case can provide the highest key rate, it provides a limited performance increase (60%) over
three-decoy, but comes at a cost of more complex experimental implementation as well as more difficult
data collection and analysis. See Appendix C.5 for a more detailed comparison between the protocols.
Overall, we can see that the three-decoy case provides a good balance between ease of implementation
and performance.
Therefore, for practicality here, in the following text we will focus on the three-decoy case as a
concrete example (whose symmetric case is the 4-intensity protocol [86]), and generalize it to the asym-
metric case by allowing Alice and Bob to have independent intensities and probabilities. This enables
a “7-intensity protocol” (with 3 independent {s, µ, ν} for each of Alice and Bob, and the vacuum state
ωA = ωB = ω = 0) in the asymmetric case.
For such a protocol, efficient and accurate parameter optimization is crucial for obtaining good key
rate (especially when considering the finite-size effects). For the 7-intensity protocol we need to use a
total of 12 parameters for a full finite-size parameter optimization:
~v = [sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA , sB, µB, νB, PsB , PµB , PνB ].
here we denote the parameters as a vector ~v, and when all devices and channel parameters (e.g. channel
loss, misalignment, dark count rate, detector efficiency, etc.) are fixed, the key rate is a function of the
intensities and probabilities R(~v), and the question of intensity parameter optimization can be viewed
as searching for:
~vopt = arg max~v∈V [R(~v)] (5.7)
where V is the search space for the parameters.
To provide a high key rate under finite-size effects, the optimal choice of parameters is very important
in implementing the protocol. However, the 7-intensity protocol has an extremely large parameter space
of 12 dimensions, for which a brute-force search is next to impossible. Therefore, to efficiently search
over the parameters in a reasonable time, a local search algorithm must be applied. But, as we will show
here, an important characteristic of asymmetric MDI-QKD is the discontinuity of first-order derivatives
for the function R(~v) with respect to the intensity parameters in ~v. This means that a straightforward
local-search algorithm, such as previously proposed in [62], will inevitably fail to find the optimal point,
since it requires continuous first-order derivatives of the searched function.
Here we will present two important theoretical results for the key rate versus parameter function,
and propose a method to circumvent the problem of discontinuous derivatives and perform efficient
and correct local search in parameter space. This method helps us overcome the biggest challenge in
successfully implementing the 7-intensity protocol.
Firstly, we propose that there is an inherent symmetry constraint for the ratio of optimal decoy
intensities, that
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Figure 5.4: An example of the discontinuity of first-order derivatives of Y L11 vs µA, µB function in decoy-
state MDI-QKD, for fixed values of νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1. Note the ridge on the line
µA
µB
= νAνB = 2.
Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
Theorem I. for any arbitrary choice of device and channel parameters, the optimal decoy intensities
µoptA , ν
opt
A , µ
opt
B , ν
opt
B that maximize the key rate always satisfy the constraint:
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
(5.8)
Secondly, we make an important observation that,
Theorem II. The key rate versus (µA, µB) function, for any given νA, νB, does not have continuous
first-order derivatives.
Both of these theorems result from the fact that the lower bound for single-photon yield, Y L11, in
decoy-state analysis (whose expression can be found in Ref. [58, 118]) is a piecewise function that
depends on whether µAµB ≤ νAνB , where a boundary line
µA
µB
= νAνB exists.
Theorem I states that, the optimal parameters that maximize the key rate must lie exactly on this
boundary line, while Theorem II states that, the key rate does not have a continuous partial derivative
with respect to µA or µB across this boundary line. This will cause the boundary line to behave like a
sharp “ridge”, on which the gradient is not defined. An illustration for this “ridge” can be seen in Fig.
5.4. A rigorous proof for Theorems I and II in the asymptotic limit can be found in Appendix C.6.
Using Theorems I and II it is possible to transform the coordinates of the search variables, and
eliminate the undefined gradient problem of the key rate function. More specifically, instead of expressing
(µA, µB), (νA, νB) in Cartesian coordinates, we can express them in polar coordinates (r
polar
µ , θ
polar
µ ) and
(rpolarν , θ
polar
ν ), where polar angles satisfy θ
polar
µ = θ
polar
ν due to Theorem I. This means we can jointly
search for:
θpolarµν = θ
polar
µ = θ
polar
ν (5.9)
with respect to which the key rate is a smooth function (graphically, this is because we are now always
searching along the “ridge”). In Appendix C.7, we will describe in more detail how to perform efficiently
an optimization of the parameters based on local-search to obtain a high secure key rate for our 7-intensity
protocol. Our method allows extremely fast and highly accurate optimization for asymmetric MDI-QKD,
and takes below 0.1s for each full local search (at any given distance) on a quad-core i7-4790k@4.0GHz
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Figure 5.5: Left: Comparison of rate vs (LA, LB). The rates are plotted in contours in log-scale, from
10−2 to 10−10. We use the parameters from Table 5.2, and N = 1011. (a) using a previous 4-intensity
protocol, (b) using our 7-intensity protocol. As can be seen, while 4-intensity MDI-QKD is limited to
only high-symmetry regions, using 7-intensity can greatly increase the applicable region of MDI-QKD,
even in extremely asymmetric regions such as (LA, 0) where one channel has zero distance (point B).
Moreover, we see that with 7-intensity protocol both LA, LB components of the gradient for key rate
(red dotted arrow) are always negative, meaning that with 7-intensity protocol it is always optimal to
only adjust the intensities, and never necessary to add any fibre, while for 4-intensity protocol, adding
fibre (e.g. increasing LB at point C) will sometimes increase the rate. Right: Comparison of rate vs
distance (Bob to Charles) for various fixed levels of mismatch x = ηAηB where ηA, ηB are the channel
transmittances, (c) using 4-intensity protocol (d) using 7-intensity protocol. As can be observed, the
higher the mismatch, the more advantage 7-intensity protocol has (and only when the channels are
symmetric will the two protocols perform identically). Data points from A1, A3, B1, B3 from Table 5.3
are also shown in the plots. Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
PC. Such computing efficiency makes it possible for real-time optimization of intensities on-the-field,
and also makes possible a dynamic MDI-QKD network that might add/delete new user nodes in real
time. In addition, in Appendix C.7 we also discuss the effect of inaccuracies and fluctuations of the
intensities and probabilities on the key rate, and show that our method is robust even in the presence
of inaccuracies and fluctuations of the parameters.
In summary, using our two Theorems and switching to polar coordinates as in Eq. 5.9 allows us to
greatly simplify the optimization problem and allow standard coordinate descent method to be applied
here.
5.3 Simulation Results
Now, we can proceed to study the performance of asymmetric MDI-QKD protocols with full parameter
optimization. Again, we use the 7-intensity protocol as a concrete example as it provides a good trade-off
between performance and practicality. We also include simulation results for protocols with alternative
numbers of decoy states in Appendix C.5.
In the main text we focus on the practical case of having finite data size. The asymptotic case of
infinitely many data size (and an analytical understanding of the ideal infinite-decoy case) is discussed
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Table 5.2: Parameters for numerical simulations, adopted from [23], including detector dark count rate
and efficiency Y0, ηd, optical misalignment ed, error-correction efficiency f , and failure probability .
Y0 ηd ed f 
8× 10−7 65% 0.5% 1.16 10−7
Table 5.3: Simulation results for asymmetric MDI-QKD in two scenarios: case A (10km, 60km) and
case B (30km, 60km), using parameters from Table 5.2 and N = 1011. We define channel mismatch
as x = ηAηB where ηA, ηB are the channel transmittances. Note that in reality, Alice and Bob cannot
modify the physical channels, and they can either add loss to the channels or keep them as-is, but
cannot decrease channel loss. Three strategies are compared here: A1 and B1 represent using the old
4-intensity protocol directly. A2 and B2 (not in Fig. 5.5) represent adding fibre to the shorter channel
to match the longer channel, i.e. making the channels (60km, 60km). And A3, B3 represent using our
new 7-intensity protocol without modifying the channels. As shown here, 7-intensity protocol always
returns a higher rate than both strategies using 4-intensity protocol.
Protocol Point x LB LA Rate Comparison with 4-intensity protocol
4-intensity A1 0.1 10km 60km 3.891× 10−7 -
4-intensity + fibre A2 1 60km 60km 1.862× 10−6 +379%
Our protocol A3 0.1 10km 60km 3.106× 10−5 +7883%
4-intensity B1 0.25 30km 60km 4.746× 10−6 -
4-intensity + fibre B2 1 60km 60km 1.862× 10−6 -61%
Our protocol B3 0.25 30km 60km 1.445× 10−5 +204%
in Appendices C.2 and C.3, and its simulation results can be found in Fig.C.3.
Our finite-key analysis is described in more detail in Appendix C.8. For simplicity we consider a
standard error analysis in numerical simulations, but it is important to note that our theory is fully
compatible with composable security. See Appendix C.8 for discussions. In addition, compared to the
“joint-bound” analysis as proposed in Ref. [86] (which jointly considers the statistical fluctuation of
multiple observables. Such an analysis model increases the key rate, but introduces multiple maxima
undesirable for local search), in the main text here we have chosen to use an “independent-bound”
analysis for our simulations, which considers each variable’s statistical fluctuations independently, and
is far more stable and faster in simulations. However, we specifically note here that all our methods
are fully compatible with joint-bound analysis. We list some representative results generated with joint-
bound analysis in Table 5.4 for comparison, and will discuss the different finite-size analysis models in
more detail in Appendix C.8.
Firstly, we consider the key rate for an arbitrary combination of (LA, LB), and perform a simulation
of key rate over all possible range of Alice and Bob’s channels. This provides a bird’s-eye view of how
using 7-intensities can affect the performance in asymmetric channels. We show the results in Fig. 5.5
(a)(b). From the plot we can make three important observations:
(1) Using 7-intensity protocol, we have a much wider applicable region for asymmetric MDI-QKD,
and an acceptable key rate can be acquired even for highly asymmetric channels. In addition, 7-intensity
protocol will always provide a higher key rate than 4-intensity protocol, except when channels are already
symmetric.
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Table 5.4: Examples of optimal parameters for the 7-intensity protocol, using simulation parameters
from Table 5.2. The numerical values are rounded to the accuracy of 0.001 in the table here. As
can be observed, Alice and Bob’s intensities compensate for channel asymmetry, while their intensity
probabilities are mostly identical - since the intensities have already compensated for the asymmetry
- despite having some numerical noises (as the key rate is not sensitive to the probabilities near the
maximum, the algorithm satisfies with them having close enough, rather than perfectly identical, values,
so the optimal values found are still slightly different even when x = 1). As shown in section 5.2, the
optimal decoy state ratios are the same, i.e. µAµB =
νA
νB
. Moreover, we can observe that the ratio of decoy
states more closely follows 1x than the ratio of signal intensities.
LA LB x sA µA νA PsA PµA PνA R
60km 10km 0.1 0.662 0.522 0.100 0.600 0.033 0.255 3.106× 10−5
60km 30km 0.25 0.593 0.457 0.089 0.581 0.036 0.266 1.445× 10−5
60km 60km 1 0.402 0.305 0.063 0.478 0.047 0.330 1.862× 10−6
LA LB x sB µB νB PsB PµB PνB
60km 10km 0.1 0.202 0.058 0.011 0.600 0.031 0.256
60km 30km 0.25 0.294 0.125 0.024 0.580 0.034 0.269
60km 60km 1 0.402 0.305 0.063 0.480 0.047 0.329
(2) No matter what position one is at, there is never any necessity for adding loss when 7-intensity
protocol is used, and optimizing on-the-spot always provides the highest rate. Details can be seen in
Fig. 5.5 caption.
(3) Using 7-intensity protocol, even extremely asymmetric scenarios, such as (L, 0) where LB = 0,
can be used to generate a good key rate. In fact, this provides an even higher rate than with symmetric
channels such as (L,L) (As the comparison between points A and B in Fig. 5.5).
Point 3 has an important practical implication: it can lead to a new type of “single-arm” MDI-QKD
setup. More details can be found in Appendix C.9 and Fig. C.8.
Here for Points 1-3, we have a good physical understanding of why allowing different intensities for
Alice and Bob can provide a larger region where the key rate is positive. As discussed in section 5.2.2,
MDI-QKD requires highly balanced intensities arriving at Charles on the two arms in the X basis for
good interference visibility, as well as roughly similar (but not necessarily balanced) levels of arriving
intensities in the Z basis, which optimize a trade-off between error-correction and probability of sending
single-photons. (The optimal choice of intensities is subject to numerical optimization as described in
section 5.2.4). Prior methods with same intensities for Alice and Bob will suffer from high QBER both
in X and Z basis, while our method decouples X and Z basis, and optimally chooses Alice and Bob’s
signal and decoy intensities respectively to compensate for channel asymmetry in both bases, ensuing
low QBER and allowing for a much higher key rate under channel asymmetry. Such effect is present in
both asymptotic and finite-key scenarios, and is the underlying reason that the 7-intensity protocol can
allow high-rate MDI-QKD regardless of channel asymmetry.
Additionally, we show that, when channels are highly asymmetric, the asymptotic key rate of the
7-intensity protocol scales quadratically with the lower transmittance among the two channels - which
means that, albeit always being able to provide higher key rate and being much more convenient than e.g.
adding fibres when channels are asymmetric (which is a relation we rigorously prove in Appendix C.3.2 for
the asymptotic case), the 7-intensity protocol will not change the asymptotic scaling properties of MDI-
QKD key rate, which is still quadratically related to transmittance - physically, this is understandable,
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since although we effectively compensate for channel asymmetry with optimized intensities and allow
good Hong-Ou-Mandel interference at Charles for decoy states, MDI-QKD still fundamentally depends
on two single signal photons both passing through the channels, hence its key rate is quadratically related
to transmittance, even in the asymmetric case with compensated intensities. More detailed discussions
and analytical proofs of the above observations can be found in Appendices C.2 and C.3.
Now, as a concrete example, let us consider two sets of channels at (LB = 10km,LA = 60km) and
(LB = 30km,LA = 60km), through which Alice and Bob would like to perform MDI-QKD. We compare
strategies of using the 4-intensity protocol, directly or with fibres added until channels are symmetric,
with directly using our 7-intensity protocol. As can be seen in Table 5.3, in this specific example, using
7-intensity protocol can provide one or two magnitudes higher key rate, and its rate is also always higher
than either strategy with 4-intensity protocol.
In fact, we can also show this by plotting key rate vs LB under a fixed mismatch x =
ηA
ηB
where
ηA, ηB are the channel transmittances (i.e. fixed difference between LA and LB). This is also the
scenario studied by Ref. [58]. Results are shown in Fig. 5.5 (c) and (d). The data points A1/A3 and
B1/B3 in Table 5.3 are also plotted. As can be seen, the higher the asymmetry between channels, the
more improvement we can gain from using 7-intensity protocol.
Figure 5.6: Here we plot the ratios of signal intensities and decoy intensities versus distance, when
channel mismatch is fixed at x = 0.1 (i.e. LA = LB + 50km). The simulation parameters are from
Table 5.2 (and this plot of intensities corresponds to the solid red key rate line in Fig. 5.5 (d)) We
also include the line ηBηA = 10 for comparison. We can observe that, the ratio of decoy states roughly
follows ηBηA (to maintain good HOM interference visibility in X basis), while the optimal ratio of signal
intensities varies greatly between 1 (optimal for probability of sending single photon) and ηBηA (optimal
for EZss). This is because signal states affect both key generation and error-correction, so having similar
intensities arriving at Charles after channel attenuation is not the only criteria for good key rate, and
optimal parameters do not necessarily satisfy sAηA = sBηB. In fact, since signal states in Z basis are
decoupled from X basis, and EZss is less sensitive to unbalanced arriving intensities,
sA
sB
can be much more
freely optimized between 1 and ηBηA , allowing 7-intensity protocol to have higher key rate. Reproduced
from [65] @2019 APS.
Here, we also list some examples of optimal parameters found by the optimization algorithm, which
are listed in Table 5.4. As we can observe from the table, Alice and Bob adjust their intensities to com-
pensate for channel asymmetry. Physically, since MDI-QKD depends on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference
of two WCP sources in the X basis, we expect the received intensities for decoy states at Charles to be
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similar on the two arms to ensure good visibility (and consequently lower QBER) in the X basis, i.e. the
ratio of decoy intensities µAµB and
νA
νB
would roughly follow the rule-of-thumb of µAηA = µBηB, which is
indeed what we can observe from Table 5.4 and Fig.5.6.
On the other hand, the ratio of signal intensities sAsB deviates more from
ηB
ηA
. This is because, as
mentioned in section 5.2.1, signal intensities not only affect the Z basis QBER, but also need to optimize
a trade-off between the single photon probabilities and error-correction. This makes it usually not follow
sAηA = sBηB. An illustration of the ratios of decoy intensities and signal intensities can be seen in Fig.
5.6.
Now, having demonstrated the new 7-intensity protocol, we proceed to introduce a powerful reality
application for it: a scalable high-performance MDI-QKD network where any node can be dynamically
added or deleted. We consider the channels from a real quantum network setup in Vienna, reported in
Ref.[54]. We focus here on the high-asymmetry nodes, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, as shown in Fig. 5.2(a). We
found that our method leads to much higher key rates, and allows easy dynamic addition or deletion
of nodes. Since intensities can be independently optimized for each pair of channels, the establishment
of new connections does not affect any existing connections, hence providing good scalability for the
network (compared to e.g. the case of using 4-intensity protocol with the strategy of adding fibres,
where each channel needs to accommodate for the longest link among all channels). See Appendix C.10
for numerical results.
5.4 Conclusion
In summary, in this chapter we have proposed a method of effectively compensating for channel asym-
metry in MDI-QKD by adjusting the two users’ intensities and decoupling the two bases. Such a method
can drastically increase the scenarios MDI-QKD can be applied to while maintaining a good key rate.
This study provides a powerful and robust software solution for a scalable and reconfigurable MDI-QKD
network.
Our method is also a general result that can in principle be used for e.g. various numbers of decoys,
or various finite-size analysis models (e.g. joint-bounds analysis, or composable security with Chernoff’s
bound). It is also potentially applicable to other types of quantum communication protocols, such as
Twin-Field QKD [25], or MDI quantum digital signature [113, 114], which both use WCP sources and
decoy-state analysis. We hope that our proposal can inspire more future work on the study of asymmetric
protocols. In fact, in the following Chapter 6, we will discuss the successful application of our method
to TF-QKD in asymmetric settings.
After the completion of an earlier version of our manuscript, we have also experimentally implemented
our new protocol in [119] (see also [120]), thus demonstrating clearly the practicality of our work.
Chapter 6
TF-QKD over Asymmetric Channels
This chapter is largely reproduced from our paper Ref. [66].
In this chapter, we consider the Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol in an asymmetric setting. We apply
our results from Chapter 5 (for asymmetric MDI-QKD) to TF-QKD, and show that our method can work
effectively here too, enabling high key rate for TF-QKD even when channels are highly asymmetric. Just
like for MDI-QKD, these results enable a potential quantum network with untrusted relays implemented
with TF-QKD, which has the advantage of both high key rate and measurement-device-independence.
6.1 Background
As we have introduced in Chapter 2, the Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol [25] is able to beat the funda-
mental rate-distance trade-off bound (the linear bound). Moreover, it also provides security against at-
tacks on measurement devices similar to MDI-QKD. Because of these advantages, TF-QKD has attracted
much attention worldwide since its proposal. Since a rigorous security proof is not provided in the origi-
nal proposal, several papers have improved the protocol and provided security proof [28, 29, 30, 32, 31].
Also, recently there have been multiple reports of TF-QKD demonstrated experimentally [33, 34, 35, 36].
However, all the above security proofs and experimental demonstrations only consider the symmetric
case where Alice’s and Bob’s channels have the same amount of loss. In reality, though, in a network set-
ting, due to e.g. geographical locations, or Alice and Bob being situated on moving free-space platforms
(such as ships or satellites), it is very likely that Alice’s and Bob’s channels are not symmetric. In the
future, if a quantum network is built around the protocol - e.g. a star-shaped network where numerous
users (senders) are connected to one central node with measurement devices, asymmetry will be an even
more severe problem since it is difficult to maintain the same channel loss for all users (and users might
join/leave a network at arbitrary locations). If channels are asymmetric, for prior art protocols, users
would either have to suffer from much higher quantum-bit-error-rate (QBER) and hence lower key rate,
or would have to deliberately add fibre to the shorter channel to compensate for channel asymmetry,
which is inconvenient (since it requires physically modifying the channels) and also provides sub-optimal
key rate.
A similar limitation to symmetric channels has been observed in MDI-QKD. In Ref. [65], we have
proposed a method to overcome this limitation, by allowing Alice and Bob to adjust their intensities (and
use different optimization strategies for two decoupled bases) to compensate for channel loss, without
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having to physically adjust the channels. The method has also been successfully experimentally verified
for asymmetric MDI-QKD in Ref. [119].
In this chapter, we will apply our method to TF-QKD and show that it is possible to obtain good
key rate through asymmetric channels by adjusting Alice’s and Bob’s intensities - in fact, we will show
that, Alice and Bob only need to adjust their signal intensities to obtain optimal performance. We
show that the security of the protocol is not affected, and that an order of magnitude higher (than
a symmetric protocol) or 2-3 times higher (than adding fibre) key rate can be achieved with the new
method. Furthermore, we show with numerical simulation results that our method works well for both
finite-decoy and finite-data cases with practical parameters, making it a convenient and powerful method
to improve the performance of TF-QKD through asymmetric channels in reality.
While we use the same main idea of allowing Alice and Bob to use asymmetric intensities to com-
pensate for asymmetric channel losses as in Ref. [65], there are some key differences that need to be
addressed for asymmetric TF-QKD. Firstly, the security proof needs to be discussed, to show that the
introduction of asymmetric channels and intensities do not affect security. Secondly, as we will later
show in Section 6.4, there is an interesting distinction between the MDI-QKD protocol in [65] and the
TF-QKD protocol in [32] in how the two bases X and Z respectively react to asymmetric incoming inten-
sities, which makes the optimal strategies for asymmetric-intensity MDI-QKD and TF-QKD different.
We will discuss this in more detail in Section 6.4.
The idea of TF-QKD protocol through asymmetric channels has also been discussed in a recent paper
[121]. Our work Ref. [66] (which this chapter is based on) is different from Ref. [121] in several aspects.
First, Ref. [121] starts with a different protocol—“sending or not sending protocol”. Second, Ref. [121]
is mostly numerical. In contrast, we start with the “simple TF-QKD” protocol in [32] and consider its
asymmetric-intensity version. We include both analytical and numerical reasoning. We also provide a
detailed discussion about the physics behind the security of our asymmetric-intensity protocol.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: In Section 6.2, we define the setup and the protocol we use.
In Section 6.3 we will extend the security proof in Ref. [32] to the case with asymmetric intensities and
channels. In Section 6.4, we discuss how the performance of TF-QKD is affected by channel asymmetry
and asymmetric intensities (and for the latter, what are the best strategies for choosing the intensities).
We show the effectiveness of our method with simulation results in Section 6.5.
6.2 Protocol
Here we consider a similar TF-QKD setup as in Ref. [32] “Protocol 3”. Alice and Bob choose two
bases X and Z randomly. When X basis is chosen, Alice (Bob) sends states |α〉a (|α〉b) for bit bA = 0
(bB = 0) or states |−α〉a (|−α〉b) for bit bA = 1 (bB = 1). When Z basis is chosen, Alice and Bob send
phase-randomized coherent states ρa,βA (ρb,βB ), where the decoy state intensities are {βA, βB}. Note
that here Alice and Bob have a common phase reference for X basis signals. After the signals are sent
to Charles, the detector events are denoted as kc, kd (0 denotes no click, and 1 denotes a click).
The papers [25, 32] consider only the case where the channels between Alice (Bob) and Charles have
equal transmittances. In reality, it is possible that the channels might have different levels of loss, due to
e.g. geographical locations or moving platforms. Here we are interested in three questions for TF-QKD
with asymmetric channels:
1. Does channel asymmetry affect security?
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Figure 6.1: An example setup for a Twin-Field QKD system. Alice and Bob send signals in X and Z
bases randomly. In X basis, Alice and Bob send coherent states with amplitudes αA, αB (with intensities
sA = α
2
A, sB = α
2
B - in the asymmetric case, we allow sA to be different from sB), phase-modulated by
{0, pi} depending on the encoded bit. In Z basis, Alice and Bob send signals in phase-randomized coherent
states, with intensities chosen from {µA, νA, ωA} and {µA, νA, ωA}, respectively. Charles performs a swap
test on the incoming signals and reports the click events in his two detectors Dc, Dd (denoted by kc, kd).
By choosing different intensities between Alice and Bob (and using the decoupled X and Z bases), the
protocol can have high key rate even if Alice and Bob’s channels have different transmittances, ηA, ηB .
Reproduced from [66] @2019 NJP (CC-BY 3.0 license).
2. How does channel asymmetry affect the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and hence key rate?1
3. Can we improve the performance of the protocol under channel asymmetry?
We will use our method from Ref. [65] and apply it to Protocol 3 in Ref. [32], to make an “asymmetric-
intensity” TF-QKD protocol that works well even when channels are highly asymmetric. Similar to
MDI-QKD, the protocol in [32] has decoupled X and Z bases. Here we allow Alice and Bob to have
different intensities in the X and the Z bases respectively, such that in X basis Alice (Bob) now send
states |αA〉a (|αB〉b) for bit bA = 0 (bB = 0) or states |−αA〉a (|−αB〉b) for bit bA = 1 (bB = 1).
We can denote the signal intensities as sA = α
2
A, sB = α
2
B . In the Z basis, the amplitudes for the
phase-randomized coherent states, {βA, βB}, can be different for Alice and Bob too (we can denote the
intensities as {β2A, β2B}, and for the three-decoy case, the sets of intensities can be specifically written as
{µA, νA, ωA} and {µA, νA, ωA}). An example setup can be found in Figure C.1.
We will answer the above three questions by showing in the following text three main pieces of results:
(1) Neither asymmetric channels nor asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob affect security.
(2) The X basis (signal state) QBER will increase with channel asymmetry, and greatly reduce the
key rate of TF-QKD if no compensation is performed - on the other hand, the Z basis gain (as well as
the upper bound to the yield and phase-error rate derived from the observable data in the Z basis) is
little affected by channel asymmetry.
(3) We can use different intensities between Alice and Bob to compensate for channel asymmetry
and get a good key rate - in fact, using only different signal states between Alice and Bob (and keeping
all decoy states and probabilities identical for Alice and Bob) can already effectively compensate for
channel asymmetry and allow good key rate for asymmetric TF-QKD.
1In the Supplementary Materials of Ref. [119], we and our collaborators presented a preliminary study on this point,
and showed that asymmetry decreases single-photon interference visibility - which will in turn increase observable QBER
for TF-QKD.
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6.3 Security
In this section we will show that neither asymmetric channels nor asymmetric intensities between Alice
and Bob affect security. Following the discussion in [32], the key is generated from events in the X
basis, and the secure key rate is bounded using the bit-error rate and the phase-error rate. The X basis
bit-error rate is directly obtained as an observable, hence the key part of the security proof lies in the
estimation of X basis phase-error rate (equivalent to the Z basis bit-error rate) based on the Z basis
observables - which, since Z basis signals are phase-randomized, is not directly obtainable.
In the security proof in Ref. [32], the phase-error rate is obtained by upper-bounding the phase-error
rate using the estimated yields of given photon numbers {m,n} (which can be upper-bounded by using
decoy-state analysis, based on observed count rates, i.e. the gains, in the Z basis).
The key message we’d like to point out is that, this entire estimation process of the phase error rate
does not rely on the fact that Alice and Bob use the same amplitude α for their signal states, or that the
channels have the same transmittance. Therefore, here we will follow the proof in Ref. [32] step-by-step,
but with asymmetric intensities and channel transmittances, to show that the security proof can be
easily extended to the asymmetric case.
A small note is that, the formulation of the original security proof in [32] appears to assume a
single Kraus operator for the channel (i.e. a pure state after the measurement, which could involve
measurements from Charles and/or Eve), but the proof can, in fact, be extended to cover the general
case where the state could be a mixed state after passing through the channel and potentially being
disturbed by Eve.2 We have discussed with the original authors, and we thank Koji Azuma for pointing
out this fact [122] and the details of incorporating multiple Kraus operators to represent a mixed state
after the measurement (and applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the mixed state to obtain the bounds
on the phase error rate). In the following text we will use the formulation of multiple Kraus operators
and density matrices as in Koji Azuma’s clarification of the original proof.
We can start by imagining a virtual scenario where Alice (Bob) prepares entangled states between
a local qubit A (B) and a signal a (b) to be sent to Charles. After Charles performs a measurement
on the signals, the X basis phase-error rate (or Z basis bit-error rate) can be obtained by Alice (Bob)
measuring their local qubits in the Z basis. The initial states can be written as:
|ψAX〉Aa =
1√
2
(|+〉A |αA〉a + |−〉A |−αA〉a)
|ψBX〉Bb =
1√
2
(|+〉B |αB〉b + |−〉B |−αB〉b)
(6.1)
here |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉) are the X basis states. Here in the asymmetric-intensity case, we allow sA = α2A
to be different from sB = α
2
B . For convenience, here let us write |ψX〉AaBb = |ψAX〉Aa |ψBX〉Bb. We can
then write the density matrix of the initial state as
ρAaBb = |ψX〉AaBb AaBb〈ψX | (6.2)
Now, the process of signals a and b going through their respective channels and Charles making a
measurement can be represented by a set of Kraus operators {Mˆabkckd,e}, where kc, kd are Charles’ detector
events, and e is the (implicit) measurement results of a potential eavesdropper Eve. The superscript
2The explicit discussion about using a single Kraus operator for each announcement outcome was also previously made
in Ref. [31] in a different security proof. So, this is a known result.
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ab represents that this operator only acts on the systems a, b (pulses sent to Charles) and not on A,B
(local qubits in Alice’s and Bob’s labs). From the perspective of Alice and Bob, as e is not announced,
the state they obtain is equivalent to Eve having discarded all measurement results e. After signals
pass through the channels and Charles announces the measurement result kc, kd, the conditional state
becomes:
ρ′AaBb =
∑
e Mˆ
ab
kckd,e
ρAaBbMˆ
ab†
kckd,e
pXX(kc, kd)
(6.3)
here pXX(kc, kd) is the X basis Gain for detection events kc, kd (which can be 0, 1 or 1, 0 for a detection
event to be considered successful). Note that, this set of operator {Mˆabkckd,i} includes all information of
the channels, detectors (and the eavesdropper) and is a general representation of their joint effects, and,
importantly, it does not require that the channels are symmetric at all.
By measuring their local qubits in the Z basis, Alice and Bob can obtain the Z basis bit-error rate
eZZ,kckd (i.e. the X basis phase-error rate):
eZZ,kckd =
∑
j=0,1
AB〈jj|ρ′AB |jj〉AB (6.4)
where ρ′AB , the state of the local qubits A,B, can be obtained by performing a partial trace over the
systems a, b
ρ′AB = trab(ρ
′
AaBb) (6.5)
Now, the key observation in the proof of [32] is that, Alice and Bob making a measurement on
the local qubits A and B after sending signals a and b and Charles making a measurement should be
equivalent to the time-reversed scenario where Alice and Bob first make local Z basis measurements on
the initial pure states |ψAX〉Aa , |ψBX〉Bb, and then send the signal systems a and b to Charles. After Alice
and Bob make the local measurements, the states become
A 〈0| |ψX〉Aa = |CA0 〉a
A 〈1| |ψX〉Aa = |CA1 〉a
B 〈0| |ψX〉Bb = |CB0 〉b
B 〈1| |ψX〉Bb = |CB1 〉b
(6.6)
which are cat states:
|CA0 〉a = e−
α2A
2
∞∑
n=0
α2nA√
2n
|2n〉a =
∞∑
n=0
cA,(0)n |n〉a
|CA1 〉a = e−
α2A
2
∞∑
n=0
α2n+1A√
2n+ 1
|2n+ 1〉a =
∞∑
n=0
cA,(1)n |n〉a
|CB0 〉b = e−
α2B
2
∞∑
n=0
α2nB√
2n
|2n〉b =
∞∑
n=0
cB,(0)n |n〉b
|CB1 〉b = e−
α2B
2
∞∑
n=0
α2n+1B√
2n+ 1
|2n+ 1〉b =
∞∑
n=0
cB,(1)n |n〉b
(6.7)
here the even (odd) cat states only contain nonzero amplitudes for even (odd) photon numbers. Nonethe-
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less we can still write the amplitudes as c
A,(0)
n , c
B,(0)
n (c
A,(1)
n , c
B,(1)
n ) for all photon number states, where
the coefficients are zero for odd (even) photon number states in an even (odd) cat state.
Note that here in the asymmetric-intensity case, Alice and Bob’s cat states are not the same, because
they use different signal intensities (hence different amplitudes αA, αB), but as we will show below, the
derivation of the upper bound for the phase error rate does not depend on the fact that Alice and
Bob have the same cat states. Therefore, the security is not compromised by using asymmetric signal
intensities. 3.
For Alice and Bob’s local Z basis measurement results i, j ∈ {0, 1} and for detection events kc, kd:
AB〈ij|ρ′AB |ij〉AB = AB〈ij|trab(ρ′AaBb) |ij〉AB
= trab(AB〈ij|ρ′AaBb |ij〉AB)
=
1
pXX(kc, kd)
trab(AB〈ij|
∑
e
Mˆabkckd,eρAaBbMˆ
ab†
kckd,e
|ij〉AB)
=
1
pXX(kc, kd)
∑
e
trab(Mˆ
ab
kckd,e AB
〈ij|ρAaBb |ij〉AB Mˆab†kckd,e)
=
1
pXX(kc, kd)
∑
e
trab(Mˆ
ab
kckd,e
|CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b a〈CAi | b〈CBj |Mˆ
ab†
kckd,e
)
=
1
pXX(kc, kd)
∑
e
a〈CAi | b〈CBj |Mˆ
ab†
kckd,e
Mˆabkckd,e |CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b
=
1
pXX(kc, kd)
a〈CAi | b〈CBj |
∑
e
Mˆab†kckd,eMˆ
ab
kckd,e
|CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b
(6.8)
which means that, the probabilities for local Z basis measurement results i, j ∈ {0, 1} (which determine
the phase-error rate) can be acquired by observing the gain if Alice and Bob sent cat states. However, Al-
ice and Bob are not really sending cat states - when Z basis is chosen, they are sending phase-randomized
coherent states. Using decoy-state analysis, what Alice and Bob acquire are the yields for phase-
randomized photon number states, pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) = a〈nA| b〈nB |
∑
e Mˆ
ab†
kckd,e
Mˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b.
The yields for photon number states are linked to Equation 6.8 using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
that upper-bounds the gains for cat states (and subsequently the phase-error rate):
a〈CAi | b〈CBj |
∑
e
Mˆab†kckd,eMˆ
ab
kckd,e
|CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b
=
∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB ×
∑
e
a〈mA| b〈mB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b
≤
∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB
×
∑
e
√
a〈nA| b〈nB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b
√
a〈mA| b〈mB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |mA〉a |mB〉b
(6.9)
where we have applied Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the two vectors: Mˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b and
Mˆabkckd,e |mA〉a |mB〉b. We can then write:
3The performance, however, does depend on signal intensities, as we will show in Section 6.4. The protocol favours
smaller αA, αB for lower phase error rate, which becomes one of the factors - but not the only factor - that affect the
optimal choice of signal intensities)
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∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB
×
∑
e
√
a〈nA| b〈nB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b
√
a〈mA| b〈mB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |mA〉a |mB〉b
≤
∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB
×
√
a〈nA| b〈nB |
∑
e
Mˆab†kckd,eMˆ
ab
kckd,e
|nA〉a |nB〉b
√
a〈mA| b〈mB |
∑
e
Mˆab†kckd,eMˆ
ab
kckd,e
|mA〉a |mB〉b
=
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(i)nA c
B,(j)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2
(6.10)
where we again use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality by considering two vectors ~u,~v whose e-th components
are
ue =
√
a〈nA| b〈nB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |nA〉a |nB〉b
ve =
√
a〈mA| b〈mB |Mˆab†kckd,eMˆabkckd,e |mA〉a |mB〉b
(6.11)
respectively, and apply ~u · ~v ≤ √~u · ~u√~v · ~v.
This means that, the phase-error rate can be upper-bounded by the yields for photon number states
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB):
pXX(kc, kd)eZZ(kc, kd)
=pXX(kc, kd)
∑
j=0,1
AB〈jj|ρ′AB |jj〉AB
≤
∑
j=0,1
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(j)nA c
B,(j)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2 (6.12)
this phase-error rate, combined with the bit error rate in the X basis, can be used to perform privacy
amplification on the error-corrected raw keys and obtain the secure key.
The key point is that, the above proof that upper bounds the phase error rate does not require the fact
that αA = αB at all. The different signal intensities will cause Alice and Bob to have different cat states,
but these states are independently used to obtain the inner product with A〈i| and B〈j| respectively.
With the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the joint cat states are reduced to a mixture of photon number
states, and there are no cross-terms between the two cat states.
This means that, using asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob will not affect the estimation
of the phase-error rate. Moreover, as we described in Equation 6.3, {Mˆabkckd,e} is a general representation
of the channels and detection, and does not require that ηA = ηB either, i.e. asymmetric channels do
not affect the security proof either.
Additionally, the decoy intensities {β2A, β2B} might be different for Alice and Bob too, but these
states are only used to estimate the yields of photon number states pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) using decoy-state
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analysis, which is exactly the same process as in MDI-QKD. As long as Eve cannot distinguish pulses
from different intensity settings, this decoy-state analysis is secure, even in the asymmetric setting -
since the sending of a given photon number n given the Poisson distribution P (n|µ) = e−µ µnn! is a
Markov process, i.e. memoryless process, Eve has no way of telling which intensity setting the photon
number state came from, therefore using asymmetric intensities does not affect the estimation of yields
for photon number states pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB).
Therefore, overall, we conclude that neither asymmetric channel losses, nor asymmetric intensities
Alice and Bob use (for signal states or decoy states), will affect the security of the protocol. Asymmetry
will only affect the performance of the protocol (which will be the subject of discussion in the next section)
- asymmetric channels will result in higher QBER and subsequently lower key rate, and asymmetric
intensities can compensate for channel asymmetry and enable high key rate for the protocol even when
channels are highly asymmetric.
6.4 Performance
In this section we will discuss how channel asymmetry, and asymmetric intensities, can affect the per-
formance of TF-QKD.
6.4.1 Channel Model
We will first discuss the channel model in the asymmetric case. Again, we extend the expressions in the
Appendix of Ref. [32], and consider asymmetric intensities and channel transmittances.
To obtain the secure key rate, three sets of observables are needed: the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd),
the X basis bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the Z basis gain pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) (for all combinations of
{βA, βB}).
Now, let us suppose Alice and Bob send signals with intensities sA, sB , and channels between Al-
ice/Bob and Charles have transmittances ηA, ηB . For simplicity we can write:
γA = sAηA
γB = sBηB
(6.13)
for signal states, and
γ′A = µ
i
AηA
γ′B = µ
j
BηB
(6.14)
for decoy states, where µiA and µ
j
B are selected from the set of decoy intensities.
The other imperfections in the channel include the dark count rate pd, the polarization misalignment
between Alice and Bob θ, and the phase mismatch φ between Alice and Bob. If we first do not consider
dark counts and phase mismatch, the intensities arriving at the detectors C and D at Charles can be
written as (similar to the discussions in Ref. [58]):
Dc =
1
2
(γA + γB − 2√γAγBcosθ)
Dd =
1
2
(γA + γB + 2
√
γAγBcosθ)
(6.15)
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the probability that one detector clicks and the other doesn’t (e.g. C clicks and D doesn’t) can be written
as
(1− e−Dc)e−Dd
=e−Dd − e−(Dc+Dd)
=e−
1
2 [γA+γB+2
√
γAγBcosθ] − e−(γA+γB)
(6.16)
Including the phase mismatch and dark counts, we can write the X basis gain and QBER in a similar
form as Ref. [32]:
pXX(kc, kd) =
1
2
(1− pd)
(
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ
)
×e− 12 (γA+γB) − (1− pd)2e−(γA+γB)
(6.17)
eXX(kc, kd) =
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − (1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − 2(1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
(6.18)
and the Z basis gain is the integral over all possible (random) relative phases:
pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB)
=(1− pd)
[
e−
1
2 (γ
′
A+γ
′
B)I0(
√
γ′Aγ
′
Bcosθ)− e−(γ
′
A+γ
′
B)
]
+ pd(1− pd)e−(γ′A+γ′B)
(6.19)
where I0(x) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind.
The Z basis gain can be used in decoy-state analysis to obtain m,n photon yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB).
Here for simplicity we first consider the infinite-decoy case, where pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) can be assumed
to be perfectly known (similar to Supplementary Information Equations 6.18, 6.19 in Ref. [32] but with
asymmetric channel transmittances):
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) =(1− pd)qZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) + (1− pd)pd(1− ηA)nA(1− ηB)nB (6.20)
where
qZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) =
nA∑
k=0
(
nA
k
) nB∑
l=0
(
nB
l
)
ηkAη
l
B(1− ηA)nA−k(1− ηB)nB−l
2k+lk!l!
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
) l∑
p=0
(
l
p
) min(k,m+p)∑
q=max(0,m+p−l)
(
k
q
)(
l
m+ p− q
)
(m+ p)!(k + l −m− p)!cosm+q(θA)cosm+p−q(θB)
sin2k−m−q(θA)sin2l−m−2p+q(θB)− (1− ηA)nA(1− ηB)nB
(6.21)
In the case with finite decoys (e.g. 3 decoy states for each of Alice and Bob), we can use linear
programming to upper-bound the yields, which is described in more detail in Appendix D.1.
Afterwards, the phase-error rate can be upper-bounded using these yields:
pXX(kc, kd)eZZ(kc, kd) ≤
∑
i=0,1
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(i)nA c
B,(i)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2
(6.22)
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With the the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd), the X basis bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the phase-error
rate eZZ(kc, kd), we can obtain the final secure key rate:
Rkckd = pXX(kc, kd)× [1− h2(eXX(kc, kd))− h2(eZZ(kc, kd))] (6.23)
where h2(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1− x)log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function.
6.4.2 Effect of Channel and Intensity Asymmetry on Gain and QBER
In the estimation of key rate, only three sets of observables are used: the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd), the
X basis bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the set of Z basis gain for each combination of decoy intensities
pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB). Here we note that, the X basis gain and Z basis gain do not explicitly depend on
the symmetry of incoming signal strengths γA/γB , and only the X basis QBER is affected by γA/γB .
For simplicity, here let us consider the second-order approximation for the Bessel function and expo-
nential function, and for now ignore the phase mismatch and dark count rate:
I0(x) = 1 +
1
4
x2 +O(x4)
ex = 1 + x+
1
2
x2 +O(x3)
(6.24)
We can then rewrite the X basis gain as:
pXX(kc, kd) =
1
2
(
e−
√
γAγBcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ
)
× e− 12 (γA+γB) − e−(γA+γB)
≈1
2
(γA + γB)− 1
8
[
3γ2A + 3γ
2
B + (2 + 4ed)γAγB
] (6.25)
and the Z basis gain as:
pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) =e− 12 (γ′A+γ′B)I0(
√
γ′Aγ
′
Bcosθ)− e−(γ
′
A+γ
′
B)
≈1
2
(γ′A + γ
′
B)−
1
8
[
3γ
′2
A + 3γ
′2
B + (4 + 2ed)γ
′
Aγ
′
B
] (6.26)
where the terms higher than second order are omitted, and θ is the total polarization misalignment
angle between Alice and Bob satisfying θ = 2sin−1(
√
ed)) (suppose Alice-Charles and Bob-Charles
each has misalignment error ed, but with misalignment angles in different directions). We can see
that, the gain in both X and Z basis is dominated by the term 12 (γA + γB) =
1
2 (sAηA + sBηB) or
1
2 (γ
′
A + γ
′
B) =
1
2 (µ
i
AηA + µ
j
BηB), i.e. taking first-order approximation:
pXX(kc, kd) ≈ 1
2
(γA + γB)
pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) ≈ 1
2
(γ′A + γ
′
B)
(6.27)
which means that the gain scales with the average of arriving intensities through Alice’s and Bob’s chan-
nels - this is different from MDI-QKD, where the gain only contains the second-order terms γ2A, γ
2
B , γAγB .
We can also see that the gain does not depend on the asymmetry of arriving intensities, e.g. γA/γB .
On the other hand, the QBER in X basis depends on the balance of arriving intensities:
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Figure 6.2: QBER versus asymmetry in arriving intensities at Charles, in the X and Z bases. Here we
consider kc, kd = 0, 1, while the other case of kc, kd = 1, 0 has exactly the same values. Both plots use
parameters ηA = ηB = 1 (as well as detector efficiency 100%) and assume misalignment of 2% from
Alice and Bob each, and no dark counts or phase mismatch. (a) We plot the X basis QBER (acquired
from full expression in Equation 6.14) as well as its first-order approximation (acquired from Equation
6.24). Here we vary sA/sB while keeping sA + sB = 0.2 to test different levels of asymmetry. As can be
seen, the X basis QBER heavily depends on the symmetry between arriving intensities sAηA and sBηB .
Physically, this is because key generation depends on single-photon interference and therefore requires
indistinguishability of incoming signals. When ηB/ηA 6= 1, X basis QBER will increase drastically if
intensities are symmetric, while one can adjust sA/sB such that sA/sB = ηB/ηA to obtain minimal X
basis QBER. (b) We plot the Z basis bit-error rate (i.e. X basis phase-error rate) obtained from linear
programming using data from 3 decoy states. Here we set νA = νB = 0.01, ωA = ωB = 0, and signal
states sA = sB = 0.1. We fix µA + µB = 0.2 and vary µA/µB to test asymmetry. As can be seen, the
upper-bounded phase error rate depends very little on the asymmetry between µAηA and µBηB , and
the linear program can effectively bound the error rate - in fact rather close to the theoretical value
obtained with infinite-decoys - as long as µA, µB are of reasonable values
a. The physical intuition is
clear too: the yields are estimated by linear programming, which usually has redundant information (in
the 9 cross terms Qµiµj where Alice and Bob each uses one of their three decoys) and is insensitive to
asymmetry, and the phase-error rate (Equation 6.17) is a linear combination of the yields, which makes
it insensitive to asymmetry just like the yields. Reproduced from [66] @2019 NJP (CC-BY 3.0 license),
re-generated with sA + sB and µA + µB fixed (rather than sB and µB fixed) to maintain symmetry of
the curves.
aNote that the yields obtained from linear programming are numerical solutions, and there is higher noise near µA/µB =
101.28 and µA/µB = 10
−1.28 which are the cases where µA ≈ νA = 0.01, or µB ≈ νB = 0.01 - if the decoy intensities
are too close, the constraints from observable data containing µA (or µB) provides little useful information, and the linear
program essentially has to use the data from one less decoy state, which is why the numerical solution is less stable near
these two points.
eXX(kc, kd) =
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − (1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − 2(1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
≈
1
2 (γA + γB)−
√
γAγBcosθ +
1
2γAγBcos
2θ − 18 (γA + γB)2
(γA + γB) + γAγBcos2θ − 14 (γA + γB)2
(6.28)
which, in the first-order approximation4, can be simplified as:
4The first order approximation for eXX(kd, kd) assumes that γA, γB are much smaller than 1 - which is reasonable,
since to get a good phase-error rate estimation, usually sA, sB are smaller or equal to 0.1, and for positions of interest
where TF-QKD beats PLOB bound, the loss in each channel is usually larger than 10dB, which means that ηA and ηB
are much smaller than 1 too - for instance 10dB channel loss corresponds to 0.1 transmittance.
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eXX(kc, kd) ≈
1
2 (γA + γB)−
√
γAγBcosθ
γA + γB
=
1
2 (
γA
γB
+ 1)−
√
γA
γB
cosθ
γA
γB
+ 1
(6.29)
We can see that here the X basis QBER does depend on asymmetry - more precisely, it depends
on how much the arriving intensities at Charles, γA = ηAsA and γB = ηBsB are balanced. This is
understandable physically, since the X basis key generation depends on single-photon interference and
relies on the indistinguishability of incoming signals. This means that, in the case that channels are not
symmetric, compensating for the channel asymmetry with different signal intensities for Alice and Bob
and aiming for ηAsA = ηBsB can help minimize the X basis QBER.
On the other hand, in the Z basis, the bit-error rate (i.e. the X basis phase-error rate) cannot be
directly measured, but is instead upper-bounded using the observable gain data from the decoy states.
As we mentioned above, the Z basis gain (in the first-order approximation) scales with 12 (γ
′
A + γ
′
B) =
1
2 (µ
i
AηA + µ
j
BηB) and does not depend on the symmetry between incoming intensities. Moreover, the
yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) are estimated using linear programming. For instance, for three decoys where
Alice and Bob respectively use {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB} as their decoy states, there are nine sets of
observable gains, {Qµµ, Qµν , Qµω, Qνµ, Qνν , Qνω, Qωµ, Qων , Qωω}, each of which constitutes a constraint
for the linear program that helps bound the yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB). Such a structure makes the linear
program relatively robust against asymmetry in the decoy states, and the linear program can fairly
accurately upper-bound the yields as long as the intensities are of reasonable values (i.e. µA 6= νA,
µB 6= νB , and none of the intensities are too large e.g. > 1).
The phase error rate, as shown in Equation 6.17, is based on a linear combination of the square
root of the yields. It is therefore also very little affected by asymmetry, and almost always reaches a
good value (at least in the infinite-data case) so long as the intensities are within a reasonable range,
regardless of the asymmetries in channel transmittances or decoy intensities.
We plot the QBER in the X and the Z bases versus asymmetry in arriving intensities (e.g. sAηA/sBηB
or µAηA/µBηB) in Figure 6.2. As can be seen, the X basis QBER depends heavily on asymmetry and is
minimal when sAηA/sBηB = 1, while the upper-bounded Z basis QBER (i.e. phase-error rate) is hardly
affected by asymmetry.
Therefore, a viable strategy for TF-QKD in asymmetric channels is to compensate for the channel
asymmetry with signal intensities {sA, sB} only, while the decoy intensities {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB}
can be still kept symmetric. However, note that the signal intensities not only determines (1) X basis
QBER, it also affects (2) X basis gain (which determines the raw key generation rate, and favours large
sA, sB), as well as (3) upper-bound of phase error rate (since the cat states are determined by signal
intensities, and the estimation favours small sA, sB - typically < 0.1 - for a tighter upper bound on phase
error rate). Criteria (1-3) cannot be simultaneously satisfied, therefore an optimization for {sA, sB} is
required for the highest key rate.
Interestingly, we can compare this with the case of MDI-QKD. As described in Ref. [65], the 4-
intensity protocol (and 7-intensity protocol in the extended asymmetric case) has decoupled X and Z
bases, where Z basis is used for key generation and X basis uses decoy states to estimation phase-error
rate. In MDI-QKD, the X basis data depends on two-photon interference and requires balanced arriving
intensities (or else the X basis QBER will increase dramatically), while the Z basis does not require
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indistinguishability of the signals, and is therefore insensitive to channel asymmetry. In MDI-QKD, all
the X basis decoy states should satisfy e.g. µAηA = µBηB , while the signal states sA, sB can be chosen
to simply optimize key generation rate. (Due to misalignment, there is a slight dependence of Z basis
QBER to asymmetry too, hence optimal sA, sB are still not equal, but this is a much weaker dependence
on symmetry than in the X basis, and optimal sA/sB is much closer to 1 than ηB/ηA in MDI-QKD.)
While our approach works both for MDI-QKD and TF-QKD, a key difference is that states that
compensate for channel asymmetry are the signal states in TF-QKD (while this responsibility lies on
decoy states in MDI-QKD), which are also involved in key generation and phase error estimation. This
means that in TF-QKD, it is more difficult to simultaneously keep a low X basis QBER and a good
key generation rate & low phase error rate. Perhaps due to this reason, the advantage of asymmetric-
intensity protocols is somewhat less pronounced in TF-QKD - nonetheless, it still provides about an
order of magnitude higher key rate than completely symmetric protocols and still 2-3 times higher key
rate than adding fibre - which means that it still is the strategy that provides highest key rate when
channels are asymmetric.
6.5 Numerical Results
Figure 6.3: Key rate versus loss between Alice and Bob, for protocols with symmetric intensities (sA =
sB), symmetric intensities with fibre added until channels are equal, and asymmetric intensities (sA, sB
fully optimized). The PLOB [27] linear bound is included for comparison. The channel mismatch x is
fixed at x = ηA/ηB = 0.1 (left) and ηA/ηB = 0.01 (right), i.e. Alice-Charles always has 10dB (20dB)
higher loss than Bob-Charles. Note that the right plot starts from 20dB of total distance (which is the
case where Bob-Charles loss is 0dB and Alice-Charles loss is 20dB). The dark count rate is set to 10−8,
misalignment is 2% for Alice and Bob each, and detector efficiency is incorporated into channel loss.
As can be seen, allowing the use of asymmetric intensities greatly improves key rate when channels are
asymmetric, and compared with a symmetric protocol, it can consistently provide approximately one
order of magnitude higher key rate when there is a 10dB channel mismatch, and two orders of magnitude
when there is a 20dB mismatch, for most distances. Interestingly, adding fibre can improve the key rate
considerably too - but it still has a lower key rate than the asymmetric-intensity protocol (the latter has
about 2-3 times higher key rate), and has the additional inconvenience of having to modify the physical
channel. Reproduced from [66] @2019 NJP (CC-BY 3.0 license).
In this section we use the technique described above - to compensate for channel asymmetry simply
with different sA, sB for Alice and Bob. We first compare our method with prior art techniques and
study the numerically optimized intensities for the asymptotic (infinite-decoy, infinite-data) case. Then,
we also show that our method works with finite decoys and also finite data size.
Chapter 6. TF-QKD over Asymmetric Channels 83
We plot the simulation results for asymptotic TF-QKD in Figure 6.3. As can be seen, for the two
cases where channel mismatch x = ηA/ηB = 0.1 and ηA/ηB = 0.01, our method consistently have much
higher key rate than TF-QKD with symmetric intensities. Interestingly, we show that adding fibre can
help users obtain a higher key rate, but it comes with the additional inconvenience of having to physically
modify the channel, and also it still has a lower key rate than our method of simply adjusting signal
intensities.
Figure 6.4: Ratio of optimal intensities log10(sA/sB) over loss between Alice and Bob. Here we test
two cases where the channel mismatch x = ηA/ηB = 0.1 and ηA/ηB = 0.01. As can be seen, sA/sB is
rather close to ηB/ηA (here respectively 10
1 and 102). However, due to signal states being involved in
key generation and phase-error rate estimation too, it slightly deviates from the value that minimizes X
basis QBER (and instead takes the value that maximizes key rate). Reproduced from [66] @2019 NJP
(CC-BY 3.0 license).
We also plot the ratio of optimal signal intensities in Figure 6.4. As we have predicted, the optimal
signal intensities are rather close to the relation of sAηA = sBηB , in order to maintain a lower X basis
QBER. However, as we discussed, since signal states are also involved in key generation and phase error
rate estimation (based on the imaginary cat states), they prevent the signal states from taking the values
that minimize QBER (but rather, makes it choose the value that maximizes the overall key rate).
Additionally, we also plot our results for the practical case with a finite number of decoys (here we
use three decoys each for Alice and Bob: {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB}) and finite data size. The upper-
bounding of photon number yields using linear programming, as well as the finite-key analysis, are both
described in more detail in Appendix D.1. We can see that similar result holds - our method has an
advantage over either using symmetric intensities directly or adding fibre. More interestingly, we include
both the case where we only allow sA, sB to be asymmetric, versus the case where all intensities and
probabilities can be optimized, and as shown in the plot, we see that using asymmetric signal intensities
alone is sufficient to compensate for channel asymmetry.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a simple method to obtain good performance for TF-QKD even if channels are
asymmetric. We present a theoretical understanding of why signal states (and not decoy states) should
be adjusted to compensate for asymmetry, and we also show that the method is still compatible with
existing security proofs. With our method, there is no need to add additional fibre, and Alice and Bob
can implement the method in software-only. This provides great convenience for TF-QKD in practice
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Figure 6.5: Key rate versus loss between Alice and Bob, for protocols with symmetric intensities and
probabilities, with symmetric intensities and fibre added until channels are equal, with only asymmetric
signal intensities (while all other parameters are symmetric between Alice and Bob), and with fully
optimized parameters (all intensities and probabilities are freely optimized). The PLOB [27] linear
bound is included for comparison. Here we consider 10−8 dark count rate, a 2% misalignment for
Alice and Bob each, N = 1012 total pulses sent, and channel mismatch of x = ηA/ηB = 0.1. Again,
detector efficiency is incorporated into channel loss. As we can see, similar to the asymptotic case,
using asymmetric intensities can greatly improve the key rate. Perhaps more interestingly, we can see
that allowing asymmetry in signal intensities alone is sufficient in obtaining a good key rate through
asymmetric channels (its key rate almost entirely overlaps with the fully optimized case). Reproduced
from [66] @2019 NJP (CC-BY 3.0 license).
- where realistic channels might likely be asymmetric - and can also be used in fibre-based quantum
networks (where adding fibre for each pair of users is impractical) where a central service-provider can
easily optimize the intensities for each pair of users. The results in this chapter make possible a high-rate
quantum network with untrusted relays using TF-QKD.
We have very recently performed an experimental demonstration for TF-QKD protocol over asym-
metric channels, using the method we proposed in this chapter (in Ref. [66]). The work is posted on
arXiv as a draft paper [68] and also selected as a talk at CLEO2020. We also plan to implement a
TF-QKD network with multiple users (and channels of different levels of loss) in the future.
We thank Koji Azuma for providing the corrected security proof [122] that incorporates mixed states
after the measurement.
During the preparation of the manuscript for Ref. [66], it came into our knowledge that another
work on asymmetric TF-QKD is under preparation [123], which is independently completed from Ref.
[66]. The two works are posted simultaneously on the preprint server [124, 123].
Chapter 7
Machine Learning in QKD
This chapter is largely reproduced from our paper Ref. [67].
In the previous Chapters 3-6, we have discussed the topics of free-space QKD and fibre-based QKD
network, and how to apply techniques to address some important practical challenges, i.e. turbulence in
free-space, and channel asymmetry in quantum networks. In this chapter, we will discuss an additional
challenge that is present in both free-space QKD and quantum network - Namely, efficient parameter
optimization (for e.g. decoy-state intensities, and probabilities of sending each intensity/basis). Pa-
rameter optimization is generally a computationally intensive task, that might be a limiting factor for
low-power free-space systems, or quantum networks with many users. In this chapter we show that, by
applying neural networks (a type of machine learning algorithm), we can greatly accelerate parameter
optimization, by up to 2-4 orders of magnitude and retaining very high accuracy compared with tradi-
tional algorithms. Such a method enables real-time parameter optimization for future free-space systems
or quantum networks, which can significantly reduce latency, and improve key rate compared to using
fixed parameters.
7.1 Background
7.1.1 Parameter Optimization in QKD
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, in reality, a QKD experiment always has a finite transmission time,
which means that the total number of signals is finite. Therefore, when estimating the single-photon
contributions with decoy-state analysis, one needs to take into consideration the statistical fluctuations
of the observables: the Gain and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), which might deviate from their
respective expected values (and the amount of deviation is what one needs to upper-bound). This
is called the finite-key analysis of QKD. In such a finite-key scenario, the choice of intensities and
probabilities of sending these intensities is crucial to getting the optimal rate. Therefore, we would need
to perform an optimization on the parameters to search for values that maximize the key rate.
Note that in this chapter, by “parameter optimization”, we mainly discuss the optimization of the
intensities of laser signals and the probabilities of choosing each intensity setting, specifically in the
finite-size scenario (similar to the model outlined in Ref. [62] for MDI-QKD). There is also previous
literature [98, 99, 100] discussing e.g. the optimization of the number of decoy states, but the subject
of study is different here. Also, some of the above literature [98] discusses optimization of intensities in
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Figure 7.1: Left: Raspberry Pi 3 single-board computer equipped with an Intel Movidius neural compute
stick. Right: A smartphone (iPhone XR) running parameter prediction for a QKD protocol with an
on-device neural network. In the same app one can also choose to run local search on the device (and
compare its running time to that of neural networks). Reproduced from [67] @2019 APS.
the asymptotic (infinite-data) limit, but here in the finite-size case that we study, the parameter space is
much larger, making the problem much more computationally challenging. Additionally, in this chapter
we discuss a broader picture where our method can be applied to various kinds of QKD protocols (and
potentially other optimization problems outside QKD or even in classical systems).
There have been various studies on BB84 [126, 95], MDI-QKD [127, 62, 86], and TF-QKD [97] under
finite-size effects. Here in the chapter, we will employ Ref.[95]’s method for BB84 under finite-size effects,
and use a standard error analysis for MDI-QKD [86, 65] and asymmetric TF-QKD [66]. Note that, our
method is not really dependent on the security analysis model - in fact it is not really dependent on any
specific protocol at all - and in principle Chernoff bound can be applied too, but for simplicity in this
chapter we only use a simple Gaussian assumption for the probability distribution of observables.
Traditionally, parameter optimization is implemented as either a brute-force global search for smaller
numbers of parameters, or a local search for larger numbers of parameters. For instance, in several papers
studying MDI-QKD protocols with symmetric [62] and asymmetric channels [65], a local search method
called coordinate descent algorithm is used to find the optimal set of intensities and probabilities.
However, optimization of parameters often requires a significant amount of computational power.
This means that, a QKD system either has to wait for an optimization off-line (and suffer from delay),
or use sub-optimal or even unoptimized parameters in real-time. Due to the amount of computing
resource required, so far parameter optimization is usually only performed on relatively powerful devices
such as a desktop PC.
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, a promising future direction of QKD is to implement it over
free-space on mobile platforms, such as drones [47], handheld systems [130], and even satellites [48].
Such devices (e.g. single-board computers and mobile system-on-chips) are usually limited in computing
power. At the same time, such free-space applications often require low-latency. However, fast and
accurate parameter optimization based on a changing environment in real time is a difficult task on such
low-power platforms.
Another highly attractive future direction of QKD is a quantum “internet of things” that connects
multiple devices, each of which can be portable and mobile, and numerous connections can be present
at the same time. An increased number of connections will present a great computational challenge for
the controller of a quantum network, which can be quickly overloaded with many pairs of users (where
Chapter 7. Machine Learning in QKD 87
Table 7.1: Time benchmarking between a previous local search algorithm and our new algorithm using
neural network (NN) for parameter optimization on various devices. Here as an example we consider two
protocols: symmetric MDI-QKD [86] and asymmetric TF-QKD [66]. Devices include a desktop PC with
an Intel i7-4790k quad-core CPU equipped with an Nvidia Titan Xp GPU, a modern mobile phone Apple
iPhone XR with an on-board neural engine, and a low-power single-board computer Raspberry Pi 3 with
quad-core CPU, equipped with an Intel Movidius neural compute stick a. As can be seen, the neural
network generally can provide over 2-4 orders of magnitude higher speed than local search depending on
the protocol, enabling millisecond-level parameter optimization. Moreover, note that the smartphone
and single-board computer provide similar performance with only less than 1/70 the power consumption
of a PC, making them ideal for free-space QKD or a quantum internet-of-things with portable devices.
More details on the benchmarking are provided in Section 7.4.
Protocol Device NN accelerator Local search NN Power Consump.
MDI-QKD Desktop PC Titan Xp GPU 0.1s 0.5-1.0ms ∼350w
TF-QKD Desktop PC Titan Xp GPU 2s 0.5-1.0ms ∼350w
MDI-QKD iPhone XR on-board neural engine 0.2s ∼1ms <5w
TF-QKD iPhone XR on-board neural engine N/A ∼1ms <5w
MDI-QKD Raspberry Pi 3 neural compute stick 3-5s 2-3ms <5w
TF-QKD Raspberry Pi 3 neural compute stick 15-16s 3ms <5w
aThe CPU on an iPhone XR has dual big cores + four small cores, but here for simplicity we use a single-threaded
program for local search, since OpenMP multithreading library is not supported on Apple devices. OpenMP is supported
on the PC and on Raspberry Pi 3, so multithreading is used for local search on these devices. Also, TF-QKD requires
a linear solver, but all commercial linear solvers cannot be used on iPhone (while open-source solvers in principle can be
compiled for iPhone, in practice the porting is highly non-trivial and very difficult). Therefore local search for TF-QKD
cannot be performed on an iPhone - but note that the neural network can still predict the optimal parameters regardless
of software library limitations, which is in fact an additional advantage of using a neural network. For TF-QKD, the
PC and Raspberry Pi respectively use the commercial solver Gurobi [128] and the open-source solver Coin-OR [129] (as
commercial solvers are not available for Raspberry Pi either).
real-time optimization might simply be infeasible for even a moderate number of connections).
In recent years, machine learning technologies based on neural networks have seen much development
in both hardware and software, and they have attracted a huge amount of attention from both the
academia and the industry. There is also an increasing number of new low-power devices implementing
on-board acceleration chips for neural networks. Here in this chapter we present a new method of using
neural networks to help predict optimal parameters efficiently on low-power devices. We test our machine
learning algorithm on real-life devices such as a single-board computer and a smart phone (see Fig. 7.1),
and find that with our method they can easily perform parameter optimization in milliseconds, within
a power consumption of less than 5 watts. We list some time benchmarking results in Table 7.1. Such a
method makes it possible to support real-time parameter optimization for both free-space QKD systems
and large-scale QKD networks with potentially thousands of connections.
7.1.2 Neural Network
In this subsection we present a very brief introduction to machine learning with neural networks.
Neural networks are multiple-layered structures built from “neurons”, which simulate the behaviour
of biological neurons in brains. Each neuron takes a linear combination of inputs xi, with weight wi and
offset b, and calculates the activation. For instance:
σ(
∑
wixi + b) =
1
1 + e−(
∑
wixi+b)
(7.1)
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Figure 7.2: An example of a neural network (in fact, here it is an illustration of the neural network used
in our work). It has an input layer and an output layer of 4 and 6 neurons, respectively, and has two
fully-connected “hidden” layers with 400 and 200 neurons with rectified linear unit (ReLU) function as
activation. The cost function (not shown here) is mean squared error. Reproduced from [67] @2019
APS.
where the example activation function is a commonly used sigmoid function σ(x) = 11+e−x , but it can
have other forms, such as a rectified linear unit (ReLU) [131] function max(0,
∑
wixi+b), a step function,
or even a linear function y = x.
Each layer of the neural network consists of many neurons, and after accepting input from the
previous layer and calculating the activation, it outputs the signals to the next layer. Overall, the
effect of the neural network is to compute an output ~y = N(~x) from the vector ~x. A “cost function”
(e.g. mean squared error) is defined on the output layer by comparing the network’s calculated output
{~yi} = {N( ~xi0)} on a set of input data { ~xi0}, versus the set of desired output {~yi0}. It uses an algorithm
called “backpropagation”[132] to quickly solve the partial derivatives of the cost function to the internal
weights in the network, and adjusts the weights accordingly via an optimizer algorithm such as stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) to minimize the cost function and let {~yi} approach {~yi0} as much as possible.
Over many iterations, the neural network will be able to learn the behaviour of { ~xi0} → {~yi0}, so that
people can use it to accept a new incoming data ~x, and predict the corresponding ~y. The universal
approximation theorem of neural network [133] states that it is possible to infinitely approximate any
given bounded, continuous function on a given defined domain with a neural network with even just a
single hidden layer, which suggests that neural networks are highly flexible and robust structures that
can be used in a wide range of scenarios where such mappings between two finite input/output vectors
exist.
There is increasing interest in the field in applying machine learning to improve the performance of
quantum communication. For instance, Ref. [60, 61] respectively apply machine learning to continuous-
variable (CV) QKD to improve the noise-filtering and to improve the prediction/compensation of inten-
sity evolution of light over time.
In this work, we apply machine learning to predict the optimal intensity and probability parameters
for QKD (based on given experimental parameters, such as channel loss, detector efficiency, misalign-
ment, dark count rate, and data size), and show that with a simple fully-connected neural network with
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two layers, we can very accurately and efficiently predict parameters (that can achieve e.g. 95-99%, or
even 99.9% the key rate depending on the protocol).
Our work demonstrates the feasibility of deploying neural networks on actual low-power devices, to
make them perform fast QKD parameter optimization in real time, with up to 2-4 orders of magnitudes
higher speed. This enables potential new applications in free-space or portable QKD devices, such as on
a satellite[48], drone [47], or handheld [130] QKD system, where the power consumption of devices is a
crucial factor and computational power is severely limited, and traditional CPU-intensive optimization
approaches based on local or global search are infeasible.
Additionally, we point out that with the higher optimization speed, we can also enable applications
in a large-scale quantum internet-of-things (IoT) where many small devices can be interconnected (thus
generating a large number of connections), and now with neural networks, even low-power devices such
as a mobile phone will be able to optimize the parameters for hundreds of users in real-time in a quantum
network.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.2 we will describe how we can formulate parameter
optimization as a function that can be approximated by a neural network. We then describe the structure
of the neural network we use, and how we train it such that it learns to predict optimal parameters.
In Section 7.3 we test our neural network approach with four example protocols, and show that neural
networks can accurately predict parameters, which can be used to obtain a near-optimal secure key rate
for the protocols. In Section 7.4 we describe two important use cases for our method and benchmark
them: enabling real-time parameter optimization on low-power and low-latency portable devices, and
paving the road for large-scale quantum networks. We conclude our results in Section 7.5.
7.2 Methods
In this section we describe the process of training and validating a neural network for parameter op-
timization. As mentioned in Sec. I, the universal approximation theorem implies that the approach is
not limited to any specific protocol. Here for simplicity, in this section when describing the methods we
will first use a simple symmetric “4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol” [86] as an example protocol. Later
in the next section when presenting the numerical results, we also include three other protocols, the
asymmetric “7-intensity” MDI-QKD protocol[65], the BB84 protocol (under finite-size effects) [95], and
the asymmetric TF-QKD protocol [66] to show that the method applies to them effectively too.
7.2.1 Optimal Parameters as a Function
Let us consider the symmetric-channel case for MDI-QKD. Alice and Bob have the same distance to
Charles; hence they can choose the same parameters. When taking finite-size effects into consideration,
the variables to be optimized will be a set of 6 parameters, [s, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν ], where s, µ, ν are the signal
and decoy intensities, and Ps, Pµ, Pν are the probabilities of sending them. Here there are also two other
parameters, the vacuum state ω and the vacuum state probability Pω, but we assume the former is a
constant, and the latter satisfies Pω = 1−Ps−Pµ−Pν , so neither are included as variables. Note that,
since only the signal intensity s in the Z basis is used for key generation, and µ, ν in X basis are used
for parameter estimation, Ps is also the basis choice probability. We will unite these 6 parameters into
one parameter vector ~p.
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The calculation of the key rate depends not only on the intensities and the probabilities, but also on
the experimental parameters, namely the distance L between Alice and Bob (or equivalently LBC , the
distance between the relay Charles and Bob), the detector efficiency ηd, the dark count probability Y0,
the basis misalignment ed, the error-correction efficiency fe, and the number of signals N sent by Alice.
We will unite these parameters into one vector ~e, which we call the “experimental parameters”.
Therefore, we see that the QKD key rate can be expressed as
Rate = R(~e, ~p) (7.2)
which is a function of the experimental parameters ~e, which cannot be controlled by the users, and
the “user parameters” ~p (or just “parameters” for short, in the rest of the chapter if not specifically
mentioned), which can be adjusted by the users.
However, this only calculates the rate for a given fixed set of parameters and experimental parameters.
To calculate the optimal rate, we need to calculate
Rmax(~e) = max~p∈PR(~e, ~p) (7.3)
which is the optimal rate for a given ~e. By maximizing R, we also end up with a set of optimal parameters
~popt. Note that ~popt is a function of ~e only, and the key objective in QKD optimization is to find the
optimal set of ~popt based on the given ~e:
~popt(~e) = argmax~p∈PR(~e, ~p) (7.4)
Up so far, the optimal parameters are usually found by performing local or global searches [62, 65],
which evaluate the function R(~e, ~p) many times with different parameters to find the maximum. However,
we make the key observation that the functions Rmax(~e) and ~popt(~e) are still single-valued, deterministic
functions (despite that their mathematical forms are defined by max and argmax and not analytically
attainable).
As mentioned in Section 7.1, the universal approximation theorem of neural network states that it
is possible to infinitely approximate any given bounded, continuous function on a given defined domain
with a neural network (with a few or even a single hidden layer). Therefore, this suggests that it might
be possible to use a neural network to fully described the behaviour of the aforementioned optimal
parameters function ~popt(~e). Once such a neural network is trained, it can be used to directly find
the optimal parameters and the key rate based on any input ~e by evaluating ~popt(~e) and R(e, ~popt)
once each (rather than the traditional approach of evaluating the function R(~e, ~p) many times), hence
greatly accelerating the parameter optimization process. As we will later show, this method works for
several common types of protocol as long as we can formulate a good analytical form of the key rate
function. Nonetheless, this method also relies on the fact that the given protocol has a convex key rate
versus parameters function (and has a bounded domain - which in practice is mostly just a “square”
domain with acceptable constant upper/lower bound values for each dimension of ~p), such that the
optimization problem is a convex optimization and a local search works (or that the function is not too
highly non-convex such that some simple global search techniques can address the non-convexity).
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7.2.2 Design and Training of Network
Figure 7.3: Data flow of the training and testing of the neural network (NN). The rounded-corner boxes
represent programs, and rectangular boxes represent data. The generator program generates many
random sets of experimental parameters ~e and calculates the corresponding optimal parameters ~popt.
These data are used to train the neural network. After the training is complete, the network can be used
to predict optimal parameters based on arbitrary new sets of random experimental data and generate
~ppred (for instance, to plot the results of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, for each protocol a single random set of
data is used as input). Finally, another “validation” program calculates the key rate based on the actual
optimal parameters ~popt found by local search and the predicted ~ppred respectively, and compares their
performances. Reproduced from [67] @2019 APS.
Here we proceed to train a neural network to predict the optimal parameters. We first write a program
that randomly samples the input data space to pick a random combination of ~e experimental parameters,
and use local search algorithm [62] to calculate their corresponding optimal rate and parameters. The
experimental parameter - optimal parameter data sets (for which we generate 10000 sets of data for 40
points from LBC =0-200km, over the course of 6 hours) are then fed into the neural network trainer, to
let it learn the characteristics of the function ~popt(~e). The neural network structure is shown in Fig.7.2.
With 4 input and 6 output elements, and two hidden layers with 200 and 400 ReLU neurons each. We
use a mean squared error cost function.
For input parameters, since ηd is physically no different from the transmittance (e.g. having half the
ηd is equivalent to having 3dB more loss in the channel - note that here we will assume that loss from
detector efficiency can be controlled by Eve and therefore can be merged into channel loss, and that all
detectors have equal ηd), here as an example we fix it to 80% to simplify the network structure (so the
input dimension is 4 instead of 5) - when using the network for inference, a different ηd can be simply
multiplied onto the channel loss while keeping ηd = 80%. We also normalize parameters by setting
e1 = LBC/100
e2 = −log10(Y0)
e3 = ed × 100
e4 = log10(N)
(7.5)
to keep them at a similar order of magnitude of 1 (which the neural network is most comfortable with)
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- what we’re doing is a simple scaling of inputs, and this pre-processing doesn’t modify the actual data.
The output parameters (intensities and probabilities) are within (0, 1) to begin with (we don’t consider
intensities larger than 1 since these values usually provide poor or zero performance) so they don’t
need pre-processing. When generating random sets of experimental parameters for training, here as an
example we use a range of common values for e1 ∈ [0, 2], e2 ∈ [5, 7], e3 ∈ [1, 3], e4 ∈ [11, 14] which
correspond to LBC ∈ [0, 200], Y0 ∈ [10−7, 10−5], ed ∈ [0.01, 0.03], N ∈ [1011, 1014]. The normalized
parameters are sampled uniformly from the range (i.e. some parameters Y0, N are uniformly sampled in
log scale). Also, note that, the range we set here (with commonly encountered values in experiment) is
a testing example, but in practice one can train with a wider range for the input values to encompass
more possible scenarios for experimental parameters (and reasonably with more sample training data).
We can also easily modify the setup to accommodate for other protocols by adjusting the number of
input and output parameters. For the asymmetric MDI-QKD scenario, one can add an additional input
parameter, the channel mismatch x = ηA/ηB , where ηA, ηB are the transmittances in Alice’s and Bob’s
channels. We can normalize the mismatch too and make it an additional input variable:
e5 = −log10(x) (7.6)
For the random training data, we sample e5 ∈ [0, 2], i.e. channel mismatch x ∈ [0.01, 1]. In this case
the output parameter vector ~p would be [sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA , sB , µB , νB , PsB , PµB , PνB ].
For BB84 under finite-size effects, the input vector is the same as in symmetric MDI-QKD, while the
output parameter vector ~p would be [µ, ν, Pµ, Pν , PX ], where vacuum+weak decoy states are used (i.e.
intensities are [µ, ν, ω], which correspond respectively to the signal, weak decoy, and vacuum states) and
only one basis - for instance the X basis - is used for encoding. Here PX is the probability of choosing
the X basis. Since the parameter space of BB84 is slightly non-convex, when generating the training
set, we have modified the local search to start from multiple random starting points (and choose the
highest local maximum). This is a simple form of global search, and can mostly overcome the small
non-convexity for the key rate versus parameters function for BB84.
For asymmetric TF-QKD, the input vector is the same as in asymmetric MDI-QKD, while the output
parameter vector ~p is [sA, sB , µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν ], where, as shown in Ref. [66], to compensate for channel
asymmetry, we employ asymmetric signal states sA, sB while using the identical vacuum+weak decoy
states (and probabilities) for Alice and Bob, while leads to 2 + 5 output parameters. For the detector
efficiency ηd, we assume it is part of the channel loss and merge it as part of LBC , i.e. in the program
ηd is set to 100% (and like for MDI-QKD, we assume the two detectors have equal detector efficiency).
An additional note for TF-QKD is that it uses a linear program to calculate the key rate R(~e, ~p), which
makes it over an order of magnitude slower than e.g. MDI-QKD, which uses analytical functions to solve
for the key rate. Due to the large amount of computation involved, we performed the data generation
on the Niagara supercomputer (using about 4 nodes × 8 hours, or 1280 core hours as each node has 40
Intel Xeon cores, after which we chose 4500 sets of random data collected from multiple runs), but note
that, these computations can be considered offline. That is, once one takes the time to generate the
training set and obtain a neural network, end users can simply deploy the neural network to compute
all future sets of data online in milliseconds.
We train the neural network using Adam [134] as the optimizer algorithm for 120 epochs (iterations),
which takes roughly 40 minutes on an Nvidia Titan Xp GPU.
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Note that, here to prevent overfitting, we have crudely employed early-stopping when training the
model, by checking the validation set (20% of the data) and stopping the training when the validation
set loss no longer decreases (despite that the training set still shows increasingly smaller error), which
helps with preventing overfitting. We test in increments of 60 epochs at a time, and choose 120 epochs
as the stopping point. We have also tested with adding e.g. Dropout layers, but the results change
very little. Likely, since the data size itself (41 samples × 10000 data sets) is larger than the number of
weights in the network (at the order of 200× 400), the overfitting problem is not severe here.
Another point worth noting is that, the universal approximation theorem suggests that the neural
network is able to approximate a function over a given domain accurately. However, we did notice from
numerical testing that at the boundaries of the domain (e.g. LBC = 0 for LBC ∈ [0, 200]) there is some
level of deviation for the neural network output from the “ground truth” optimal value. One reason
might be that the approximation might be less accurate at the boundaries (which could potentially be
alleviated by selecting a wider domain for the training values - also, the boundary values such as zero
channel loss LBC = 0 are not feasible in practice anyway)
1, while for most values except the boundaries,
the approximation is extremely accurate, as we will show with numerical results in the next section.
In terms of the security of the neural network, we do not yet know if e.g. adversarial attacks (specific
input values designed such that the neural network outputs an incorrect result) might exist for our
neural network, which has continuous output values (and not discrete ones like in a classification task).
Nonetheless, even if the neural network outputs inaccurate or incorrect values, it will not affect the
security of the QKD protocol - since the decoy-state analysis is valid as long as Alice (and/or Bob)
knows accurately what intensities she sent, even if the intensity values are poorly chosen. In the case a
“bad” set of intensities and probabilities are suggested by the neural network, it can at most be considered
a denial-of-service attack, and Alice and Bob can also find out the issue before using the values, as they
can easily test the expected key rate by evaluating R(~e, ~p) with the neural network output first.
7.3 Numerical Results
After the training is complete, we use the trained network for 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol to take in
three sets of random data, and record the results in Table 7.2. As can be seen, the predicted parameters
and the corresponding key rate are very close to the actual optimal values obtained by local search, with
the NN-predicted parameters achieving up to 99.99% the optimal key rate.
Here we also fix one random set of experimental parameters as seen in Table 7.3, and scan the neural
network over LBC =0-200km. The results are shown in Fig.7.4(a) and 7.5(a). As we can see, again the
neural network works extremely well at predicting the optimal values for the parameters, and achieves
very similar levels of key rate compared to using the traditional local search method.
We also use a similar approach to select a random set of input parameters and compare the predicted
key rate versus optimal key rate for each of 7-intensity (asymmetric MDI-QKD), BB84, and TF-QKD
protocol. The results are included in Fig.7.4(b-d) and 7.5(b-d). As can be seen, the accuracy of the
neural network is very high in these cases too, with up to 95-99% the key rate for 7-intensity protocol, up
1Another more technical potential cause for this behaviour might be that, when we generate the large set of training
data, the local search algorithm is set to have a relatively low maximum iteration count limit to reduce computation time
- meaning that at extreme values such as LBC = 0 or very long distance where the rate is close to zero, which require
more iterations, the generated training data might not be the optimal value because the local search has not run enough
iterations, and this difference is reflected in the neural network trained by these data, too.
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of expected key rate using neural network (NN) predicted parameters vs using
optimal parameters found by local search for various protocols, using experimental parameters from Ta-
ble 7.3, at different distances between Alice (or Charles) and Bob. We compare the key rate generated
with either sets of parameters (dots with NN-predicted parameters, and lines with local search gener-
ated parameters). We tested four protocols: (a) symmetric MDI-QKD (4-intensity protocol) [86], (b)
asymmetric MDI-QKD (7-intensity protocol) [65], (c) BB84 protocol [95], and (d) asymmetric TF-QKD
protocol [66]. As can be seen, the key rate obtained using predicted parameters is very close to that
obtained from using optimal parameters found with local search. Reproduced from [67] @2019 APS.
to 99.99% for BB84, and ∼80-95% for asymmetric TF-QKD (the accuracy for TF-QKD is smaller, likely
because of either the smaller training set, or the linear solvers used in TF-QKD bringing in inherent
non-convexities, which make the data noisier and more difficult to fit).
7.4 Applications and Benchmarking
In the previous section we have demonstrated that a neural network (NN) can be trained to very ac-
curately simulate the optimal parameter function ~popt(~e) and be used to effectively predict the optimal
parameters for QKD. The question is, since we already have an efficient coordinate descent (CD) algo-
rithm, what is the potential use for such a NN-prediction approach? Here in this section, we will discuss
two important use cases for the neural network.
1. Real-time optimization on low-power devices. While it takes considerable computing power
to “train” a neural network (e.g. on a dedicated GPU), using it to predict (commonly called “inference”)
is computationally much cheaper, and will be much faster than performing a local search, even if the
neural network is run on the same CPU. Moreover, in recent years, with the fast development and
wide deployment of neural networks, many manufacturers have opted to develop dedicated chips that
accelerate NN-inference on mobile low-power systems. Such chips can further improve inference speed
with very little required power, and can also offload the computing tasks from the CPU (which is often
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of neural network (NN) predicted parameters vs optimal parameters found by
local search for various protocols, using experimental parameters from Table 7.3, at different distances
between Alice (or Charles) and Bob. We compare neural network (NN) predicted parameters (dots)
versus optimal parameters found by local search (lines), for four protocols: (a) symmetric MDI-QKD
(4-intensity protocol), (b) asymmetric MDI-QKD (7-intensity protocol), (c) BB84 protocol, and (d)
asymmetric TF-QKD protocol. Similar to Fig. 7.4, as can be seen, the NN-predicted parameters are
very close to optimal values found with local search. Note that there is some noise present for the BB84
protocol. This is because the key rate versus parameters function shows some levels of non-convexity, and
we combined local search with a randomized approach (similar to global search) that chooses results from
multiple random starting points. Therefore there is some level of noise for the probability parameters
(which are insensitive to small perturbations), while the neural network is shown to learn the overall
shape of the global maximum of the parameters and return a smooth function. Similar applies for TF-
QKD, which has small levels of non-convexity due to linear solvers being inherently non-convex, although
due to the limitation in training time, we did not apply global search for TF-QKD. Reproduced from
[67] @2019 APS.
reserved for more crucial tasks, such as camera signal processing or motor control on drones, or system
operations and background applications on mobile phones).
Therefore, it would be more power-efficient (and much faster) to use a neural network running on
inference chips, rather than using the computationally intensive local search algorithm with CPU on
low-power devices. This can be especially important for free-space QKD scenarios such as drone-based,
handheld, or satellite-ground QKD, which not only have a very limited power budget, but also require
low latency in real-time.
Note that, some protocols we use for demonstration here (BB84, and MDI-QKD with “independent
bounds” finite key analysis as in [65]) are pretty fast to optimize to begin with, on the order of seconds
even on a single-board computer. However, there are cases where optimization itself is much slower, for
instance when global search and/or linear solver are needed. For instance, the asymmetric TF-QKD
protocol [66] or the “9-intensity” MDI-QKD protocol (an asymmetric MDI-QKD protocol where Alice
and Bob each use four instead of three decoy states, as described in Ref. [65], which requires using
both linear solver and global search) would respectively take 2 seconds and 11 seconds to generate just
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Table 7.2: Optimal parameters found by local search vs neural network (NN) predicted parameters for
symmetric MDI-QKD (4-intensity protocol) using three different random sets of experimental parameters
(set b we include here is the same one used for Fig. 7.4(a) and Fig. 7.5(a), as listed in Table 7.3), at
the same distance LBC of 50km between Charles and Bob. Y0 is the dark count probability, ed is the
basis misalignment, and N is the number of signals sent by Alice. Here for simplicity, the detector
efficiency is fixed at ηd = 80% (since it is equivalent to channel loss). Fibre loss per km is assumed to
be α = 0.2dB/km, the error-correction efficiency is fe = 1.16, and finite-size security failure probability
is  = 10−7. As can be seen, the predicted parameters from our neural network are very close to the
optimal parameters found by local search, within a 1% error. Moreover, the key rate is even closer,
where the rate calculated with predicted parameters can achieve up to 99.99% (sometimes even higher
than) the key rate found by local search for this protocol. Due to limited width of the page, this table
(reproduced from Table 7.2 in Ref. [67]) has been split into two parts, showing experimental input
parameters (top) and optimal intensity parameters (bottom) separately.
Set Method R LBC Y0 ed N
a Local search 5.5390× 10−5 50km 7.50× 10−6 0.0115 3.14× 1013
a NN 5.5385× 10−5 50km 7.50× 10−6 0.0115 3.14× 1013
b Local search 3.2559× 10−6 50km 1.75× 10−7 0.0287 2.99× 1012
b NN 3.2559× 10−6 50km 1.75× 10−7 0.0287 2.99× 1012
c Local search 2.7738× 10−6 50km 4.29× 10−7 0.0196 2.11× 1011
c NN 2.7739× 10−6 50km 4.29× 10−7 0.0196 2.11× 1011
Set Method R s µ ν Ps Pµ Pν
a Local search 5.5390× 10−5 0.431 0.170 0.0256 0.862 0.00736 0.0906
a NN 5.5385× 10−5 0.431 0.169 0.0257 0.861 0.00729 0.0901
b Local search 3.2559× 10−6 0.176 0.183 0.0290 0.670 0.0200 0.216
b NN 3.2559× 10−6 0.177 0.184 0.0289 0.670 0.0193 0.216
c Local search 2.7738× 10−6 0.209 0.241 0.0442 0.540 0.0339 0.298
c NN 2.7739× 10−6 0.210 0.242 0.0441 0.538 0.0338 0.298
one point even on a fast desktop PC. On single-board computers it is generally 10-30 times slower,
meaning that an optimization would likely take tens of seconds to even minutes, which is quite long
since many free-space sessions might only have a window of minutes (e.g. satellite-ground or handheld
QKD). Also, some alternative finite-key analysis, such as the “joint bounds” analysis (as opposed to using
“independent bounds”) proposed in [86], will introduce similar problems, as it involves linear solver and
non-convexities in the key rate versus parameters function (which often necessitate global search).
Moreover, there are some practical reasons where software/hardware limitations might favour using a
neural network over performing local search on CPU on low-power platforms. For instance, as mentioned
above, performing local search uses up all CPU resource, which would be non-ideal for drones and
handheld systems that need the CPU for the control system, while a neural network running on a
separate accelerator chip offloads the computational requirement. Also, software-wise, computing the
key rate and performing optimization on CPU mean requiring the entire software stack to be set up on
the mobile device - however, many software libraries, e.g. all commercial linear solver libraries, dont even
work on mobile architecture such as ARM CPUs but a neural network pre-trained with data generated
by linear solvers can still be run on these platforms. This can be shown in Table 7.1 where iPhones don’t
support linear solvers required for calculating the key rate, but a neural network can be used to directly
output the parameters (without needing to calculate the key rate first).
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Table 7.3: Random experimental parameter sets we use for simulation of Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5 for the
four protocols (symmetric/asymmetric MDI-QKD, BB84, TF-QKD). Y0 is the dark count probability,
ed is the basis misalignment, and N is the number of signals sent by Alice (and Bob, in MDI-QKD and
TF-QKD). Here for simplicity, the detector efficiency is fixed at ηd = 80% for MDI-QKD and BB84, and
100% for TF-QKD (detector loss is included in the channel loss). The channel mismatch x for MDI-QKD
and TF-QKD is the ratio of transmittances between Alice’s and Bob’s channels, ηA/ηB .
Protocol x ed Y0 N ηd
4-intensity MDI 1 0.029 1.7× 10−7 3.0× 1012 80%
7-intensity MDI 0.10 0.026 2.7× 10−6 2.6× 1013 80%
BB84 - 0.011 3.6× 10−6 3.2× 1012 80%
TF-QKD 0.54 0.024 1.8× 10−6 1.9× 1013 100%
Lastly, atmospheric turbulence causes the channel transmittance to quickly fluctuate at a time scale
of 10-100 ms order [53] (and QKD over moving platforms can have average channel losses constantly
changing with time e.g. due to changing distances). With a neural network it would be potentially
feasible to quickly tune laser intensities based on sampled channel loss in real time. Nonetheless, a set of
changing laser intensities would require modified finite-size analysis, so we only propose it as a possibility
here and will leave the details for future discussions.
To benchmark the performance of neural networks on low-power devices, as examples, we choose the
4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol and the TF-QKD protocol, and test our neural network models on two
popular mobile low-power platforms: a single-board computer, and an ordinary mobile phone, as shown
in Fig. 7.1. We implement both CPU-based local search algorithm and neural network prediction on
the devices, and list the running time in Table 7.1, where we compare neural networks to local search
on the portable devices and on a powerful desktop PC. As shown in Table 7.1, using neural networks,
we can find the optimal parameters in milliseconds regardless of the protocol 2 (which is 2-4 orders of
magnitude faster than local search on CPU), in a power footprint less than 1/70 that of a desktop PC.
In Table 7.1 we used the 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol and the TF-QKD protocol as two examples,
although note that for other protocols, e.g. 7-intensity MDI-QKD or BB84 protocol, the advantage of
NN still holds, since the NN prediction time is little affected by the input/output size (for instance, in
Fig. 7.2, there are 400 × 200 connections between the two middle hidden layers, and only 4 × 400 and
6 × 200 connections involving output or input neurons. This means that the numbers of input/output
nodes have little impact on the overall complexity of the network), while local search time increases
almost linearly with the number of output (searched) parameters. For instance, running 7-intensity
MDI-QKD protocol, which has 12 output parameters, takes about 0.4s using local search on an iPhone
XR - which is double the time of the 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol, which has 6 output parameters -
but with a NN it still takes about 1ms (making the advantage of using NN even greater in this case).
Additionally, note that even without neural network acceleration chips, many devices can still choose
to (1) run the neural network on CPU (at the expense of some CPU resource), and this option is still
much faster than local search (for instance, running the neural network on iPhone XR with CPU takes
between 1.3 − 2.0ms, which is not that much slower than the dedicated neural accelerator chip). (2)
2Note that, for neural networks it generally takes some time to load the model into the device when first used (about
0.2-0.3s on Titan Xp GPU and neural engine on the iPhone, and 3s on Raspberry Pi with the neural compute stick), but
this only needs to be done once at boot time, and can be considered part of the startup time of the device - once the
network is running, the predictions can be performed on many sets of data taking only milliseconds for each operation.
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generate a static “lookup table” for all possible inputs down to a given resolution. This is ideal for sys-
tems with extremely limited computing power or with software/hardware restrictions, such that neural
networks cannot be run in real time. The lookup table can be generated using a GPU on a desktop
computer first and stored on a mobile system to check when needed. This is slower than directly run-
ning a neural network, but it is still considerably faster than performing a local search. More details are
discussed in Appendix E.1.
2. Quantum networks. In addition to free-space QKD applications that require low-power, low-
latency devices, the neural network can also be very useful in a network setting, such as a quantum
internet-of-things (IoT) where numerous small devices might be interconnected in networks as users or
relays. For an untrusted relay network, MDI-QKD or TF-QKD protocol are desirable. However, the
number of pairs of connections between users will increase quadratically with the number of users, which
might quickly overload the computing resources of the relay/users.
With the neural network, any low-power device such as a single-board computer or a mobile phone
can easily serve as a relay that connects to numerous users and optimizes e.g. ∼5000 pairs of connections
(100 users) in under 5 seconds for MDI-QKD or TF-QKD. This is a task previously unimaginable even
for a powerful desktop PC, for which even supporting a network with 20 users would take from 20s
(MDI-QKD) to 6 minutes (TF-QKD) to even 30 minutes (“9-intensity MDI-QKD”), if the protocol
chosen is difficult to optimize. Therefore, our new method can greatly reduce the required compute
power of devices and the latency of the systems when building a quantum Internet of Things.
7.5 Conclusion and Discussions
In this chapter we have presented a simple way to train a neural network that accurately and efficiently
predicts the optimal parameters for a given QKD protocol, based on the characterization of devices and
channels. We show that the approach is general and not limited to any specific form of protocol, and
demonstrate its effectiveness for four examples: symmetric/asymmetric MDI-QKD, BB84, and TF-QKD.
We show that an important use case for such an approach is to enable efficient parameter optimization
on low-power devices. We can achieve 2-4 orders of magnitude faster optimization speed compared to
local search, with a fraction of the power consumption. Our method can be implemented on either the
increasingly popular neural network acceleration chips, or on common CPUs that have relatively weak
performance. This can be highly useful not only for free-space QKD applications that require low latency
and but have a limited power budget, but also for a quantum internet-of-things (IoT) where even a small
portable device connected to numerous users in a quantum network can easily optimize the parameters
for all connections in real-time.
Here we have demonstrated that the technique of machine learning can indeed be used to optimize
the performance of QKD protocols. The effectiveness of this simple demonstration suggests that it may
be possible to apply similar methods to other optimization tasks, which are common in the designing
and control of practical QKD systems, such as determining the optimal threshold for post-selection in
free-space QKD, tuning the polarization controller motors for misalignment control, etc.. Such a method
might even be applicable for optimization and control tasks in classical systems, to use a pre-trained
neural network in accelerating well-defined but computationally intensive tasks. We hope that our work
can further inspire future works in investigating how machine learning could help us in building better
Chapter 7. Machine Learning in QKD 99
performing, more robust QKD systems.
All training data are generated from simulations based on models in Refs. [86, 65, 95, 66], using
local/global search algorithm. The generated datasets, and the neural networks trained from them, are
available upon reasonable request by email (see Ref. [67] for author contact information).
Note added: After our posting of a first draft of Ref. [67] on the preprint server [135], another work
on a similar subject was subsequently posted on the preprint server [136] and later published at [137].
While both our work and the other work [67, 137] have similar approaches in parameter optimization
with neural networks, and observe the huge speedup neural network has over CPU local search, a few
important differences remain. Firstly, we show that the neural network method is a general approach
not limited to any specific protocol (and show its versatile applications with four examples), while Ref.
[136, 137] is limited to discussing asymmetric MDI-QKD only. Secondly, we point out that a key use
case of this approach would be performing parameter optimization on low-power devices with neural
networks. This was only briefly mentioned in passing in Ref. [136, 137]. In contrast, we perform testing
and benchmarking on real hardware devices. Our work not only will allow more types of smaller portable
devices to join a network setting, but also can be important for free-space QKD applications where low
power consumption and low latency are crucial.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Conclusions of this Thesis
In this thesis, we have discussed two promising future directions of QKD: free-space QKD and fibre-based
QKD networks. We have focused on three important challenges in practical QKD:
1. atmospheric turbulence (in free-space QKD)
2. asymmetric channel losses (in QKD networks with untrusted relays)
3. efficient parameter optimization (for all QKD systems)
and we have proposed adaptive techniques that greatly improve the practical performance of QKD when
the above challenges are present. For (1), we have proposed a real-time selection method that can
conveniently use a pre-fixed threshold and greatly increase the maximum tolerable channel loss. For
(2), we have proposed a method that allows two users to use different intensity settings to compensate
for channel loss. For (3), we have proposed the use of machine learning techniques to greatly accelerate
parameter optimization, enabling low-power devices for free-space QKD and fast optimization for large-
scale networks. A list of the topics of which each chapter corresponds to and their applications is shown
in Table 8.1. We believe that such techniques, aimed at solving some of the key challenges in some
important scenarios for QKD, will help pave the way towards future implementations of free-space QKD
and fibre-based QKD networks.
Here we believe it would also be beneficial to introduce some of the methodologies behind our
work. In this thesis, we have taken an approach that combines both engineering/numerical techniques
(such as post-selection, local/global optimization, and machine learning) as well as a strong physi-
cal/mathematical intuition behind our choice. For instance, we have proposed some key theoretical
observations behind our methods:
• Chapter 3: For free-space BB84, optimal data post-selection threshold does not depend on the
condition of turbulent channel, allowing us to perform real-time selection with a pre-fixed threshold,
in a “semi-blind” approach regardless of channel.
• Chapter 4: Free-space MDI-QKD will have turbulence-induced channel asymmetry in real-time
that worsens its performance, which necessitates post-selection on both transmittance and asym-
metry.
100
Chapter 8. Conclusion 101
Table 8.1: An recapitulation of the topics of chapters in this thesis, and their corresponding appli-
cations (for free-space QKD or fibre-based networks). Some terms (MDI-QKD, TF-QKD, turbulence,
asymmetry) are abbreviated due to limited space here.
Chapter Ref.
Protocol Topic Application
BB84 MDI TF Turb. Asym. Machine Learning Free-space Network
3 [63] X - - X - - X -
4 [64] - X - X - - X -
5 [65] - X - - X - - X
6 [66] - - X - X - - X
7 [67] X X X - - X X X
• Chapter 5: MDI-QKD has an inherent asymmetry between its two bases (and differs from a simple
Hong-Ou-Mandel interference), allowing us to follow different strategies in two decoupled bases
when compensating for channel asymmetry.
• Chapter 6: Similar to MDI-QKD, for TF-QKD single-photon interference visibility also depends
on channel asymmetry (and can be improved by adjusting signal intensity).
• Chapter 7: The overall optimization process of a function can be viewed as a “super-function”.
Such a super-function can be simulated efficiently with neural networks.
Notably, the results for Chapters 5 and 6 (asymmetric MDI-QKD and TF-QKD) might be especially
of interest to a broader Physics community. Our physical insight1 is that QKD is a playground for
demonstration of effects in quantum mechanics. For instance, in TF-QKD, we are interested in the
effect of single-photon interference whereas MDI-QKD relies on two-photon interference.
In more detail, in TF-QKD, to achieve such an interference, it is important for the two laser pulses
to be indistinguishable (same spectral property and timing info). [Incidentally, effects on misalignment
of basis have been studied in the literature, such as Ref. [58] for MDI-QKD, and Ref. [32] for TF-QKD.]
For MDI-QKD, we are interested in two-photon interference. Our work shows that, in one of the
bases (X-basis), the two laser pulses need to be indistinguishable to achieve low QBER. This is directly
analogous to the standard HOM dip. On the other hand, in the other basis (Z-basis), the QBER will
remain low even when the two laser pulses are distinguishable from each other.
Asymmetry plays a key role in our work. The fact that Charlie is performing a measurement in a
particular basis (Z-basis) in MDI-QKD means that Charlie’s measurement is not symmetric with respect
to the basis choice by Alice and Bob. Such an asymmetry allows us to decouple the intensities of the
two bases completely.
We also allow asymmetry between the signal states and the decoy states. Perhaps, we could name it
as a principle of “Efficiency from Asymmetry”. Such a principle is also effectively applied in Chapter 6
to TF-QKD, where again one of the basis (X-basis) requires indistinguishability, but this time for single-
photon interference, and the other basis (Z-basis) uses phase-randomized pulses and does not consider
QBER. The choice of intensities are again decoupled completely for the two bases.
1The following discussion here is based on helpful suggestions from HK Lo and from Ref. [139].
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Another interesting physical observation we have made is the prediction of turbulence-induced chan-
nel asymmetry for free-space MDI-QKD, which will greatly decrease interference visibility if two channels
are independently fluctuating. In this case, the channel asymmetry is changing quickly with time and
we cannot effectively compensate for it with choice of intensities. We instead proposed that we can
post-select the signals and keep only ones obtained under high channel symmetry. This is an effect - to
our knowledge - not previously studied for free-space MDI-QKD, and we believe it will be helpful for
implementations of MDI-QKD or simply HOM interference experiments through free-space channels. In
fact, in Ref. [142], people have reported a HOM interference experiment between one free-space and one
fibre channel, and they have observed such turbulence-induced decrease in visibility, for which they also
implemented a post-selection technique to improve visibility.
Last but not least, many topics of this thesis are cross-disciplinary projects that bridge Computer
Science with Physics, where efficient and novel software design, combined with a good understanding
of the physics behind the problems, plays a key role in the solution for many of the problems in this
thesis. We believe it is an approach with increasing importance in designing practical QKD systems
(and perhaps in other physical fields too), and hope to apply such an approach of combining Physics
with computing techniques (optimization, parallel computing, machine learning) to more future projects
to come.
8.2 Outlook and Future Works
In this section, we discuss some remaining issues to be solved, and some potential future directions of
research.
Some near-term topics:
• Model for PDTC of a turbulent channel: In Chapters 3 and 4 we have focused on a simple
channel model (PDTC) of a truncated log-normal distribution. This model is applicable to the
scintillation of signals, but does not apply well to beam-wandering, which is also an important
affecting factor for QKD under turbulence. There have been studies on better PDTC models, such
as Ref. [140]. In principle, as we stated in the main text, the optimal threshold value itself does
not depend on the form of PDTC, but the actual performance does depend on the channel. It
would be interesting to see a rigorous discussion and estimation of the performance of the methods
in Chapters 3 and 4 with a more comprehensive turbulence model.
• Finite-size effects and asymmetry in free-space MDI-QKD: In Chapter 4 we have only
studied the infinite-data scenario and have not finished the study on MDI-QKD with finite-size
effects (and a full optimization of parameters, including both intensities and probabilities) yet.
Part of the reason is the limitation in computational power (since, as we stated in Chapter 4,
the current channel model involves 2D integrations every time the key rate function is calculated),
which would require more efficient algorithm design and more powerful computing devices, such as a
computer cluster. A comprehensive study of free-space MDI-QKD with fully optimized parameters
and finite-size analysis would be an interesting topic (with practical importance) to be studied in
the future.
Also, up so far we have discussed symmetric expected values for the channel losses and the same
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intensities for Alice and Bob. It would be interesting to discuss the general case of asymmetric
channels and intensities, by combining the methods in Chapters 4 and 5.
• Experimental implementation of asymmetric TF-QKD and TF-QKD network: To-
gether with our collaborators we have successfully implemented MDI-QKD over highly asymmet-
ric channels in experiment, demonstrating its usefulness for a future network setting. With the
theory for asymmetric TF-QKD completed (as shown in Chapter 6), we are interested in exper-
imentally demonstrating TF-QKD over asymmetric channels, and exploring a TF-QKD network
setting (which, compared to MDI-QKD, can increase the key rate and extend maximum distance
between users). We have already completed a preliminary demonstration of asymmetric TF-QKD
[68], which is also accepted as a talk at the CLEO 2019 conference.
• Machine learning accelerated optimization in more fields In Chapter 7 we have demon-
strated that neural networks can be used to accelerate parameter optimization for QKD. As we
discussed in the chapter, the key idea of our method is in fact rather general, and in principle
applies to any convex optimization problem (or even non-optimization problem - as long as there
is a single-valued function that is computationally intensive to evaluate, but is needed in real-time
applications), not necessarily only for QKD, but potentially for other fields of Physics and even
outside Physics in other fields that require optimization. For instance, we note that very recently,
an article with a similar approach has been posted on arXiv [141] that makes use of a neural
network, trained from pre-generated input-solution pairs, to accelerate the calculation of numer-
ical solutions to the three-body problem. We hope to see such an approach of machine learning
acceleration finding uses in more fields in and outside quantum information.
Some long-term topics:
• Model for Hong-Ou-Mandel interference through two free-space channels: In Chapter
5, we have focused on a model where the two channels are independently fluctuating (each following
a PDTC based on a single channel). This is based on the assumption that the signals from Alice
and Bob respectively reach two receiving telescopes coupled to two single-mode fibres. The signals
in the fibres then interfere at an in-fibre beam-splitter. In this way, the interference is physically
no different from a fully fibre-based system, while the turbulent channels can be modelled as two
independent PDTCs, plus the coupling loss to the single-mode fibres. This setup has been physi-
cally implemented in a current experiment (presented as a poster at the QCrypt 2019 conference
[142]), albeit it performs MDI-QKD through one fibre channel and one free-space channel (where
the free-space signal couples back to a single-mode fibre), meaning that the model is in fact feasible.
However, an alternative setup is to either couple to multi-mode fibre, or directly interfering signals
coming from free-space channels at a free-space beam splitter. In such cases, the channels can
no longer be modelled as just independent fluctuations in the channel losses, but rather, the
turbulent modes and the distorted wavefronts will directly affect the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference
visibility. Such a study will involve more background knowledge and further theoretical studies on
atmospheric physics and quantum light through turbulence, and will also require more experimental
verifications.
Additionally, one more approach to addressing turbulence in free-space MDI-QKD could be using
adaptive optics (e.g. deformable mirrors) that directly compensate for the distorted wavefronts
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and reduce the effect of turbulence in hardware. This is an alternative to the approach of receiving
non-compensated signals, and improving signal-to-noise ratio in software by post-processing as
discussed in this thesis.
We thank the helpful discussions from Prof. Thomas Jennewein and Mr. Shuang-Lin Li on some
of the above topics and ideas in free-space HOM interference.
• Machine learning in finding new physics: In Chapter 7 we presented a very simple demon-
stration that novel techniques introduced from other fields such as machine learning can be highly
useful for practical QKD systems. Nonetheless, it is based on given analytical and numerical models
of QKD systems, and simply improving upon existing knowledge, by accelerating the computa-
tion of a function we already know. In fact, there is an increasing interest in bridging the fields
of machine learning and Physics. For instance, there have been proposals to use reinforcement
learning (another type of machine learning algorithm, without requiring pre-generated training
data) to find new optical experimental setups that create a desired quantum state [143], or to
increase the stability of quantum gates on physical superconducting qubits [144]. We believe that
a deeper understanding of machine learning techniques and the introduction of it to the field of
Physics (especially quantum communication and computation) can help us find more new physics
and improve the practical QKD/Quantum Computing systems in fundamental and new ways.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Information for
Background on QKD
This Appendix contains supplemental information for Chapter 2.
A.1 Variants of TF-QKD
Since the proposal of the original TF-QKD protocol, there have been multiple papers that propose
variants of the TF-QKD protocol that aim at providing a rigorous security analysis. As mentioned in
the main text, an important underlying idea of these proofs is the division of signals into an “encoding
part” that generates the key, and a “testing part” that bounds the phase error rate. The variants of
TF-QKD type protocol differ in their approach of choosing “encoding” and “testing” phases as well as
the respective usage/absence of phase randomization in the two bases. In this section we will briefly
introduce some of the representative protocols.
For instance, in the “TF-QKD* protocol” [28], the authors divide signals into Code and Test phases
that both contain signals in X and Z bases. The former phase announces the global phase publicly and
generates the key, while the latter phase randomizes the phase, but only asks Alice and Bob to sample
the gains (without requiring QBER) of signals. The gains can be used to perform a decoy-state analysis
and estimate the yields of each photon number state, which can be used to bound the phase error rate
with an “unbalanced quantum coin”, whose bias represents the amount of disturbance in the channel
and is considered invariant between Test and Code phases. This coin bias can then be used to bound
the phase error rate for the Code phase.
Another proposal, [32] (“simple TF-QKD”), assigns the X and Z bases respectively to encoding and
testing phases. The X basis uses a fixed (zero) global phase without randomization and encodes the key in
0, pi phase modulations, while the Z basis uses phase-randomized pulses to perform decoy-state analysis.
In the non-phase-randomized X basis, it is proven that the phase-error rate can be estimated from the
gain of “cat states” (superpositions of either odd-numbered or even-numbered photon number states).
It is then shown that the gain of cat states can be upper bounded using the yields of phase-randomized
photon number states (which is invariant across the bases), where these yields can be estimated from
the decoy-state analysis in the Z basis.
The Phase-Matching (PM) QKD [29] protocol doesn’t physically divide signals into encoding and
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testing phases, but rather employs a “virtual” protocol, where Alice and Bob did not announce the global
phase, and performed decoy-state analysis. The virtual protocol has the same experimental observables
as the real protocol. This means that Alice and Bob can use the real observables to estimate the yields
of “photon number states” (which only exist in the virtual protocol) and derive a phase error rate in the
virtual protocol. The phase error rate is assumed to be invariant across the virtual and real protocols;
therefore it can be used to estimate the key rate for the real protocol.
The Sending-or-not-Sending (SNS) QKD [30] uses Z and X bases for encoding and testing. However,
a difference here is that SNS-QKD uses randomized coherent pulses in the Z basis (and instead of
encoding information in the phase, Alice and Bob uses a small probability  of sending a pulse to encode
bit 1, and not sending 1−  to encode bit 0). The X basis uses phase-randomized pulses, but announces
the phase. In the X basis, SNS-QKD employs a similar argument as above mentioned for PM-QKD,
that suppose there is a virtual protocol where the phases were not announced, the observables as well
as the phase error rate in the virtual protocol should be invariant, i.e. the same as the real protocol.
Like PM-QKD, this allows SNS-QKD to estimate the single-photon yield and phase error rate based on
X basis data and estimate the key rate.
There are also other protocols, such as MDI-TF-QKD, and PM-MDI-QKD, which we haven’t dis-
cussed in detail here. In the review paper Ref. [74], the authors classify the TF-QKD-like protocols into
two types, the ones that use “BB84-type two-basis analysis” (which fundamentally use single-photons
as information carriers), such as TF-QKD* [28], SNS-QKD [30], and the ones that directly use coherent
states as information carriers, such as PM-QKD [29], simple TF-QKD [32], MDI TF-QKD [145], and
PM-MDI QKD [31].
Appendix B
Supplemental Information for
Free-Space BB84
This Appendix contains supplemental information for Chapter 3.
B.1 Decoy-State BB84 Rate Function
B.1.1 Standard Channel Model
Here we present a brief recapitulation of the decoy-state BB84 model we used. We follow the notations
as in Lo, Ma, and Chen’s Paper in 2005 [14].
Alice uses a WCP source at intensity µ, which sends pulses with a Poissonian photon number distri-
bution: Pi =
µi
i! e
−µ. We will first consider using the standard channel model (as in the original paper
Ref.[14]), where for each i-photon pulse |i〉, the transmittance, yield Yi, gain Qi, and QBER ei are:
ηi = 1− (1− η)i
Yi ≈ Y0 + ηi = Y0 + 1− (1− η)i
Qi = Yi
µi
i!
e−µ
ei =
e0Y0 + edηi
Yi
(B.1)
where Y0, ed are the dark count rate and misalignment, respectively, and e0 =
1
2 . The overall Gain Qµ
and QBER Eµ for this intensity µ are:
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µi
i!
e−µ =
∞∑
i=0
YiPi
Eµ =
1
Qµ
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
µi
i!
e−µ =
1
Qµ
∞∑
i=0
eiYiPi
(B.2)
where Qµ and Eµ are simulated here for rate estimation using known channel transmittance η, while in
experiment they will be measured observables.
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For this standard channel model, we assume that the photon number distribution after passing
through the channel would still be Gaussian. Using decoy-state technique to combine Qµ and Eµ for
different intensities, we can estimate the single-photon contributions Q1 and e1. The achievable secure
key rate is at least
RGLLP = q{−f(Eµ)Qµh2(Eµ) +Q1[1− h2(e1)]} (B.3)
as given by the GLLP formula[71], where h2 is the binary entropy function, q =
1
2 or q ≈ 1 depending
on whether efficient BB84 is used, and f is the error-correction efficiency.
B.1.2 Channel Model after Post-Selection
However, one thing worth noting is that although photon number distribution is Gaussian after the
signals pass through the standard channel model, it is no longer necessarily so if we perform post-
selection, in which case the photon number distribution might change, and thus the decoy-state key rate
form in Eq. B.3 (which depends on a Gaussian distribution model) might no longer be adequate.
To show that this will not be a concern for us, we will explicitly discuss how the post-selection from
P-RTS will affect the yield for each photon number. From Eq. B.1, before post-selection, the yield for
pulses with a given photon number i is
Yi(η) = Y0 + 1− (1− η)i (B.4)
For simplified model, among the post-selected signals, we have replaced η in Eq. B.4 with
〈η〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(B.5)
thus the yield for i-photon pulse is assumed to be:
Y Simplifiedi (ηT ) = Y0 + 1− (1− 〈η〉)i (B.6)
in which case, we are simply replacing the η with a higher expected value 〈η〉, but the expression is
in the same form as Eq. B.4, and the received photon number distribution is still Gaussian. (Hence
decoy-state analysis and key rate expression still hold).
However, if we consider the more realistic case, post-selection might have a different effect on pulses
with different photon number i. Therefore, to estimate the yield for each photon number, and analyze
the photon number distribution after the channel and the post-selection, we should group up pulses with
the same given photon number, and calculate the expected value of the yield for each given i. We can
call this the “pulse-wise integration” model.
Y Pulse−wisei (ηT ) =
∫ 1
ηT
Yi(η)pη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
= 〈Yi(η)〉 (B.7)
and the Gain Qµ and QBER Eµ would become:
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Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
〈Yi(η)〉µ
i
i!
e−µ =
∞∑
i=0
〈Yi(η)〉Pi
Eµ =
1
Qµ
∞∑
i=0
ei〈Yi(η)〉µ
i
i!
e−µ =
1
Qµ
∞∑
i=0
ei〈Yi(η)〉Pi
(B.8)
In the case of this “pulse-wise integration” model, Qµ and Eµ can no longer be considered as from
a Gaussian distribution with intensity ηµ, which is seemingly warning us that the decoy-state analysis
might not hold true anymore. However, here we make the observation that for i = 0, trivially,
Y Simplified0 = Y0 = Y
Pulse−wise
0 (B.9)
and for i = 1, the yield is a linear function of η, hence
Y Simplified1 = Y0 + 〈η〉 = 〈(Y0 + η)〉 = Y Pulse−wise1 (B.10)
While for all multi-photon cases where i ≥ 2, the function
Yi(η) = Y0 + 1− (1− η)i (B.11)
is a strictly concave function on the domain [0, 1]. Therefore, from Jensen’s Inequality, the expected
value of a concave function is strictly smaller than the function (Yi) of the expected value, i.e.
Y Pulse−wisei = 〈Yi(η)〉 < Yi(〈η〉) = Y Simplifiedi , i ≥ 2 (B.12)
This means that, with the simplified model, with the Gaussian photon number distribution as-
sumption and the standard decoy-state key rate analysis, we are correctly estimating the vacuum and
single-photon contributions, but always over-estimating the multi-photon contributions. This will in fact
result in an under-estimated key rate for the simplified model than the realistic case (yield-wise inte-
gration model). Therefore, we make the “validity argument” here that, despite post-selection will result
in a non-Gaussian photon number distribution, by using the simplified model and the same decoy-state
analysis, we will never incorrectly over-estimate the key rate, and can be confident in the improvement
in performance from using P-RTS.
B.2 Proof of Rate-Wise Integration Model as Upper Bound
To better compare the models, let us first simply the notations, and define 〈f(η)〉 operator as taking the
expected value of f(η) over pη0,σ(η) (in the case of using post-selection, the distribution is truncated,
and will be normalized by dividing by
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη). The expected value 〈f(η)〉 can be expressed as:
〈f(η)〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
f(η)pη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(B.13)
Then, we can easily see that, mathematically, the two models we proposed so far, the rate-wise
integration model and the simplified model, are only different in that they apply the “expected value”
operator at different levels of the function. We can simply write RRate-wise and RSimplified as:
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RRate-wise(ηT ) = 〈R(η)〉
RSimplified(ηT ) = R(〈η〉)
(B.14)
Now, we introduce the Jensen’s Inequality :
For a random variable X following a probability distribution p(X), and for any given convex function
f(x), we always have
〈f(X)〉 ≥ f(〈X〉) (B.15)
the equal sign is taken when the function f(x) is linear.
For decoy-state BB84, RGLLP (η) is a convex (and increasing) function of η, therefore we have
〈R(η)〉 ≥ R(〈η〉), i.e.
RRate-wise(0) ≥ RSimplified(0) (B.16)
This holds true even after a threshold is applied, too, since we can simply replace the distribution
p(η) with the truncated distribution on domain [ηT , 1], and normalize it by dividing by the constant∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη. Since R(η) is non-concave on all sections of [0, 1], the Jensen’s Inequality always holds
true, regardless of the threshold. i.e.
RRate-wise(0) ≥ RRate-wise(ηT ) ≥ RSimplified(ηT ) (B.17)
here we also include Eq. 3.3’s result that RRate-wise(ηT ) is non-increasing with ηT .
Therefore, we see that RRate-wise serves as an upper bound for the possible rate in a turbulent
channel, as it is the maximum achievable rate when we know all transmittance information and make
use of the entire PDTC. The simplified model always has no higher rate than this upper bound. This
means that, when we use RSimplified to calculate the rate, we never overestimate the performance of the
protocol. When we demonstrate the improvements we gain by using P-RTS in decoy-state BB84, the
actual possible rate will be even higher, thus the validity argument for the usage of the simplified model
in estimating the rate.
B.3 Proof of Optimality of Critical Transmittance as Threshold
for Simplified Model
Following the argument in Section 3.2.3, here we give a rigorous proof that ηT = ηcritical is indeed the
optimal threshold for the simplified model, given that RS−P (η) (and similarly for RGLLP (η)) is nearly
linear. For the simplified model, we showed that
RSimplified(ηT ) =
∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη ×RS−P (〈η〉) (B.18)
where 〈η〉 satisfies:
〈η〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(B.19)
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Then, using the Leibniz Integration Rule, and taking derivative with respect to ηT (here we omit the
subscript of η0, σ for the PDTC, and S − P (or GLLP ) for the rate), we have
d
dηT
〈η〉 = p(ηT )∫ 1
ηT
p(η)dη
(〈η〉 − ηT ) (B.20)
using the chain rule,
d
dηT
R(〈η〉) = dR(η)
d〈η〉
d〈η〉
dηT
= R′(〈η〉) p(ηT )∫ 1
ηT
p(η)dη
(〈η〉 − ηT )
(B.21)
Maximizing RSimplified requires that
d
dηT
RSimplified(ηT ) = 0 (B.22)
expanding the derivative using Eq. B.18 gives us
d
dηT
RSimplified(ηT )
=
(∫ 1
ηT
p(η)dη
)
× d
dηT
R(〈η〉)− p(ηT )R(〈η〉)
= R′(〈η〉)p(ηT )(〈η〉 − ηT )− p(ηT )R(〈η〉)
= p(ηT )[(〈η〉 − ηT )R′(〈η〉)−R(〈η〉)]
(B.23)
Therefore, the optimal threshold requires that
(〈η〉 − ηT )R′(〈η〉) = R(〈η〉) (B.24)
When R(η) is a linear function on the domain [ηcritical, 1] and R(ηcritical) = 0, there is
R′(〈η〉) = R(〈η〉)−R(ηT )
(〈η〉 − ηT ) (B.25)
combined with Eq. B.24, we have
R(ηT ) = 0 (B.26)
for η ∈ [ηcritical, 1], there is one and only one point satisfying R(ηT ) = 0, that is
ηT = ηcritical (B.27)
For η ∈ [0, ηcritical), on the other hand,
R(〈η〉)−R(ηT ) < R′(〈η〉)(〈η〉 − ηT ) = R(〈η〉) (B.28)
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which becomes
R(ηT ) > 0 (B.29)
but R(η) = 0 for all η ≤ ηcritical, so no ηT ∈ [0, ηcritical) satisfies the zero derivative requirement. Which
means that, when RGLLP (η) is near linear on [ηcritical, 1], we have
ηT = ηcritical (B.30)
as the one and only optimal threshold for RSimplified.
Additionally, if we do not ignore the convexity of R(η), consider the tangent line for R(η) at 〈η〉,
since R(η) is a convex function of η,
(〈η〉 − ηT )R′(〈η〉) > R(〈η〉)−R(ηT ) (B.31)
optimal threshold requires that
R(〈η〉) > R(〈η〉)−R(ηT ) (B.32)
i.e. R(ηT ) > 0, which means that the optimal threshold position will be shifted rightward from ηcritical,
the actual amount of shift depends on how much R deviates from linearity (in numerical simulations,
we see that since R(η) is very close to linear, this shift is very small). Also, although RRate-wise is not
affected for a threshold no larger than ηcritical, using a threshold larger than ηcritical will cause R
Rate-wise
to decrease, since “bins” with positive rate are discarded. Therefore, the maximum point for RSimplified is
no longer the maximum RRate-wise, but slightly smaller than it. This also explains why in the numerical
results, the optimal RSimplified is always slightly lower than upper bound, due to non-linearity of R(η).
Also, a small note is that, the Jensen’s Inequality asks the function to be differentiable at every point,
while the turning point of R at ηcritical is a sharp point. To address this, we can construct another R2
with an infinitesimally small yet smooth “turn” at ηcritical to replace the sharp point, but as the “turn”
is infinitely small, integrating R and R2 over any region will yield infinitely close results. Therefore the
turning point’s structure does not affect the above results.
B.4 Analytical Expression for Optimal Threshold
B.4.1 Single-Photon Case
Let ηsys = η × ηd. The single photon Shor-Preskill rate is
RS−P = (Y0 + ηsys){1− 2h2[e(ηsys)]} (B.33)
where the single-photon QBER is
e(ηsys) =
1
2Y0 + edηsys
Y0 + ηsys
(B.34)
For the rate to be zero, we require:
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RS−P = 0 (B.35)
hence
1− 2h2[e(ηsys)] = 0 (B.36)
or, h2[e(ηsys)] =
1
2 . This numerically corresponds to e(ηsys) = 11% = ecritical (which is the QBER
threshold for Shor-Preskill rate). Therefore, substituting into Eq. B.34, we have
ηsys =
1
2 − ecritical
ecritical − edY0 (B.37)
expressing it in channel transmittance η
ηcritical =
Y0
ηd
1
2 − ecritical
ecritical − ed (B.38)
or, if we substitute ηcritical = 11% into the equation, we have
ηcritical =
Y0
ηd
0.39
0.11− ed (B.39)
This is the analytical expression for the critical transmittance for the single-photon case. Also, we
can see that the critical transmittance is proportional to the background count (i.e. noise) in the system.
i.e.
ηcritical ∝ Y0
ηd
(B.40)
B.4.2 Decoy-State BB84
Consider the asymptotic case of decoy-state BB84, with infinite number of decoys (i.e. the only significant
intensity is the signal intensity µ). Using the GLLP rate,
RGLLP = q{−fQµh2(Eµ) +Q1[1− h2(e1)]} (B.41)
we would like to find ηcritical such that
R(ηcritical) = 0 (B.42)
hence
fQµh2(Eµ) = Q1[1− h2(e1)] (B.43)
or
h2(e1) + f
Qµ
Q1
h2(Eµ) = 1 (B.44)
Let ηsys = η × ηd, the observables and single-photon contributions can be written as:
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Qµ = Y0 + 1− exp(−µηsys)
Eµ =
1
2Y0 + ed(1− exp(−µηsys))
Y0 + 1− exp(−µηsys)
Q1 = µexp(−µ)(Y0 + ηsys)
e1 =
1
2Y0 + edηsys
Y0 + ηsys
(B.45)
Now, if η  1, we can use the approximation 1 − exp(−µηsys) = µηsys. If the dark/background
count rate Y0 also satisfies Y0  ηsys (which is a reasonable approximation, since with parameters in
Table 3.2, Y0 is at the order of 10
−5, while ηdηcritical is at the order of 10−3), we can write
Qµ
Q1
≈ Y0 + µηsys
µexp(−µ)(Y0 + ηsys) ≈ exp(µ)
e1 ≈ 1
2
Y0
ηsys
+ ed
Eµ ≈ 1
2µ
Y0
ηsys
+ ed
(B.46)
substituting back into Eq. B.44, and defining
x =
Y0
ηsys
=
Y0
ηdη
(B.47)
we can have
h2(
1
2
x+ ed) + fe
µh2(
1
2µ
x+ ed) = 1 (B.48)
which is a function that is only determined by ed and µ. We can write its solution for x as
xcritical = F(ed, µ) (B.49)
Then the critical transmittance (i.e. optimal threshold position) can be written as
ηcritical =
Y0
ηd
[
1
F(ed, µ) ] (B.50)
where F(ed, µ) does not have an explicit analytical expression, because h2 function cannot be analytically
expanded. (One can, however, numerically use linear fit to expand h2, if given the approximate range
of the experimental parameters ed and µ). The important observation here, however, is that for the
decoy-state case, we can still have:
ηcritical ∝ Y0
ηd
(B.51)
which points out that the critical threshold is directly proportional to the dark (or background) count
rate of the experimental devices, and inversely proportional to the detector efficiency.
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B.5 PDTC parameters
In our simulations, we have fixed several typical values for σ for free-space QKD, corresponding to the
case of weak-to-medium level turbulence, and have considered the PDTC to be a fixed distribution for
a given σ regardless of the channel loss. In reality, though, σ is distance-dependent, too. A commonly
used estimation for σ is the “Rytov Approximation”[146]
σ2 = 1.23C2nk
7/6L11/6 (B.52)
which relates σ both to the distance L and the refractive index structure constant C2n (which is determined
by atmospheric conditions).
Also, with simulation software such as MODTRAN[147], it is possible to simulate the relationship
between η0 and L for a given free-space channel. Therefore, one necessary next step would also be
to estimate performance for cases with realistic values for η0 and σ, both from literature and from
simulations, as well as to study the possible correlation σ and η0 (both related to L) in simulations.
B.6 Note about Correlations between Quantum and Classical
Signals
As we have described in Chapter 2, the real-time selection method we discuss does not depend on the
specific means with which we obtain the channel transmittance. For some specific setups, such as one
based on a classical signal (e.g. the setup in Ref. [102]), the effectiveness of the real-time selection
depends on a good correlation of transmittances for the classical signal and the quantum signal. In Ref.
[102] Fig. 2, the authors of that paper has provided an illustrative comparison between the classical
signal strength and the quantum count rate, and concluded that the correlation was good (despite that
a quantitative analysis on the temporal correlation of data was not provided - except a brief discussion
that the fluctuation σ was of different values for the classical and quantum signals).
If the correlation between classical and quantum signals are not perfect, we would like to point out
that this can be considered as an “imperfect threshold”. Suppose we calculate an optimal pre-fixed
threshold of ηT = ηcritical = 0.0012 based on our device parameters. In principle, we are supposed to
select all signals with η > ηT = 0.0012. However, what we’re actually sampling and selecting upon is
the classical detector voltage V > VT . For a given VT , the actual threshold ηT we apply on the quantum
transmittance might be e.g. a value slightly different from ηcritical = 0.0012 (due to a bias in the classical
reading), or a value fluctuating around ηcritical = 0.0012 (due to fluctuation in the classical reading, or
the correlation changing in real time). This means that, imperfect correlation can be thought of as an
imperfect threshold ηT which could be shifted from the optimal position, or even could be following a
probability distribution. Such an imperfect threshold will decrease the performance, but from Fig. 3.4
and Appendix B.3, we can see that ηcritical is the position where
d
dηT
RSimplified(ηT ) = 0, this means that
a slight perturbation on ηT near this optimal point will have little effect on the key rate, i.e. our method
is robust against small inaccuracies on the threshold.
We can perform a quick estimation based on Rayleigh scattering (which depends quadratically on
the inverse of wavelength, i.e. I ∝ 1λ4 ). Given e.g. classical channel of 808nm and quantum channel
of 850nm, there will be a 22.5% difference in the scattering intensity, i.e. quantum channel has about
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0.9dB smaller loss than the classical channel. If the entire channel loss comes from Rayleigh scattering
(while in practice it actually also depends on absorption, Mie scattering, and the loss due to scope
geometry and turbulence), this means that e.g. setting ηclassical = 0.0012 would result in an actual
threshold of ηquantum = 0.00147. Using parameters in Table 3.2 and µ = 0.3, ν = 0.05, σ = 0.9, at 35dB
using ηT = 0.00147 instead of 0.0012 results in only a 26.5% decrease in key rate (6.2 × 10−7 versus
4.9 × 10−7, while at this location R = 0 without post-selection), and only 0.6dB smaller maximum
tolerable loss (44.4dB versus 43.8dB, while the case without post-selection only reaches 31dB). This
means that indeed an inaccurate threshold has a limited impact on the effectiveness of our method.
For a more comprehensive atmospheric transmittance model, we also tested simulating a channel of
30km using MODTRAN (relative humidity RH = 95%, “Ocean View” profile), from which we obtain
η = 0.0201 at 808nm, and η = 0.0253 at 850nm, which means about 26% higher transmittance for the
quantum signal. Again, this level of inaccuracy for the threshold would not affect the key rate too much,
which we have observed is very robust against perturbations on the threshold near the optimal position.
1
If the correlation is time-dependent and the deviations are randomized, we can think of ηT as a
“fuzzy” threshold which follows a probability distribution of its own, see Fig. B.1. For instance a
simple pηT0,σT (ηT ), which can be e.g. a Gaussian distribution determined by expected value of threshold
ηT0, and standard deviation σT of the distribution. If we write the cumulative PDTC as CDF (ηT ) =∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη, and expected value after post-selection E(ηT ) =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη, we can obtain portion
of selected signals and expected value of transmittance among these signals:
P =
∫ 1
0
pηT0,σT (ηT )CDF (ηT )dηT
〈η〉 = 1
P
∫ 1
0
pηT0,σT (ηT )E(ηT )dηT
(B.53)
Of course, the actual form of pηT0,σT (ηT ) needs experimental data to validate, and the optimality of
the threshold might need more careful discussions. (While Ref. [102] mentioned that the probability
distributions for quantum and classical signals have different σ - i.e. they do have somewhat different
levels of fluctuations - their temporal correlations are not quantified.) Nonetheless, the key point here
is that having inaccurate or “fuzzy” threshold values will likely have little impact on the key rate (due
to the robustness of the key rate against small perturbations near the optimal point), and it will not
affect the security either (as the channel transmittance is public information - Even can even directly
manipulate the classical signal and control Bob’s post-selection, but this is at most a denial-of-service
attack that reduces the key rate but not the security of the protocol).
1The level of wavelength dependency of transmittance is affected by e.g. humidity, which determines the amount of
water absorption - which makes the dependency deviate from I ∝ 1
λ4
from only Rayleigh scattering. In some more extreme
cases, such as 143km with relative humidity RH = 10%, the wavelength dependency is stronger, and the transmittances
for classical/quantum channels are 0.0008 and 0.0016, meaning that the quantum transmittance is twice as high. Even
so, for the same BB84 test case in the previous paragraph, using double the value of optimal threshold ηT = 0.0024 only
decreases maximum loss to 42.4dB instead of 44.4dB (from using optimal threshold), which is still much better than the
31dB maximum loss of not using post-selection; and e.g. at the same 35dB position, even when using double the value of
optimal threshold, key rate is 2.1 × 10−7, about 1/3 that of R = 6.2 × 10−7 with optimal threshold, but it is still rather
effective, as using no post-selection cannot generate key at this position.
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Figure B.1: Illustration of a case where the correlation between classical and quantum signal is time-
dependent and the deviation is a random variable. In this case we can consider the threshold as a “fuzzy
threshold” that follows a probability distribution. In this case the proportion of post-selected signals
and the expected value of transmittances among these signals need to be integrated over this probability
distribution of the threshold value. Nonetheless, if the amount fluctuation is small, such imperfections
will likely have little impact on the key rate, which is robust against small perturbations of threshold
from the optimal value.
Figure B.2: An example transmittance versus wavelength plot for a 30km horizontal free-space channel,
simulated with MODTRAN.
Appendix C
Supplemental Information on
Asymmetric MDI-QKD
This Appendix contains supplemental information for Chapter 5.
C.1 Note about Adding Fibre
Figure C.1: Setup for asymmetric MDI-QKD. When channels are highly asymmetric (e.g. Alice and
Bob1), to increase the symmetry in the channel, sometimes one adds additional loss to the system in
Bob’s lab[24], in exchange for better symmetry. When estimating the key rate, Bob assumes that both
Charles-Bob1 and Bob1-Bob2 channels are controlled by Eve. This is therefore a pessimistic estimation
of the key rate, and is not necessarily the optimal strategy. Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
In this section we provide an intuitive description of why adding additional loss is suboptimal, and
how our method works better with asymmetric channels.
Previously, when Alice and Bob have asymmetric channels, a common solution is to add fibre (thus
adding loss) to the shorter channel in exchange for better symmetry, such as in Ref. [24]. Afterwards
one selects symmetric intensities for Alice and Bob and acquires a higher rate. However, the added fibre
lies in Bob’s lab, and is in fact securely under the control of Bob. But by assuming a symmetric setup,
we are effectively relinquishing its control to Eve, and pessimistically estimating the key rate. Therefore,
intuitively, this is not necessarily the optimal strategy. We will show with our new protocol that, when
the channels are asymmetric, Alice and Bob can independently choose their optimal intensities, and that
optimizing intensities and probabilities alone is sufficient to compensate for the different channel losses.
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C.2 Scaling of Key Rate with Transmittance
In this section we discuss the scaling properties of key rate versus transmittance, for prior protocols
with the same parameters for Alice and Bob, and our new protocol that uses different intensities for
Alice and Bob. We will show in Appendices B and C that the scaling of the key rate versus distance is
mainly determined by the signal states (so long as we have good single photon estimation from decoy
states). This also means that, the advantage of our method is really not dependent on the number of
decoy states used or the finite-size analysis model used (or lack thereof, in the asymptotic case), and
our results are in principle applicable to any protocol that decouples the signal and decoy states in the
Z and X bases and allows different intensities for Alice and Bob.
The transmittance of the two channels are (ηA, ηB), and the asymmetry (mismatch) x is defined as
x =
ηA
ηB
(C.1)
C.2.1 Single-Photon Source
Now, let us consider a single-photon case first. That is, suppose Alice and Bob both send perfect single
photons only, and the key is generated from two-photon interference. If we ignore the dark counts, the
asymptotic key rate can be written as [70]:
RSP = ηA × ηB × [1− 2h2(e11)] (C.2)
where h2 is the binary entropy function and e11 is the QBER (which is a quantity that, when dark count
rate is ignored, is independent of the transmittance). This means that in the perfect single-photon case,
the key rate is proportional to ηAηB, and the mismatch x does not explicitly appear in its expression:
RSP ∝ ηAηB (C.3)
In fact, for a given total distance LA + LB = L, any positioning of the untrusted relay Charles (e.g.
at the midpoint, in Alice’s lab, or in Bob’s lab) would not affect the key rate, since ηAηB only depends
on L.
C.2.2 Weak Coherent Pulse Source
The previous discussion for single-photon MDI-QKD suggests that, by nature, there is not really any
limitation on symmetry for MDI-QKD, at least for the ideal single photon case. Then, where does this
dependence of key rate on channel symmetry which we observed come from? In this section, we will
show that the scaling of the key rate depends on the signal states’ trade-off between error-correction
and probabilities of sending single-photons, when using WCP sources, rather than privacy amplification
(which depends on the estimation of single-photon contributions).
More concretely, (as we will prove in the next section) for protocols with symmetric intensities, there
are two sharp cut-off values for the mismatch, xmax and xmin, that prevent the protocol from acquiring
any key rate when x > xmax or x < xmin (and optimizing identical intensities sA = sB cannot circumvent
this problem). This is why protocols such as 4-intensity protocol are limited to near-symmetric positions.
On the other hand, when a protocol allows independent intensities for Alice and Bob (such as our new
7-intensity protocol described in the main text), we show that the mismatch can always be compensated
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by optimizing intensities sA and sB (hence lifting the limitations x
max and xmin). In fact, we show
that for positions with high asymmetry, key rate no longer depends on mismatch x = ηAηB at all, and the
optimal key rate only scales with the smaller of the two channel transmittances. That is,
Roptimal ∝ min(η2A, η2B) (C.4)
which means that, the biggest advantage of protocols with independent intensities for Alice and Bob (e.g.
7-intensity protocol) is to completely lift the limitation on channel asymmetry. When compared with
adding fibre to maintain asymmetry, we see that its scaling property is still the same, i.e. quadratically
related to the (smaller of) channel transmittances, although our method will always perform better (by
a constant coefficient) than adding fibre. Moreover, it provides the convenience of not needing additional
fibre, which may not be feasible in free-space channels, or when channel mismatch is changing.
Proofs for the above scaling properties can be found in the next section.
C.3 Proof of Scaling Properties of Key Rate with Transmit-
tance
In this section we outline the analytical proofs for the observations on the scaling properties of asymptotic
MDI-QKD key rate versus transmittance in the presence of asymmetry, described in Appendix C.2. We
also discuss how the finite-decoy and finite-size effects can be considered as imperfections in the infinite-
decoy, infinite-data case, and that the scaling properties are still approximately the same - which are only
determined by the signal states’ trade-off between error correction and probabilities of sending single
photons, and not affected by decoy states.
To simplify the discussion, it is convenient to first use a few crucial approximations as described in
Ref.[58]:
1. We consider the asymptotic case with infinite data size.
2. We assume an infinite number of decoy states, i.e. Alice and Bob can perfectly estimate the single
photon gain Y11 and QBER e11. In this case, Alice and Bob only need to choose appropriate signal
intensities sA, sB.
3. We ignore the dark count rate Y0, when studying the scaling properties with distance (as back-
ground noise only affects the maximum transmission distance where transmittance is at the same order
as the dark count rate, but does not affect the overall scaling properties of key rate versus distance).
4. When describing the channel model to estimate the observable gain and QBER QZss and E
Z
ss
(which affect the error-correction), we make second-order approximations to two functions:
I0(x) ≈ 1 + x
2
4
+O(x4)
ex ≈ 1 + x+ x
2
2
+O(x3)
(C.5)
where I0 is the modified bessel function of the first kind. This approximation is relatively accurate when
sAηAηd and sBηBηd are both small, where ηd is the detector efficiency.
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With the above approximations, one can write the key rate conveniently as (excerpting Eq. C.1 and
C.2 from Ref.[58]):
R =
η2Bη
2
d
2
G(x, sA, sB) (C.6)
where G(x, sA, sB) is a function determined by (sA, sB) and the asymmetry x only:
G(x, sA, sB) = xsAsBe
−(sA+sB)[1− h2(ed − e
2
d
2
)]
− 2xsAsB + (s
2
B + x
2s2A)(2ed − e2d)
2
× feh2(EZss(x, sA, sB))
EZss(x, sA, sB) =
(sB + xsA)
2(2ed − e2d)
2[2xsAsB + (s2B + x
2s2A)(2ed − e2d)]
(C.7)
where h2 is the binary entropy function.
Now, having described the key rate function, we are interested in how it scales with the transmit-
tances ηA, ηB, using different optimization strategies for the intensities. We will discuss two cases:
1. Rsymmetric, where Alice and Bob use the same intensity s = sA = sB, and optimize s.
2. Roptimal, where Alice and Bob fully optimize a pair of intensities sA, sB, which can take different
values.
C.3.1 Symmetrically Optimized Intensities
Let us consider the case where Alice and Bob use the same intensity s = sA = sB, and optimize s. This
is the case discussed by previous protocols (such as the 4-intensity protocol, although here to simplify
the proof we focus on the infinite-decoy case and only consider signal intensities).
In this case, the function G is optimized over s (and is a function of x only). The rate satisfies
Rsymmetric = max
s
R ∝ η2B max
s
G(x, s, s) (C.8)
therefore, Rsymmetric is proportional to η
2
B when channel mismatch
ηA
ηB
is fixed.
Moreover, since Rsymmetric is also proportional to G(x), we will have Rsymmetric = 0 if G(x) = 0.
Note that, we can rewrite the signal state QBER EZss as:
EZss(x) =
(1 + x)2(2ed − e2d)
2[2x+ (1 + x2)(2ed − e2d)]
(C.9)
since the equal intensities are canceled out, i.e. EZss is only a function of x. In fact, E
Z
ss is a function
that minimizes at x = 1 and reaches 50% (where Rsymmetric is naturally zero) when x → 0 or x → ∞.
Therefore, if G(x) 6= 0 at x = 1, there must exist some critical values of xmax and xmin which result in
a sufficiently large QBER such that G(x) = 0 (and Rsymmetric = 0).
This means that, Rsymmetric is quadratically related to ηB (or ηA) when mismatch
ηA
ηB
is fixed, but
also has two cut-off positions for critical levels of mismatch, beyond which no key can be generated.
These two critical mismatch positions are what limit previous MDI-QKD protocols to near-symmetric
positions. Also, as we have previously mentioned, we see that this critical dependence on mismatch
actually comes from the error-correction part (which involves EZss).
Appendix C. Supplemental Information on Asymmetric MDI-QKD 132
C.3.2 Fully Optimized Intensities
Figure C.2: Rate vs distance contours for single photon MDI-QKD RSP , decoy-state MDI-QKD with
symmetric intensities Rsymmetric, and with fully optimized intensities Roptimal. We plot the contour
line of R = 10−9.5. Here for a better comparison with WCP sources, we arbitrarily set a probability
P11 = sAsB × e−(sA+sB) (where sA = sB = 0.6533) of single photon pairs being sent when calculating
RSP . For the decoy-state case, as described in Appendix C.3, we assume infinite decoys, infinite data
size, ignore dark count rate, and take second-order approximation when calculating gain and QBER (so
that we only focus on the ideal scaling properties of key rate with distance). As can be seen, RSP is not
limited by asymmetry, and takes constant value for any fixed LA + LB (meaning that the dependence
of key rate on asymmetry does not come from single photon contributions in the privacy amplification
part when using WCP sources). For decoy-state MDI-QKD, we can clearly see Rsymmetric being limited
by the two cut-off lines where |LA − LB| takes maximum value (which corresponds to critical values of
channel mismatch xmax and xmin). On the other hand, Roptimal is not limited by asymmetry, and has
contours nearly perpendicular to the axes when asymmetry is high (meaning that, when one channel is
significantly longer than the other, Roptimal is only dependent on the longer channel). Reproduced from
[65] @2019 APS.
Now, let us consider the case where Alice and Bob are allowed to fully optimize their intensities
sA, sB (such as in the 7-intensity protocol, although again, here we only focus on the signal states in the
infinite-decoy case).
In this case, the function G is optimized over sA, sB. The rate satisfies
Roptimal = max
sA,sB
R ∝ η2B max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) (C.10)
Now, let us focus on the properties of G(x, sA, sB). Looking at its expression Eq. C.7 in the previous
section, we make the important observation that, except for the term e−(sA+sB) in the single photon
probabilities, every other term is only a function of sB and xsA (rather than x and sA separately). We
can re-write G(x, sA, sB) as
G′(x, s′A, sB) = s
′
AsBe
−s′A
x e−sB [1− h2(ed − e
2
d
2
)]
− 2s
′
AsB + (s
2
B + s
′2
A)(2ed − e2d)
2
× feh2(EZss(s′A, sB))
EZss(s
′
A, sB) =
(sB + s
′
A)
2(2ed − e2d)
2[2s′AsB + (s
2
B + s
′2
A)(2ed − e2d)]
(C.11)
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where we define equivalent intensity s′A as
s′A = sA × x (C.12)
Moreover, if ηA  ηB (i.e. mismatch x 1), we can approximately assume that
e
−s′A
x ≈ 1 (C.13)
which means that we can rewrite max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) as
Gmax = max
s′A,sB
G′(s′A, sB) (C.14)
which, importantly, is a constant value not dependent on the value of x, when x 1. The actual value
of sA equals
sA =
s′A
x
(C.15)
Physically, this means that, when there is asymmetry between Alice and Bob’s channels, we can com-
pensate for this asymmetry by adjusting the intensities, to keep the same ”equivalent intensity” received
by Charles and keep EZss at a low value. In this case, E
Z
ss is no longer limited by the mismatch x, and
we can perform MDI-QKD at arbitrary values of asymmetry.
Also, the key rate is now given by:
Roptimal ∝ η2BGmax (C.16)
This means that, when ηA  ηB (e.g. the “single-arm” case previously mentioned where LA is much
shorter than LB), the key rate of asymmetric MDI-QKD is only related to ηB and still quadratically
scales with ηB. When ηB  ηA, though, we can rewrite x′ = ηBηA , and rewrite
Roptimal ∝ η2A max
s′B,sA
G′(s′B, sA) (C.17)
Therefore, overall,
Roptimal ∝ min(η2A, η2B) (C.18)
Now, we plot the two cases (symmetric intensities and fully optimized intensities) in a contour plot.
As we can observe in Fig.C.2, the key rate Rsymmetric has two cut-off mismatch positions beyond which
the key rate is zero. This limitation is removed when full optimization of intensities is implemented.
Moreover, for Roptimal, we see that the contours are perpendicular to the axes in high asymmetry re-
gions, which means that the key rate only scales with the longer of the two channels.
Also, note that, from Eqs. (C4), (C6), we can also make the observation that there is never any need
to add fibre to the shorter channel when fully optimizing the intensities, and our new method always
provides higher key rate than prior art technique of adding fibre till channels are symmetric, while using
same intensities for Alice and Bob.
To show this, consider the system having a fixed longer channel LB (i.e. suppose ηB is fixed and
Appendix C. Supplemental Information on Asymmetric MDI-QKD 134
ηA > ηB, x =
ηA
ηB
> 1). Adding loss to ηA is equivalent to decreasing x.
With symmetric intensities (and adding loss till ηA = ηB), the key rate can be written as:
Rsymmetric =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
s
G(1, s, s) (C.19)
Suppose we fully optimize the intensities for this case with added fibre, we will obtain the same key
rate (since for x = 1, i.e. symmetric setup, the optimal choice of intensities satisfies sA = sB):
max
s
G(1, s, s) = max
sA,sB
G(1, sA, sB) (C.20)
However, let us compare it with the case of using fully optimized intensities and no additional loss:
Roptimal =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) (C.21)
As described in Eq. C.11, we can re-write G(x, sA, sB) as G
′(x, s′A, sB) (recall that the equivalent
intensity s′A is defined as xsA). We make the observation that G
′(x, s′A, sB) strictly increases with x.
That is, for any two given values of s′A, sB and x > 1,
G′(x, s′A, sB) > G
′(1, s′A, sB) (C.22)
hence after optimization we also have
max
s′A,sB
G′(x, s′A, sB) > max
s′A,sB
G′(1, s′A, sB) (C.23)
which means that, when fully optimizing Alice and Bob’s intensities (which already compensate for
the mismatch between channels), it is always optimal not to add any additional loss to the channels.
Moreover, combining Eqs. (C15), (C16), (C17), (C19), we can see that
Roptimal =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB)
>
η2dη
2
B
2
max
s
G(1, s, s) = Rsymmetric
(C.24)
That is, compared to the case where one adds loss to ηA until ηA = ηB, our new protocol always
provides higher key rate as long as the channels are asymmetric. Intuitively, this is because adding
fibre while using same intensities for Alice and Bob is in fact a suboptimal subset of the overall set of
strategies Alice and Bob can take (which includes adjusting Alice and Bobs intensities independently, as
well as adding any length of fibres to change x). Even when considering adding fibre as one of the valid
variables, we have shown that the optimal point is always located where no fibre is added. Therefore, our
method is a better-optimized strategy than adding fibre because it considers a larger parameter space.
Note that, fully optimizing Alice and Bob’s intensities does not change the fundamental scaling
property - the key rate is still quadratically related to transmittance in the longer arm - However, it
always provides better key rate than prior art techniques, and also offers the great convenience of not
having to physically add loss to the channels and being able to implement everything in software.
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Figure C.3: Contours of rate vs distance for decoy-state MDI-QKD, under different assumptions for prac-
tical imperfections, for the key rates for the asymptotic case with infinite decoys (and ideal assumption
of zero dark count rate and 100% detector efficiency), the asymptotic case with 4-intensity/7-intensity
protocol (with practical device parameters), and the finite-size case with 4-intensity/7-intensity proto-
col. Top: protocols with identical intensities for Alice and Bob, Bottom: protocols with fully optimized
intensities. (Note that in the bottom plot there are some noises in the asymptotic 7-intensity protocol
key rate. This is because the optimal ν can take a very small value in the ideal case where data size is
infinitely large. This results in some numerical noises in computer simulations). We plot the contour
lines of R = 10−7. As can be observed here, the finite number of decoys, the non-ideal experimental
parameters, and the finite-size effects are all imperfections that reduce the key rate. However, the overall
shapes of the contours still remain largely the same, and follow the upper bounds given by the ideal
infinite-decoy case. (Except for 4-intensity protocol under finite-size effect, which no longer has two clear
cut-off mismatch positions, but is still severely limited by channel asymmetry, while 7-intensity protocol
lifts this constraint completely). Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
C.3.3 Practical Imperfections
Up to here we have analytically shown how choosing to fully optimize the intensities can affect the
key rate, for the asymptotic, infinite-decoy case. The behavior of contours as shown in Fig.C.2 is a
result of sA, sB compensating for the difference in channel loss. However, we have so far assumed
perfect knowledge of single-photon contributions, and have not yet discussed the decoy-state intensities.
Moreover, non-ideal experimental parameters (including dark count rate and detector efficiency), and
finite-size effects will both affect the key rate. Here in this subsection, we compare the key rate under
more practical assumptions, and show that the above factors can be considered as imperfections that
reduce the key rate, but maintain similar contour shapes and scaling properties for the key rate - that
is, we will still observe a high dependence on asymmetry for protocols with identical intensities for Alice
and Bob, and fully optimizing intensities can completely lift this limitation.
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In practice, with a finite number of decoys (for instance, for 4-intensity and 7-intensity protocols,
where Alice and Bob choose respectively three decoy intensities, µ, ν, ω), the estimation of Y11 and e11
is not perfect; therefore the key rate will be slightly lower than the aforementioned infinite-decoy case.
Moreover, to accurately estimate Y11 and e11, the decoy intensities need to be optimized to compensate
for channel loss, too. As described in section 5.2.1 in the main text, the decoy states should maintain
balanced arriving intensities at Charles (e.g. µAηA = µBηB), to ensure good HOM visibility and low
QBER in the X basis. Note that, the optimization of decoy intensities has a very different purpose from
that of the signal intensities sA, sB - the signal intensities are optimized so as to reduce E
Z
ss (while keeping
single photon probability sAsBe
−(sA+sB) high) and maximize the key rate, while the decoy intensities
are optimized to estimate Y L11 and e
U
11 as accurately as possible, whose ideal values Y11 and e11 (used in
the infinite-decoy case above) provide an upper bound for the practical key rate with finite number of
decoys. As we see in Fig.C.3, the asymptotic key rate with a finite number of decoys follows a similar
shape as its upper bound, the infinite-decoy case.
Additionally, the detector efficiency (which is equivalent to channel loss) contributes to a uniformly
shifted key rate in both LA and LB directions, while dark counts reduce the key rate more significantly
in the higher loss region (both of which we have ignored in the ideal case as described at the beginning of
this section). However, as observed in Fig.C.3 (the solid lines consider both finite-decoys and practical
parameters), these factors do not change the overall shape of the contours either.
Lastly, finite-size effect will reduce the key rate significantly. As observed in Fig.C.3 bottom plot,
while the key rate is reduced, the contour shapes remain largely unchanged (meaning that even under
finite-size effect, the 7-intensity protocol can still effectively compensate for channel asymmetry effec-
tively). In Fig.C.3 top plot, we can find similar observations, that finite-size effect reduces the overall
key rate. However, note that, under finite-size effect, the shapes of key rate contours for the 4-intensity
protocol are somewhat different, and no longer follow the two cut-off positions xupper, xlower for channel
mismatch (which appear as straight lines in e.g. Fig.C.2). This is because, though the key rate is still
limited by EZss (which causes the cut-off mismatch positions), it is also limited by the estimation of
Y L11 and e
U
11 using the decoy states. Compared to the asymptotic case, here under finite-size effect, the
increased eU11 is likely a more severe limiting factor than E
Z
ss, and not being able to choose independent
intensities for Alice and Bob prevents an accurate estimation of Y L11 and e
U
11 (due to poor HOM visibility
in X basis caused by unbalanced intensities). Therefore, here the dependence of key rate on channel
asymmetry is present in both privacy amplification and error-correction terms, and the shapes of con-
tours are a result of both effects. (The difference in contour shape from the infinite-decoy case is more
prominent for the finite-size case, likely because the key rate is more sensitive to eU11 here). Importantly,
under finite-size effects, the key rate for 4-intensity protocol is still highly limited by channel asymmetry,
while 7-intensity protocol completely removes such a constraint and allows two channels with arbitrary
asymmetry between them.
C.4 Note about Decoupling Signal and Decoy Intensities
In this section we provide a simple intuitive explanation for why our protocol provides a better choice
of decoy and signal intensities.
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Let us recall again the key rate formula of MDI-QKD [17, 86]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(C.25)
Here there are three criteria that determine whether a MDI-QKD protocol generates good key rate
in the presence of channel asymmetry:
(a) Similar arriving intensities at Charles in the X basis, in order to have good HOM interference
and keep QBER low in the X basis (which is important for a good estimation of eX,U11 ).
(b) Similar arriving intensities at Charles in the Z basis, in order to keep QBER EZss low in the
Z basis (which is due to misalignment), although this term is much less sensitive to the difference in
intensities than (a).
(c) A high enough probability of sending single-photons, sAe
−sAsBe−sB . Note that both criteria (b)
and (c) involve the signal states sA, sB, so there is a trade-off between (b) and (c).
Prior protocols require Alice and Bob to use the same set of intensities. This overly constrains the
solution space (because Alice and Bob try to use the same set of intensities to satisfy (a), (b) and (c)
simultaneously), and leaves high QBER in both the X and Z bases, and thus resulting in low key rate
when channels are asymmetric.
By relaxing this constraint (allowing Alice and Bob to have different intensities), and decoupling
criteria (a) from criteria (b) and (c) by allowing independent decoy and signal intensities, we can satisfy
(a) nicely, while simultaneously achieving a good trade-off between (b) and (c), hence ensuring a high
key rate.
Remark : for more detail on the trade-off between (b) and (c), here (b) is optimal when arriving
intensities are matched, i.e. sA/sB = ηB/ηA, and (c) is independent of asymmetry and is optimal when
signal intensities are both 1. In fact, since EZss is much less sensitive to sA/sB, such a trade-off between
two terms favors (c) more than (b), thus the optimal sA/sB is often closer to 1 than ηB/ηA. The actual
optimal signal intensities can be found by numerical optimization, as described in section 5.2.4. An
example of µA/µB and sA/sB can also be seen in Fig.5.6, where we observe that µA/µB follows ηB/ηA
rather closely, while sA/sB has relatively much more freedom in its optimization (between 1 and ηB/ηA).
C.5 Generality of Our Method: MDI-QKD Protocols other
than Three Decoy States
In the main text we have focused on the 7-intensity protocol, where Alice and Bob each uses one signal
intensity sA (sB), and three decoy intensities µA, νA, ω (µB , νB , ω). However, the core idea of our
protocol lies in two key points: (1) X and Z bases are decoupled, where decoy-states in the X basis
bound Eve’s information and signal state in the Z basis encodes the key, and (2) Alice and Bob use
different intensities to compensate for channel asymmetry. This means that our protocol is not limited
to the 7-intensity protocol, but can easily be applied to other protocols too, as long as points (1) and
(2) are satisfied.
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In this section, we demonstrate the generality of our method by actually applying it to other kinds
of MDI-QKD protocols where Alice and Bob use a different number of decoy intensities in the X basis,
and show that similar advantages as with the 7-intensity protocol can be observed when using asym-
metric intensities. We will also show with numerical results that, although these alternative protocols
will certainly work, the 7-intensity protocol provides a good balance between performance and ease of
experimental implementation.
Here we compare three cases:
1. Alice and Bob each uses two decoy intensities µA, νA (µB , νB) in the X basis. We denote this case
as a 6-intensity protocol (including the two signal intensities), where the parameter choices are:
[sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA ,
sB , µB , νB , PsB , PµB , PνB ]
(C.26)
Here PνA = 1−PsA −PµA and PνB = 1−PsB −PµB . This is similar to the “one-decoy” setup that was
discussed in Ref. [62]. Note that here it’s not a “5-intensity” protocol, because using µA, µB , ω alone is
not sufficient to satisfactorily bound the single-photon contributions and will result in low or zero key
rate. Therefore, in this setup, the vacuum state is not used, and Alice and Bob each use two non-zero
decoy states.
2. Alice and Bob each use three decoy intensities µA, νA, ω (µB , νB , ω) in the X basis. This case is
the 7-intensity protocol we discussed in the main text, where the parameter choices are
[sA, µA, νA, ω, PsA , PµA , PνA , PωA ,
sB , µB , νB , ω, PsB , PµB , PνB , PωB ]
(C.27)
Here PωA = 1−PsA −PµA −PνA , PωB = 1−PsB −PµB −PνB , and ω is the vacuum state (for simplicity
we can assume ω = 0).
3. Alice and Bob each use four decoy intensities µA, νA, ν2A, ω (µB , νB , ν2B , ω) in the X basis. We
denote this case as a 9-intensity protocol, where the parameter choices are
[sA, µA, νA, ν2A, ω, PsA , PµA , PνA , Pν2A , PωA ,
sB , µB , νB , ν2B , ω, PsB , PµB , PνB , Pν2B , PωB ]
(C.28)
Here PωA = 1−PsA −PµA −PνA −Pν2A , PωB = 1−PsB −PµB −PνB −Pν2B , and ω is the vacuum state.
Note that in all of these three protocols, the key rate formula stays the same as Eq. 5.1:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(C.29)
What is changing here is only the estimation of the single-photon contributions, namely the yield Y X,L11
and QBER eX,U11 . While we have analytical bounds for decoy-state analysis [58] for the 7-intensity
protocol, we use a linear programming approach to numerically estimate Y X,L11 and QBER e
X,U
11 in
the 6-intensity and 9-intensity cases. Such an approach has been widely discussed in literature as in
Refs.[94, 62, 96].
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Now, we perform numerical simulations with the 6-intensity, 7-intensity and 9-intensity protocols,
and show that they all have much higher performance than their symmetric-intensity counterparts when
channel asymmetry is present. This demonstrates the generality of our method as using asymmetric
intensities can always improve the performance of MDI-QKD with asymmetric channels.
We also compare the performances of the three protocols with each other, and show that using more
decoy intensities can always guarantee higher or equal performance than using fewer decoy intensities,
regardless of data size and asymmetry. The 7-intensity always provides no smaller key rate than the
6-intensity protocol, and although 9-intensity protocol can potentially provide an even higher key rate,
the advantage is small, and the 7-intensity protocol we used in the main text is a good balance between
key rate performance and ease of experimental implementation.
Interestingly, as observed in Fig. C.4 (a)(b), for the 6-intensity and 9-intensity protocols, although
the yield Y X,L11 and QBER e
X,U
11 are estimated numerically using linear programming, there is still a
“ridge” (discontinuity in first-order derivatives) along µAµB =
νA
νB
, and νAνB =
ν2A
ν2B
as we saw for 7-intensity
protocol in the main text. For 6-intensity protocol, the ridge is very clearly shown. For 9-intensity
protocol, the ridge exists but is less prominent, and sometimes not visible (likely because, e.g. if two
pairs of proportional decoy states νAνB =
ν2A
ν2B
already provide good estimation of Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 , the third
pair µA, µB has more freedom, and wouldn’t affect the decoy-state analysis or the key rate too much
even if it doesn’t provide good HOM visibility and results in high EXµµ).
We plot the simulated key rate for the protocols in Fig. C.4 (c)(d). We first consider a similar
scenario as Fig. 5.5 (c)(d), using parameters from Table 5.2, a channel mismatch of ηAηB = x = 0.1,
and data size of N = 1012 (here we use a larger data size than in the main text, since for N = 1011, 6-
intensity protocol with symmetric intensities cannot generate key rate even at LB = 0km so a comparison
is not immediately clear in the plot). As shown in Fig. C.4, for each protocol, allowing asymmetric
intensities provides a much higher key rate than using symmetric intensities only, demonstrating the
general effectiveness of our method for different protocols under channel asymmetry.
We also make an important observation here: The more decoy intensities one uses, the higher the
key rate one can obtain after parameter optimization, even with finite-size effects considered (e.g. the
9-intensity protocol always has a higher key rate than 7-intensity, and 7-intensity also always has a higher
rate than 6-intensity). This is because, for instance, the 6-intensity protocol can in fact be considered
as a special case of the 7-intensity protocol, just with PωA and PωB infinitely close to zero, and with 9
instead of 4 constraints for e.g. the gains QXij when estimating Y
X,L
11 . With close to zero data, the 5
new constraints are obviously very loose (with very large finite-size fluctuation) and will not provide any
useful information, but the key point is, in a linear program these loose constraints will not decrease the
key rate. Therefore, any optimal set of parameters for the 6-intensity protocol can also be considered
as a valid set of parameters for the 7-intensity protocol, i.e. the parameter space of 6-intensity protocol
is a subset of that of the 7-intensity protocol, and the latter always provides no smaller key rate than
the former (and often the 7-intensity protocol can find a better parameter set in the larger parameter
space, resulting in higher key rate).
The same goes for the 9-intensity protocol, but as we have seen in Fig. C.4, the advantage it
provides over the 7-intensity protocol is rather small (compared to e.g. 6-intensity versus 7-intensity),
while requiring more complex control of the intensity modulators in the experimental setup, and more
complicated data collection and analysis: the users need to collect 16 sets of gains and error-gains, and
the parameter optimization is also a lot slower and more unstable (evaluating the linear program is on
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Figure C.4: Left: Examples of Y X,L11 versus µA and µB where other parameters are all fixed for (a)
6-intensity protocol and (b) 9-intensity protocol. Just like for 7-intensity protocol, we can see a ridge
along µAµB =
νA
νB
, or µAµB =
νA
νB
=
ν2A
ν2B
. Note that the ridge is a lot less obvious for 9-intensity protocol (and
sometimes is not visible) likely because two proportional pairs of decoy-states can estimate single-photon
contribution reasonably well, so the third pair (µA, µB) here has more freedom in the choice of intensities.
Right: Comparison of rate vs LB for 6-intensity, 7-intensity and 9-intensity protocols, where mismatch
x = 0.1, i.e. LA = LB+50km (assuming fibre loss 0.2dB/km). The rates are plotted in log-scale. We use
the parameters from Table 5.2, andN = 1012. (c) using symmetric intensities for Alice and Bob, (d) using
fully optimized asymmetric parameters for Alice and Bob. As can be seen, using asymmetric intensities
can greatly improve the key rate for all three protocols, when channel asymmetry is present. Note that
there is a higher amount of noise present for the 9-intensity case due to the numerical instability brought
by linear program solvers (similar to that of joint-bound finite-size analysis, which will be discussed in
Appendix C.8), but the key points here are that the 9-intensity protocol also benefits considerably from
using asymmetric intensities, and that the 9-intensity protocol does not have a significant advantage
over the 7-intensity protocol despite being more complex to implement. Reproduced from [65] @2019
APS.
average slower than analytical expression by about 50 times, and linear programs also introduce numerical
instabilities). Similar observations have been made for the symmetric case in Ref. [62] (although in this
paper the signal states are not decoupled from decoy states so the protocols are slightly different) that
using decoy states {µ, ν, ω} provides higher key rate than {µ, ν}, but adding one more decoy-state ν2
provides little further advantage.
Therefore, our conclusion is that, while our method of asymmetric intensities and decoupled bases
surely works well with other protocols such as 6-intensity and 9-intensity protocols, the 7-intensity
protocol we introduced in the main text strikes a good balance between key rate performance and the
ease of both experimental implementation and data analysis.
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C.6 Decoy State Intensities
In this section we will describe Theorems I and II in more detail, and show their theoretical proofs in
the asymptotic limit of infinite data size (Moreover, numerically, we found that Theorems I and II in
fact hold true even under finite-size effects).
C.6.1 Symmetry of Optimal Decoy Intensities
Figure C.5: An example of the two difference cases of Y X,L11 vs µA, µB function, for fixed values of
νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1. Left: Y
a
11, where
µA
µB
≤ νAνB (“case 1”); Right: Y b11, where
µA
µB
> νAνB (“case 2”).
Allowed regions are marked in color for either cases. In case 1, we show that
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0, so any given
point A can descend along µB axis (the solid black arrow) to get higher rate, until it reaches boundary
line µAµB =
νA
νB
where µB is highest. Similarly, in case 2,
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0, so any given point B can descend
along µA axis until
µA
µB
= νAνB to get highest rate. Therefore, the optimal (µ
opt
A , µ
opt
B ) that maximize the
piecewise function Y X,L11 always occur on the boundary line. Moreover, for any given point C(µA, µB)
on the boundary line, the function values of Y a11, Y
b
11 are the same. However, we show that
∂Y a11
∂µA
at C1
is not equal to
∂Y b11
∂µA
at C2 (along the dot-dash red lines). Therefore, the piecewise function Y
X,L
11 is not
smooth. Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
To prove Theorem I, here we will actually propose an even stronger assumption for µA, µB:
Theorem III. for any arbitrary choice of device and channel parameters, and any two given values
of νA, νB, the optimal decoy intensities µ
opt
A , µ
opt
B that maximize R always satisfy the constraint:
µoptA
µoptB
=
νA
νB
(C.30)
Remark: as will be shown below, Theorem I is simply a corollary from Theorem III.
Proof for Theorem III: Here for convenience, we first limit the discussion to the asymptotic
case (i.e. infinite data size), and we assume that the vacuum intensity is indeed ω = 0. Throughout
the rest of the text, we will use Qkij and E
k
ij to denote the observed gain and QBER, where, if not
specified, the first subscript is Alice’s intensity, and the second is Bob’s intensity, which can be chosen
from {sA, µA, νA, ω} and {sB, µB, νB, ω} for Alice and Bob, respectively. The superscript k signifies the
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basis X or Z (although, here we only explicitly write the basis for illustration purposes, since the basis
is already implied by the choice of intensities).
First, looking at the key rate expression [17, 86]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(C.31)
we can see that only the term Y X,L11 [1−h2(eX,U11 )], i.e. the decoy-state analysis and privacy amplification,
is determined by the decoy intensities (and probabilities, if finite-size effect is considered) only, and not
affected by the signal intensities sA, sB. This is an important and very convenient characteristic of the
4-intensity/7-intensity protocol, that the signal state is only concerned with key generation, while the
decoy states are only responsible for privacy amplification. That is, the optimization of decoy-state
intensities is decoupled from the key generation. Now, we can make an observation that, under given
device parameters and channel loss, the optimization of the decoy intensities is independent of sA, sB,
and its only goal is to maximize Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )].
Furthermore, to perform the decoy state analysis, we note that the upper bound for single-photon
QBER satisfies the form of:
eX,U11 = f(Y
X,L
11 , νA, νB) (C.32)
where eX,U11 is only determined by Y
X,L
11 , νA and νB. The full expression, as in [58], is listed below:
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBQXννE
X
νν − eνAQXνωEXνω
−eνBQXωνEXων +QXωωEXωω)
(C.33)
.
Now, suppose we first fix two arbitrary values of νA, νB, and try to maximize Y
X
11 [1 − h2(eX11)] by
optimizing µA, µB, we can see that maximizing Y
X,L
11 will suffice, since it will simultaneously minimize
eX,U11 , whose only component dependent on µA, µB is Y
X,L
11 . The question now becomes simply finding:
(µoptA , µ
opt
B ) = argmax(Y
X,L
11 (µA, µB)) (C.34)
A very important characteristic of Y X,L11 is that, its expression is dependent upon whether
µA
µB
≤ νAνB ,
i.e. it is a piecewise function, as described in Ref.[58]:
Case 1: If µAµB ≤ νAνB :
Y X,L11 = Y
a
11 =
1
(µA − νA) [
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ ] (C.35)
Case 2: otherwise, if µAµB >
νA
νB
:
Y X,L11 = Y
b
11 =
1
(µB − νB) [
µB
νAνB
QM1νν −
νB
µAµB
QM2µµ ] (C.36)
where we denote the two expressions of Y X,L11 in the two cases as Y
a
11 and Y
b
11, and the two terms Q
M1
νν
and QM2µµ are linear combinations of the observable Gain, and are functions of (νA, νB) and (µA, µB)
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only, respectively. Their full expressions can be found in Appendix C.6.3. Also, note that if µAµB =
νA
νB
,
the two cases Y a11 = Y
b
11.
Now, we can make a key observation, that in case 1, for any given µA, the partial derivative
∂Y a11
∂µB
always satisfies
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0 (C.37)
(The actual expression of the partial derivative and proof of its positivity are shown in Appendix C.6.3).
However, in case 1, µB is bounded by µB ≥ µAνBνA , so the only optimal case is to take the boundary
condition
µoptB =
µAνB
νA
(C.38)
This means that, in the region of µAµB ≤ νAνB , any two optimal value pair (µ
opt
A , µ
opt
B ) must satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
= νAνB , or else we can always decrease µB to get a higher rate, meaning that the previous point is
not the actual maximum. We illustrate this behavior in Fig.C.5.
Similarly, for case 2, the partial derivative with respect to µA satisfies
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0 (C.39)
and µA is bounded by µA >
µBνA
νB
. In the same way, in case 2 for any given µB, we can acquire:
µoptA =
µBνA
νB
(C.40)
Up to here, we have proven that Theorem III is indeed correct.
Proof for Theorem I: Now, following the same idea, any four optimal value pair (µoptA , µ
opt
B , ν
opt
A , ν
opt
B )
must satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
, or else we can always vary (µA, µB) while keeping (νA, νB) fixed, and let
µA
µB
= νAνB
to get a higher rate, meaning that the previous point is not the actual maximum. Therefore, we have
shown that Theorem I is indeed correct, that the optimal decoy intensities always satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
(C.41)
Note that the same conclusion doesn’t hold true for traditional 3-intensity MDI-QKD (i.e. using
{µ, ν, ω} for both X and Z basis and using µ in Z basis to generate the key), that is because the key rate
for 3-intensity depends on µ for both key generation and error-correction, such that QZµµ, E
Z
µµ terms and
the single-photon probability µe−µ both depend on µ, hence optimizing only Y L11 is no longer sufficient.
Therefore, this independence of s from µ, ν is an additional advantage that the 4-intensity/7-intensity
protocol can provide, under asymmetric conditions.
Also, one thing to note is that, although the above theorem provides us with a way to constrain
µA
µB
, νAνB , the actual values of these ratios still need to be found by optimization. In Ref. [58], the authors
have proposed a rule-of-thumb formula for finding optimal intensities:
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µAηA = µBηB (C.42)
for which we now have a good understanding of the reason - such a relation keeps the arriving intensities
balanced at Charles, in order to maintain good HOM visibility in the X basis and low QBER.
However, this is still only a rough approximation, and is an exact relation only when the dark count
rate Y0 is ignored, data size is infinite, and infinite number of decoys are used (Ref. [58] considered the
case where µ is both the signal and decoy intensity, and only proved Eq. C.42 to be exact in the ideal
infinite-decoy case with no noise). For a general case, µA/µB is not always exactly equal to ηB/ηA (and
does not only depend on the mismatch x = ηA/ηB) but rather deviates slightly from it when (ηA, ηB)
changes. But at least, one general rule is that µA/µB decreases with x = ηA/ηB, or, to put in more
simple words, the larger the channel loss, the higher the intensities we should choose to compensate for
the loss.
C.6.2 Non-smoothness of Key Rate vs Intensities Function
In the previous section we have shown that the piecewise expression for Y X,L11 causes the optimal value
to occur on the boundary line µAµB =
νA
νB
. Here we continue to show that Theorem II is a result of this
piecewise function, too.
Proof of Theorem II: The theorem means that, the key rate does not have a continuous partial
derivative with respect to µA or µB at the boundary line. This will cause the boundary line to behave
like a sharp “ridge”. To prove this, instead of differentiating Y a11 vs µB and Y
b
11 vs µA, here we perform
partial differentiation of both Y a11, Y
b
11 vs µA, and observe this discontinuity of derivative.
First, we rewrite Y11 into:
Y a11 =
νA
(µA − νA) [
1
νAνB
QM1νν −
1
µAµB
QM2µµ ] +
1
νAνB
QM1νν
Y b11 =
νB
(µB − νB) [
1
νAνB
QM1νν −
1
µAµB
QM2µµ ] +
1
νAνB
QM1νν
(C.43)
The last term is not dependent on either µA or µB. Note that, here on the boundary of
µA
µB
= νAνB ,
the values of Y a11 and Y
b
11 are equal:
Y a11 = Y
b
11 (C.44)
Performing the partial differentiation against µA, we can get:
∂Y a11
∂µA
=− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
+
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
)
∂Y b11
∂µA
=− νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
(C.45)
We can see that, on the boundary of µAµB =
νA
νB
, the first terms are again equal, however, the second
term in
∂Y a11
∂µA
is strictly larger than 0 (detailed proof by expanding QM2µµ , Q
M1
νν are shown in Appendix
C.6.3). Therefore,
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∂Y a11
∂µA
6= ∂Y
b
11
∂µA
(C.46)
The derivatives of Y X,L11 vs µA on the two sides of the “ridge” are not equal, causing the rate function
R to have a non-defined gradient. A similar proof can be applied to µB and it leads to the same result.
An illustration can be seen in main text Fig. 2, which chooses a given set of values (νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1)
and plots the key rate over (µA, µB). As can be clearly observed, there is a sharp ridge on the line
µA
µB
= νAνB = 2, meaning the key rate function versus intensities is not smooth.
C.6.3 Proof of Negativity of Partial Derivatives for Decoy Intensities
As described above, the expression for the single-photon yield, Y X,L11 depends on whether
µA
µB
≤ νAνB . For
case 1, if µAµB ≤ νAνB , we would like to prove that
Lemma I:
∂Y a11
∂µB
and
∂Y b11
∂µA
are both always negative.
Proof of Lemma I: Here, we use a simplified model of the Gain QXij as in Ref.[58], which ignores
the dark count rate Y0, and takes a second-order approximation for the modified Bessel function:
QXµµ =
η2Bη
2
d
4
[2xµAµB + (µ
2
B + x
2µ2A)(2ed − e2d)] (C.47)
where ηB is the transmittance in Bob-Charles channel, x =
ηA
ηB
is the channel mismatch, ηd is the detector
efficiency, and ed is the misalignment. Here for convenience we can further define
 = 2ed − e2d, T =
η2Bη
2
d
4
(C.48)
such that
QXµµ = T (2xµAµB + µ
2
B + x
2µ2A) (C.49)
Now, let us consider
∂Y a11
∂µB
where
Y X,L11 = Y
a
11 =
1
(µA − νA) [
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ ] (C.50)
To calculate the single-photon gain, the two terms:
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
(C.51)
are linear combinations of the observable Gains QZij .
We can make the observation that, only the term
− νA
(µA − νA)µA
(
QM2µµ
µB
)
(C.52)
contains µB, so, we only need to prove the positivity of
∂
∂µB
(
QM2µµ
µB
), where
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QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
= eµA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ
(C.53)
substituting with Eq. C.49,
1
T
QM2µµ = (2xµAµB + x
2µ2A + µ
2
B)e
µA+µB
− x2µ2AeµA − µ2BeµB
= 2xµAµBe
µA+µB
+ x2µ2Ae
µA(eµB − 1) + µ2BeµB(eµA − 1)
(C.54)
Therefore,
QM2µµ
µB
= T × [2xµAeµA+µB + x2µ2AeµA
eµB − 1
µB
+ (eµA − 1)µBeµB ]
(C.55)
note that here, as µA, µB > 0, we have e
µA , eµB > 1, and each of the three functions satisfy
∂
∂µB
(eµA+µB) > 0
∂
∂µB
(
eµB − 1
µB
) > 0
∂
∂µB
(µBe
µB) > 0
(C.56)
Therefore, we have proven that ∂∂µB (
QM2µµ
µB
) > 0 and that
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0. Similarly, we can also prove that
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0. Thus, the optimal point (µoptA , µ
opt
B ) must happen on the boundary, i.e.
µoptA
µoptB
=
νA
νB
(C.57)
C.6.4 Proof of Discontinuity of Partial Derivatives for Decoy Intensities
Now, to prove the discontinuity of the first-order derivatives of the key rate function, we need to show that
Lemma II: Partial derivative of Y a11 and Y
b
11 with respect to µA, i.e.
∂Y a11
∂µA
and
∂Y b11
∂µA
are not equal.
Proof of Lemma II:
∂Y a11
∂µA
=− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
+
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
)
∂Y b11
∂µA
=− νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
(C.58)
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On the boundary of µAµB =
νA
νB
, the first terms are equal, i.e.
− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
) = − νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
) (C.59)
However, here we have to show that the second term in
∂Y a11
∂µA
is strictly larger than zero:
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
) > 0 (C.60)
or, since µA > νA and µA, νA > 0, simply
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
> 0 (C.61)
Just like in Appendix C.6.3, we can expand the gain QXij using Eq. C.49:
QM1νν
νAνB
= 2xeνA+νB + x2
νA
νB
eνA(eνB − 1)
+ 
νB
νA
eνB(eνA − 1)
QM2µµ
µAµB
= 2xeµA+µB + x2
µA
µB
eµA(eµB − 1)
+ 
µB
µA
eµB(eµA − 1)
(C.62)
Subtracting them, we can acquire:
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
= 2x(eµA+µB − eνA+νB)
+ x2(µAe
µA
eµB − 1
µB
− νAeνA e
νB − 1
νB
)
+ (µBe
µB
eµA − 1
µA
− νBeνB e
νA − 1
νA
)
(C.63)
Note that, when a given variable x > 0, the functions
d
dx
(ex) > 0
d
dx
(
ex − 1
x
) > 0
d
dx
(xex) > 0
(C.64)
Therefore, these three functions strictly increase with their variable x, i.e. for any x1 > x2, f(x1) >
f(x2). Now, we can use the conditions µA > νA, µB > νB, and acquire:
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eµA+µB > eνA+νB
µAe
µA > νAe
νA
µBe
µB > νBe
νB
eµA − 1
µA
>
eνA − 1
νA
eµB − 1
µB
>
eνB − 1
νB
(C.65)
Therefore, we have proven that
QM2µµ
µAµB
− QM1νννAνB > 0, i.e.
∂Y a11
∂µA
6= ∂Y
b
11
∂µA
(C.66)
Similarly, one can show that
∂Y b11
∂µB
6= ∂Y
a
11
∂µB
(C.67)
Therefore, for any given intensities (νA, νB), the rate function R(µA, µB) is not smooth against the
two intensities (µA, µB).
Remark: Also, though not explicitly proven here - since νA, νB will affect not only Y
X,L
11 , but will
affect eX,U11 too, their derivatives will be a lot more complex than µA, µB - numerically we observed that
for any given (µA, µB), the rate function R(νA, νB) is actually not smooth against the two intensities
(νA, νB) either, and the ridge still appears at
µA
µB
= νAνB .
C.7 Local Search Algorithm
In this section we describe how to perform the optimization for the parameters, which is an indispensable
process in obtaining the optimal key rate. In addition, we also discuss the effect of inaccuracies and
fluctuations of the intensities and probabilities on the key rate, and show that our method is robust even
in the presence of inaccuracies and fluctuations of the parameters.
To provide a good key rate under finite-size effects, the optimal choice of parameters is an extremely
important factor in implementing the protocol. However, the 7-intensity protocol has an extremely large
parameter space of 12 dimensions, for which a brute-force search is next to impossible. To put into
context, a desktop PC (quad-core i7-4790k@4.0GHz) can evaluate the function R(~v) at approximately
105 parameter combinations ~v per second. But searching over a very crude 10-sample resolution for
each parameter would take over 4 months, and a 100-sample resolution for each parameter would take
3× 1011 years, a time longer than the age of the universe! Therefore, a local search algorithm must be
used to efficiently search the parameters in a reasonable time.
There have been studies to apply convex optimization to QKD e.g. in Ref. [62] to find the optimal
set of parameters and in Refs. [148, 149, 150] to bound the information leakage and secure key rate.
Here we start by adopting a local search algorithm for parameter optimization, proposed in Ref. [62],
called “coordinate descent” (CD), which requires drastically less time than using an exhaustive search.
Instead of performing an exhaustive search over the parameter space, we can descend along each axis at
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a time, and iterate over each axis in turn. For instance, suppose we currently iterate sA:
Ri+1 = max
sA∈(sAmin,sAmax)
R(sA, µ
i
A, ν
i
A, P
i
sA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA ,
siB, µ
i
B, ν
i
B, P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
=R(si+1A , µ
i
A, ν
i
A, P
i
sA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA ,
siB, µ
i
B, ν
i
B, P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
(C.68)
which freezes the other coordinates, and replaces sA with the optimal position on the current coordinate-
axis sA. In the next iteration the algorithm will descend along axis µA, etc., hence the name coordinate
descent. The search space satisfies that: the probabilities lie within (0, 1), and while the intensities
could be in principle larger than 1, typically that doesn’t provide a good key rate, so here we also
define the domain for all intensities as (0, 1). The decoy intensities also follow two additional constraints
µA > νA and µB > νB. The CD algorithm is able to reach the same optimal position as a gradient
descent algorithm (with descends along the gradient vector), the commonly used approach for parameter
optimization.
However, a significant limitation of coordinate descent is that it does not work correctly over functions
that have discontinuous first-order derivatives (which cause the gradient to be non-defined). For instance,
in the presence of a sharp “ridge” as in Fig.2 in the main text, any arbitrary point P on the ridge will
cause the CD algorithm to terminate incorrectly and fail to find the maximum point. Mathematically,
this is caused by the gradient being not clearly defined at a position where derivatives are discontinuous.
Therefore, coordinate descent does not work anymore for asymmetric MDI-QKD.
As we discussed above, such discontinuity of derivatives comes from the “ridge”, µAµB =
νA
νB
. Moreover,
we know that the optimal parameters must satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
. Therefore, here we propose to use polar
coordinate instead of Cartesian coordinate to perform coordinate descent, and jointly search µAµB and
νA
νB
.
In this way, we can make the rate vs parameter function smooth. We redefine ~v as:
~vpolar = [sA, sB, rµ, rν , θµν , PsA , PµA , PνA , PsB , PµB , PνB ] (C.69)
where
rµ =
√
µ2A + µ
2
B rν =
√
ν2A + ν
2
B
θµν = tan
−1(µA/µB) = tan−1(νA/νB)
(C.70)
In this way, the expression of Y L11 always takes the boundary value (and only has a single expression).
Therefore, when other parameters are fixed, R(θµν) is actually a smooth function, therefore by searching
over the parameters ~vpolar, we can successfully find the optimal parameters and maximum rate.
After converting to polar coordinates and jointly searching θµν , the coordinate descent algorithms
becomes:
Ri+1 = max
sA∈(sAmin,sAmax)
R(sA, s
i
B, r
i
µ, r
i
ν , θ
i
µν ,
P isA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA , P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
=R(si+1A , s
i
B, r
i
µ, r
i
ν , θ
i
µν ,
P isA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA , P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
(C.71)
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Additionally, when searching along each coordinate (for instance, fixing other parameters and search-
ing sA), we employ an iterative searching technique to further accelerate the algorithm, which starts out
with a coarse resolution and iteratively narrows the search region while increasing the resolution (this
is a similar technique as introduced in Ref. [62], but efficiently parallelized to utilize multi-threading on
modern PCs). For instance, we can start out with e.g. 100 samples within the (0, 1) region and evaluate
them in parallel. After the maximal point is found, we can then choose two neighbouring samples on
the left and right of the maximal point, and start a finer search among 10 more samples between them.
This process can be iterated until maximum value no longer changes significantly, or until the maximum
depth is reached. Such technique allows a search resolution that dynamically changes as needed (from
10−2 down to even 10−5, although in practice often 10−3 is sufficient), and it efficiently uses e.g. the 8
threads on a quad-core CPU, enabling fast and accurate optimization below 0.1s.
One more note is that, the key rate obtained by our method is in fact robust against small inaccuracies
in the parameters. For instance, for Point A3 (10km, 60km) in Table 5.3, if we round all parameters
to an accuracy of 0.001 (as shown in Table 5.4) and use it for simulation, we can still get 99.5% of the
optimal key rate 3.106 × 10−5, while rounding the parameters to 0.01 will still give us 93.0% of the
optimal key rate. In fact, even if we just keep one significant digit of each parameter, we can still get
47.6% of the optimal key rate. This would make it much easier for an experimental implementation of
our method, as the key rate is very forgiving of inaccuracies in the parameters, which makes a much less
stringent requirement on the intensity modulators and random number generators.
Note that, the above “accuracy” discusses how strict the requirement is for us to generate an in-
tensity/probability with its mean value close to the desired optimal value (e.g. limited by bits in the
random number generator or the accuracy of the intensity modulator), but we are still assuming we
have perfect knowledge of the variables we generate. In addition, here we would like to point out that
our conclusions remain unchanged, even in the presence of intensity fluctuations, or imprecision in the
intensity probabilities.
Firstly, the system is not very sensitive to the probabilities (since the partial derivatives with respect
to them are zero at the optimal points), so even if all signal and decoy probabilities are simultaneously
set 5% away from the optimal value (and we take the global worst-case key rate value among all possible
combinations of positive/negative deviation for each variable), the key rate will not significantly drop -
for instance for the (10km, 60km) case, one can still obtain 92.3% the ideal key rate (2.869×10−5 versus
3.106× 10−5) even with a 5% deviation for the probabilities.
Similarly, for intensity fluctuations, even if we add a 5% deviation to all intensities (again, taking
the (10km, 60km) case as an example) we can still get 73.1% the ideal key rate (2.270 × 10−5 versus
3.106 × 10−5). Moreover, one important point to note is that, intensity fluctuation is not a problem
unique to asymmetric MDI-QKD (or the new asymmetric protocol that we propose in this work). Even
if one uses prior protocols (such as the 4-intensity protocol), one would still obtain a significantly lower
key rate if taking intensity fluctuation into consideration, such as 39.9% the key rate (3.671 × 10−5
versus 9.206 × 10−6 with no fluctuation) at (0km, 50km), and zero key rate (versus 3.891 × 10−7 with
no fluctuation) at (10km, 60km). Therefore, the advantage of our method remains unchanged, even if
intensity fluctuations are considered.
Appendix C. Supplemental Information on Asymmetric MDI-QKD 151
C.8 Finite Size analysis
In this section we describe the finite-key analysis used in our simulations.
The analytical proofs in Appendix C.6 are shown for the asymptotic case. Numerically we show that
7-intensity protocol works effectively in the finite-key regime too, as can be observed in the main text
Fig. 5.5.
To account for finite-size effects, we perform a standard error analysis[86, 62], and estimate the
expected value 〈n〉 of an observable n by
n = n− γ√n ≤ 〈n〉 ≤ n+ γ√n = n (C.72)
where we define the upper and lower bound for an observable n as n and n. Here, γ is the number of
standard deviations the confidence interval of the observed value is from the expected value (for instance,
for a required failure probability of no more than  = 10−7, we should set γ = 5.3).
We can denote the observed counts as nXµi,µj , and error counts as m
X
µi,µj , where µi ∈ {µA, νA, ω},
µj ∈ {µB, νB, ω}. Then, the observed gain and error can be acquired from:
QXµi,µj =
nXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
TXµi,µj =
mXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
EXµi,µj =
TXµi,µj
QXµi,µj
(C.73)
where N is the total number of signals sent, and Pµi , Pµj are the probabilities for Alice and Bob to send
the respective intensities. Note that here we define the QBER in terms of error-gains:
TXµi,µj = Q
X
µi,µjE
X
µi,µj (C.74)
As described in Appendix C.6, we can define the key rate expression as [17, 86]:
R = PsPs{sAsBe−(sA+sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(C.75)
and the single-photon gain and error estimated by [58]:
Y X,L11 =
1
µA − νA (
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ )
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBTνν − eνATνω
−eνBTων + Tωω)
(C.76)
where QM1νν , Q
M2
µµ are linear combination terms of the observables
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
(C.77)
Now, with standard error analysis, we can define the upper and lower bounds for the gain and
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Table C.1: Simulation results of key rate estimated with independent-bounds versus joint-bounds, using
parameters in Table 5.2. The data points for independent-bounds correspond to the solid red curve in
Fig.5.5 (d). As can be seen, using joint-bounds for finite-size estimation can improve the key rate signif-
icantly. However, this will result in multiple maxima and cause instabilities in simulations. Therefore,
we have used independent-bounds throughout the main text.
LA LB Rindependent Rjoint
60km 10km 3.106× 10−5 6.714× 10−5
100km 50km 4.677× 10−11 7.568× 10−8
113km 63km 0 7.311× 10−10
error-gain:
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj + γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj − γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj + γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj − γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
(C.78)
Therefore, we have
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
Y X,L11 =
1
µA − νA (
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ )
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBTνν − eνATνω
−eνBTων + Tωω)
(C.79)
which we can use to substitute into Eq. C.75 to obtain the key rate under finite-size effects. (Note
that here QXωω takes the lower bound in both Q
M1
νν and Q
M2
µµ , because its overall coefficient is positive in
Y X,L11 ).
Note that, in Ref. [86], in addition to proposing the 4-intensity protocol, Zhou et al. have proposed
a “joint-bounds” finite-key analysis, which jointly considers the statistical fluctuations of observable
Gain and QBER. It is a tighter bound and can provide a higher rate than considering each observable’s
fluctuation independently as we’ve discussed above in this section (i.e. using “independent-bounds”). To
illustrate this, we perform a simple simulation of key rate versus distance plot, using independent-bounds
and joint-bounds (as well as using traditional 3-intensity protocol [62] for comparison). As can be seen in
Fig.C.6, 4-intensity protocol with joint-bounds analysis provides a higher rate than independent-bounds
(and both have higher rates than the 3-intensity protocol).
However, joint-bound analysis is based on linear optimization and sometimes brings multiple maxima
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Figure C.6: Rate vs distance (Alice to Bob) for symmetric case, for N = 1011 using parameters Y0 =
6.02 × 10−6, ηd = 14.5%, ed = 1.5%, a parameter set in Zhou et al.’s paper [86]. Here we compare the
traditional 3-intensity protocol as proposed in Ref.[62] (red solid line), and the 4-intensity protocol[86]
with independent-bound (blue solid line) and joint-bound analysis (blue dot-dash line). Reproduced
from [65] @2019 APS.
for R(~v), which is undesirable for local search, and will result in unpredictable behaviours (such as sudden
“jitters” in the resulting rate versus distance plot, as can be observed in the joint-bound plot in Fig.C.6.
Similar behavior is observed in Ref.[86] too).
Here just for comparison, we list in Table C.1 some example data points where we apply both
independent-bound and joint-bound analysis. As can be seen, using joint-bounds, we can indeed gain
a further improved key rate. However, this comes at the expense of not knowing whether we are
indeed at the global maximum or not, due to the existence of multiple maxima (and is not ideal for
comparing asymmetric/symmetric protocols, as the key rate estimated could be just local maxima for
both of them). Therefore, as the purpose of this work is to study asymmetric MDI-QKD, we focus on
independent-bounds throughout the main text.
Also, note that although we have used standard error-analysis for simplicity, our method here can in
principle be applied to finite-key analysis with composable security, too, such as using Chernoff bound
[96]. The key point is that (as explicitly demonstrated in Appendices B and C), the scaling of asymmetric
MDI-QKD key rate versus distances depends on the signal states (which performs a trade-off between
error-correction and single photon probability). The decoy states need to maintain balanced arriving
intensities at Charles, but only serve to estimate the single-photon contributions as accurately as possible,
whose asymptotic bounds are given by the infinite-data, infinite-decoy case. Adopting different finite-
key analysis (or no analysis at all, as in asymptotic case) affects the bounds on single photon gain and
QBER Y L11 and e
U
11. The finite-size case can be seen as the asymptotic case with correction terms (i.e.
imperfections) added to the privacy amplification, but its key rate will have a similar scaling property
as the asymptotic case. This means that the advantage of our method is independent of the finite-size
analysis model used (or lack thereof, in the asymptotic case).
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Table C.2: Simulation results of key rate between each pair of nodes in a MDI-QKD network, using
parameters from Table 5.2, N = 1011, and channels in main text Fig. 1(a). As can be seen, using
7-intensity protocol always provides higher rate than either using 4-intensity directly (which fails to
establish some connections) or using 4-intensity after adding fibre to each channel to accommodate
the longest channel (which results in an identical low rate for every connection - since every channel
equals the longest channel after adding fibre). 7-intensity protocol therefore enables high scalability and
reconfigurability because each link is independent of other links and no added fibre is needed.
Method A1-A3 A1-A4 A1-A5
4-intensity, add fibre 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10
4-intensity, direct 0 0 0
7-intensity, direct 1.97× 10−7 2.42× 10−7 2.77× 10−7
Method A3-A4 A3-A5 A4-A5
4-intensity, add fibre 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10
4-intensity, direct 2.41× 10−4 3.22× 10−4 5.77× 10−4
7-intensity, direct 2.48× 10−4 3.53× 10−4 5.87× 10−4
Figure C.7: ”Single-arm” MDI-QKD where Bob and Charles are both in the same lab, with Bob’s channel
having as little loss as possible. By optimizing intensities, we can achieve maximum distance (loss) in
the single channel between Alice and Charles, while enjoying the security of MDI-QKD. Reproduced
from [65] @2019 APS.
C.9 Single-Arm MDI-QKD
In the main text we have proposed a new type of “single-arm” MDI-QKD setup, which is the extremely
asymmetric case where one channel has high loss while the other channel has close to zero loss. In this
section we will describe it in more detail and outline its potential applications.
Suppose we have one crucial channel (e.g. a free-space channel, say in a satellite-ground connection,
or a ship-to-ship connection) through which we would like to send quantum signals. We would like to
prevent all attacks on the detector and improve the security with MDI-QKD, but cannot add a third
party in the middle of the free-space channel. In this case, it is possible to add another source Bob in
the laboratory (alongside Charles’ detectors, with as a small loss as possible in Bob-Charles channel),
and use it to interfere with the signals coming from Alice over the longer free-space channel, as shown
in Fig.C.7. With 7-intensity protocol, a high key rate can be generated from this extremely asymmetric
case, providing the security of MDI-QKD to a single channel where relays cannot be added while still
maintaining good performance.
If one uses 4-intensity protocol, Bob has to add a fibre similar in loss to that of the free-space
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Figure C.8: Simulations of “single-arm” MDI-QKD. We use parameters from Table 5.2, and setN = 1011.
The three lines are generated using 4-intensity protocol and adding fibre until LA = LB (black solid line),
using 4-intensity protocol but without being able to add fibre (black dashed line), and using 7-intensity
protocol directly (red dot-dash line). As can be seen, using 7-intensity protocol tremendously increases
the key rate and maximum distance for the longer single-arm. At R = 10−7, using 7-intensity protocol
(having maximum distance at 90km) increases maximum distance by 17.5 or 33.2km (or, 3.5 to 6.6dB
of loss) compared to 4-intensity with/without fibre, respectively. Reproduced from [65] @2019 APS.
channel (to maintain the symmetry), while as we’ve shown with 7-intensity protocol, Bob can simply
choose as small a loss as possible, and obtain maximum acceptable loss in Alice’s channel. Not only does
7-intensity protocol make such a highly asymmetric MDI-QKD possible, it actually provides a higher
rate compared to the symmetric case (if Bob adds a fibre). Moreover, since Alice’s channel loss might
be constantly changing, it can be very difficult to adjust an added fibre and maintain the symmetry;
thus, the convenience of not having to add any loss with 7-intensity protocol is a significant factor, too.
As we can observe in main text Fig. 5.5(a)(b), for the same required minimum rate, rather than
performing an experiment at (Lmax, Lmax), if we are free to adjust one channel (and want maximum
distance in the other channel), we can set the shorter channel to zero, and obtain a longer distance
in the other channel, e.g. (L′max, 0) with L
′
max > Lmax. For instance, in main text Fig. 5.5(a)(b),
choosing point B(102km, 0km) can extend the longer arm from 85km to 102km, from the symmetric
point A(85km, 85km) for the same R = 10−10.
Here we list the simulations results for single-arm MDI-QKD. To demonstrate the advantage, here we
study three-cases: using 4-intensity (but being able to add fibre until channels are symmetric), using 4-
intensity (however, due to being e.g. in a free-space channel or a dynamic network, without the luxury to
add fibres and compensate for the channels), and using 7-intensity directly on the asymmetric channels.
As can be seen in Fig.C.8, 7-intensity protocol provides better performance than both strategies using
4-intensity, and increases the maximum distance from 56.8km and 72.5km (respectively for adding/not
adding fibre) to 90km. Thus, our new protocol can enable a unique new application of providing the
security of MDI-QKD to a single channel where relays cannot be added (e.g. a free-space link), while
still maintaining high key rate.
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C.10 MDI-QKD Network Numerical Results
In this section we consider the channels from a real quantum network setup in Vienna, reported in
Ref.[54], and numerically show that using 7-intensity protocol can provide high-rate communication
between each pair of users, while previous protocols either fail to establish some connections in the
network, or suffer from a low key rate for all connections.
Here, we focus here on the high-asymmetry nodes in Ref.[54], A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, plotted in main
text Fig. 1(a), and consider the case where an untrusted relay is placed at A2. The topology here is a
commonly studied model of a star-type network, which is considered for QKD networks in [151, 152],
and is also the model for the MDI-QKD network experiment in Ref.[57]. Such a network can provide a
complete graph of connections between any two users, but only requires one physical connection from
each user. We show the simulation results in Table C.2, where using 7-intensity protocol consistently
provides high-rate connections even for nodes with very high asymmetry, and maintains the same (in
fact moderately higher) key rate for nodes that are near-symmetric, i.e. including a long channel doesn’t
affect the rate between pairs of existing shorter channels.
Being able to establish connections with arbitrarily placed new nodes without affecting existing nodes
is a very important property for a protocol to be used in a scalable and reconfigurable network, whose
links will obviously be, more often than not, asymmetric. For the 4-intensity protocol, to accommodate
the highest-loss channel, all connections will suffer from non-optimal key rate. Moreover, since new users
might be added/deleted dynamically, such adding-fibre strategy will have poor scalability, since each new
node affects the performance of all existing nodes, and also causes interruption of service when users
update their fibres. With 7-intensity protocol, we are completely free of the worries of asymmetry, and
can directly use the protocol on any channel combination optimally, so each node can be added/deleted
without affecting the rest. This greatly improves not only the key rate, but also the scalability of a
MDI-QKD network.
Appendix D
Supplemental Information on
Asymmetric TF-QKD
This Appendix contains supplemental information for Chapter 6.
D.1 Numerically Estimating Photon-Number Yields with Lin-
ear Programs
In this section we briefly describe the linear programming approach we used to estimate the upper
bounds for the photon-number yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) - which for simplicity here we will denote as
Ynm - which is the probability of obtaining a set of detection events kc, kd given that Alice and Bob
respectively sent nA, nB (or, n,m) photons. Such an approach has been widely discussed in literature
as in Refs.[94, 62, 96], and is also described in the simple TF-QKD proof paper [32]. We also used a
similar linear programming approach for some of the results in Ref. [65] Appendix E, but it was not
described in detail in that paper.
For simplicity, in this section we denote the observable gain in Z basis pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) as Qµi,µj
where µi = β
2
A and µj = β
2
B , and kc, kd are omitted (since the same expressions hold true for kc, kd =
(0, 1) or kc, kd = (1, 0), and we can substitute the observable data for each kc, kd respectively to obtain the
corresponding pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)). Also, as mentioned above, we denote the yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
as Ynm.
D.1.1 Linear Program Model
Following Ref.[17], the yields Ynm where Alice sends n photons and Bob sends m photons, satisfy the
constraints:
∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm = Q
Z
µiµj (D.1)
where the photon number distributions are Poissonian:
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Pµin = e
µi
µni
n!
Pµjm = e
µj
µmj
m!
(D.2)
Here, the right-hand-side constants QZµiµj are the “observables”, i.e. the gain and error-gain respec-
tively for the intensity combination µi, µj (which can be any intensity among the set of decoy intensities).
For the case of 3 decoys each for Alice and Bob, Equation (A.1) corresponds to 9 sets of constraints.
Using Equation (A.1) as linear constraints, and {Ynm} as variables, we can apply linear programming,
to maximize or minimize any linear combination of any of the variables (called an objective function) -
for instance, here we can run the linear program multiple times, each time acquiring the upper bound
for a given Ynm where (n,m) can be (0, 0), (2, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 2).
Note that, since there are infinitely many photon number states, to solve the linear program on an
actual computer, we have to perform a cut-off and discard higher-order terms with large photon numbers.
In practice we choose Scut = 10, such that a term is only discarded when both n ≥ 10 and m ≥ 10. For
the discarded terms, we can either set them to zero (for lower bounds) or 1 (for upper bounds).∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≥
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm
∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm +
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
) (D.3)
Therefore, in practice, the linear constraints can be written as:
QZµiµj −
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
)
≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≤ QZµiµj (D.4)
with the additional constraint on variables:
0 ≤ Ynm ≤ 1 (D.5)
The linear program is run multiple times, each time maximizing a given Ymn, where (n,m) can be
(0, 0), (2, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 2).
D.1.2 Finite-Size Effects
In this subsection we consider finite-size effects for the privacy amplification process. Because of the
statistical fluctuations, the observables (gains) we obtain in the Z basis might deviate from their respec-
tive expected values, which will lie within a certain “confidence interval” around the observed values.
Here we will perform a standard error analysis, similar to that in [62, 86, 65], which is meant to be a
straightforward estimation of the performance of TF-QKD under asymmetry and with practical data
size, but not as a rigorous proof for composable security.
Consider a random variable, whose observed value is n; we can bound its expected value 〈n〉 with
the upper and lower bounds
n = n− γ√n ≤ 〈n〉 ≤ n+ γ√n = n (D.6)
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with a confidence (success probability) of erf(γ/
√
2), where γ is the number of standard deviations
the confidence interval lies above and below the observed value, and erf is the error function. In the
simulations we consider a security failure probability of  = 10−7, which means we should set γ ≈ 5.3.
In the Z basis, let us denote the observed counts for a given intensity setting {µi, µj} as nZµi,µj , which
satisfies
nZµi,µj = Q
Z
µi,µj × (NPµiPµj ) (D.7)
where N is the total number of signals sent and Pµi , Pµj are the probabilities for Alice and Bob to
respectively choose intensities µi and µj . By applying Equation (A.6), we can acquire the upper and
lower bounds to QZµi,µj :
QZµiµj = Q
Z
µiµj + γ
√
QZµiµj
NPµiPµj
QZµiµj = Q
Z
µiµj − γ
√
QZµiµj
NPµiPµj
(D.8)
Then, we can substitute them into the upper and lower bounds in the linear program when estimating
Ynm:
QZµiµj −
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
)
≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≤ QZµiµj (D.9)
which loosens the bounds and will result in a slightly higher upper bound for Ynm (which is understand-
able, since we expect a lower key rate with finite-size effect considered). Similar linear programs for
finite-size decoy-state have also been considered in Ref. [94].
Note that, although here we only consider a standard error analysis, in principle our results in
this paper are applicable to e.g. composable security using Chernoff’s bound [96]. The key point is,
the dependence on channel asymmetry, and the compensation for asymmetry using intensities, are only
relevant in the X basis (signal states). The asymptotic case (with infinite decoys, where only signal states
are relevant) therefore defines the fundamental scaling of key rate versus asymmetric channels, and all
types of finite size analysis on the decoy states (e.g. using standard error analysis, using Chernoff’s
bound [96], or adding a “joint bounds” analysis to tighten the bounds on statistical fluctuation and
obtain a higher key rate [86], versus not considering finite-size effects at all and assuming the asymptotic
key rate [25, 29, 30, 32, 31], i.e. assuming expected values of the gain and QBER to be identical to
observed values in experiment) can be viewed of as correction terms (imperfections) on the yields and
the key rate in the asymptotic limit. Our method is only related to the signal states and their intensities
in the X basis, and is in principle always applicable regardless of the type of decoy-state analysis (e.g.
the number of decoys) and the finite-size analysis used, as long as the Z basis is decoupled from the X
basis.
With finite-size effect considered, the optimizable parameters for TF-QKD now include
[sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA ,
sB , µB , νB , PsB , PµB , PνB , ]
(D.10)
where the implicit parameters are ωA, ωB (which for simplicity we assume to be zero), and PωA =
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1 − PsA − PµA − PνA and similarly PωB = 1 − PsB − PµB − PνB , and the choice of signal states sA, sB
versus the decoy states automatically implies basis choice, too. The above parameters are optimized
using the same coordinate descent algorithm as described in Ref. [65]. In Figure 6.5, the dot-dash line
(fully asymmetric) optimizes all 12 parameters, while the dashed line (signal-only asymmetric) optimizes
only 7 parameters (where all parameters except sA, sB are identical for Alice and Bob):
[sA, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν , sB , µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν ] (D.11)
Performing coordinate descent on key rate versus parameters while estimating the yields with linear
programming is rather CPU-intensive. We have used a 40-core (80-thread) machine (a single compute
node in the Niagara supercomputer [138], each node with dual 20-core Intel Skylake CPUs) to generate
Figure 6.5, where the OpenMP multithreading library is used to parallelize the coordinate descent
algorithm (to accelerate the search along each coordinate). The details of the algorithm can be found
in Ref. [65, 62]. Also, we used Gurobi [128], a commercial linear program solver, to solve the linear
programming models. Linear programs sometimes introduce multiple maxima, which means a local
search on parameters sometimes might get trapped in a local maximum. To alleviate this, we can start
a local search from multiple random starting points, and pick the largest search result, which can be
viewed as a form of global search. (In principle, we can permutate the search results and perform
multiple iterations of random search using e.g. an evolution algorithm [153], but here using one iteration
with multiple random starting points is usually sufficient in finding a good key rate).
Appendix E
Supplemental Information for
Machine Learning in QKD
This Appendix contains supplemental information for Chapter 7.
E.1 Lookup Table
As an alternative solution for devices with hardware limitations (very little CPU power and no GPU/AI-
chip) or software limitations (libraries unsupported on the platform) that prevent them from directly
running a neural network, it is still possible to get a speedup, by using a pre-generated lookup table of
optimal parameters. For instance, for 4-intensity MDI-QKD, we can set a 100 point resolution to Y0,
ed, and N , and 100 points from LBC = 0 − 200km. This will result in a total of 1 × 108 data points
that need to be calculated. Such a task is only possible with the parallelizable nature of the neural
network, and the immense parallel processing power of the GPU. Predicting all the data points with
a neural network on a desktop GPU would take an estimated time of 25 minutes. On the other hand,
the local search algorithm takes 6 hours to generate the 4 × 105 training data alone, and would take
as many as two months to sample all 1 × 108 input sets. The fast generation of such a lookup table is
possible because we only take a small random sample (4 × 105) in the 4-dimensional input space, and
use the neural network to learn the overall function shape with these data. Afterwards, once we have
“learned” the function, we can predict (or, intuitively, interpolate) all the 1× 108 points over the entire
input parameter space with ease.
In Table E.1 we show a simple time benchmarking of the neural network inference and pre-generated
lookup table versus local search algorithm on different devices including a powerful desktop PC and two
models of low-power single board computers, for the 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol. We can see that
although using a lookup table is slower than directly running a neural network, it still has a significant
advantage over local search on a CPU. This means that, the lookup table method is ideal for systems
with extremely limited computing power or with software/hardware restrictions that prevent them from
running a neural network (for instance, the Raspberry Pi 0W system has an older armv6 architecture,
and neither Intel compute stick nor tensorflow are officially supported on the platform). The lookup
table can be generated using a neural network running on a GPU on a desktop computer first, and
stored on a mobile system to check when needed. Note that, this does not contradict a neural network’s
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Table E.1: Time benchmarking of using local search algorithm versus using neural network (NN) infer-
ence and using a pre-generated lookup table, for the 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol. The desktop PC
has an Intel i7-4790k quad-core CPU (with 16GB of RAM) and an Nvidia Titan Xp GPU. The single-
board computers are a Raspberry Pi 3 with a quad-core CPU (with 1GB of RAM), and a Raspberry Pi
Zero W with a single-core CPU (with 500MB of RAM). As can be seen, on the single-board computers,
using a pre-generated lookup table is slower than directly using a neural network for inference, but it is
still significantly faster than performing local search on CPU. By pre-generating a lookup table offline
(e.g. on a desktop PC with GPU) and storing them on devices, we can still gain 15-25 times faster speed
over local search on low-power devices, making the method suitable for devices where directly running
neural networks is not feasible.
Device Local search NN Lookup table
Desktop PC with GPU 0.1s 0.5-1.0ms 0.05s
Raspberry Pi 3 3-5s 2-3ms 0.2s
Raspberry Pi 0W 11-14s N/A 0.5s
necessity, but rather is one of its applications, since only with a neural network can we possibly generate
a lookup table over such a large parameter space.
Nonetheless, such a database would take up more storage resource (generating, for instance, a 100-
point resolution lookup table for 4-intensity MDI-QKD would take up roughly 2.4GB of space (assuming
single-precision floating point of 4 bytes is used for each output parameter), which we can choose to divide
into 10 smaller tables, each taking up 240MB space, to avoid loading the entire table in memory), for
such low-power devices, storage space is a lot cheaper than the extremely-limited CPU and memory
resource (for instance, Raspberry Pis can read SD cards, which can easily have 64-256GB of storage
space), and using small but many databases, they can be quickly loaded in parts into Raspberry Pi’s
memory, too.
Therefore, here we show a simple solution to find optimal parameters using a lookup table pre-
generated by a neural network offline, such that a speedup of up to 15-25 times can still be gained over
running local search on a low-power device, even when directly running a neural network on the device
is infeasible due to either hardware or software restrictions.
